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Why is state-building more advanced in some sub-Saharan African countries than 
in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady declines, or gains 
followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-building trajectories of Africa’s 
states? This dissertation endeavors to shed light on these questions by assessing the 
impact of one suspected cause of state-building variation: the way power is distributed 
among states and their neighbors. Specifically, this dissertation assesses whether the 
relative distribution of power provides incentives or disincentives to regimes in charge of 
states to pursue policies that are conducive or detrimental to state-building. Employing 
OLS, two hypotheses are tested: one which predicts that regimes in charge of relatively 
weak states promote policies conducive to state-building, and another which predicts that 
regimes in charge of relatively weak states opt for a strategy of personal rule that runs 
counter to the imperatives of state-building. Findings are mixed and often contingent 
upon how state-building is measured; when state-building is assessed in terms of how 
 
 
proficiently the state regulates social and economic life, provides infrastructure services 
to its population, and promotes human development, support is found for the latter 
hypothesis. Yet when state-building is measured in terms of how well the state 
monopolizes the legitimate use of force or forges convergence between nations and the 
state,  no statistically significant relationship in either direction is found. Thus, while 
there is at least some evidence that the regional distribution of power impacts the state-

































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 










Professor William L. Reed III, Chair 
Professor David Cunningham 
Professor Kurt Finsterbusch 
Professor John McCauley 











I would like to express gratitude to my friends and family for their support as I worked on 



























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................1 
The State of Africa’s States .................................................................................................1 
The Research Question and Puzzle ......................................................................................3 
What Does “State-Building” Mean, & How do We Know it When We See it? .................5 
Explaining When, Where, How, & Why State-Building Succeeds or Fails ......................27 
Conclusion and an Outline of Chapters 2-5 .......................................................................37 
CHAPTER 2 ......................................................................................................................40 
Introduction: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power ....................................40 
Altering the Agency-Structure Dynamic: Charles Tilly and Interstate War ......................42 
The Agency-Structure Dynamic in the Twenty-First Century Global South ....................48 
Revising Tilly: Relative Power and State-Building in the Twenty-First Century .............60 
Summary and Conclusion ..................................................................................................82 
CHAPTER 3 ......................................................................................................................84 
Introduction: Testing the Link Between Relative Power & State-Building ......................84 
The Research Design .........................................................................................................85 
The Procedure and Results...............................................................................................102 
Assessing the Relationship Between Relative Power and State-Building .......................112 
Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................................116 
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................118 
Introduction: Relative Power & State-Building Revisited: Does Context Matter? .........118 
Uncovering the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building .......119 
The Procedure and Results...............................................................................................123 
Assessing the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building ..........143 
Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................................157 
iv 
 
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................................................158 
How & Why Relative Power Impacts State-Building: Theory & Findings .....................159 
Pathways for Future Research in the Area of State-Building ..........................................162 
Policy Implications of the Dissertation’s Findings ..........................................................170 
Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................................171 
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................172 
Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3 ............................................................................172 
A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3 ............................176 
Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4 ............................................................................177 
A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4 ............................187 




















1.0  The State of Africa’s States 
In June of 2011 Foreign Policy magazine, in collaboration with The Fund for Peace, 
released its seventh annual Failed States Index assessment. The contents of the index 
were predictable; of the 12 states most in danger of failing, eight were African. 
Moreover, not a single African state received an assessment higher than “borderline,” 
with most scoring either “in danger” or “critical.”
1
 The problems facing Africa’s states 
are well-known and to a large degree similar across borders. The continent is dominated 
by weak, illegitimate rulers whose powerbases are often composed entirely of members 
of their own ethnic groups. Domestic needs often go unmet, due either to 
misappropriation of resources or a legitimate inability of the national economies to 
generate sufficient revenue. Political instability, decrepit or altogether-absent 
infrastructure, weak institutions, and the proliferation of disease are a handful of the usual 
consequences. 
 Numerous development statistics bear out the above characterization of Africa’s 
states. In 2009, despite having received nearly 900 billion dollars in official development 
assistance since 1970,
2
  African states south of the Sahara desert had an average life 
expectancy of 53.5 years, a literacy rate of 66 percent, a GDP per capita of 922 dollars 
(compared to a GDP per capita of 37,016 dollars in the United States) and were able to 
provide just 32 percent of the members of their populations with access to a sanitary 
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means of human waste disposal.
3
 Moreover, despite both a larger military expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP between 1988 and 2009 than any other region save for the Middle 
East, as well as the deployment of tens of thousands of international peacekeeping troops, 
military observers, civilian police and staff per year, sub-Saharan African states remain 
the world’s most internally fragmented.
4
  
Yet, while every sub-Saharan African state faces serious political, economic, and 
human development challenges, it would be a mistake to view the continent as a 
monolith; there is, in fact, considerable variation between the strength of its states. On 
one extreme lie states like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the 
former with an internationally recognized government that controls at best a handful of 
city blocks, and the latter whose vast territory and dearth of roads make the projection of 
power far beyond the capital city impossible.
5
 On the other end of the continuum are 
states like Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. While by no means problem-free, these 
states maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force within their borders (arguably 
meeting the minimum threshold of stateness) and have relatively good records when it 
comes to redistributing resources to their populations. Botswana, for example, has 
avoided the resource curse and parlayed revenue generated from its primary export – 
diamonds – into an 84 percent literacy rate, an infant mortality rate lower than that of all 
but four sub-Saharan countries, the provision of clean water to 95 percent of its 
                                                 
3
 These statistics were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators datasets, found at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
4
 Data on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, available between 1988 and 2009, comes from 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and can be found at: http://www.sipri.org/databases. 
Data on troop, military observer, civilian police and staff data can be found at: 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko 
5
 For an account of the impact of geography and population disbursement on state-building, see: Jeffrey 
Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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population, and a GDP per capita over four times the continent average.
6
 And just as the 
range is broad between Africa’s weakest and strongest states, there is considerable 
variation in the strength of the states that fall somewhere in between. 
1.1  The Research Question and Puzzle 
The fact that the African continent is not a monolith but rather composed of states 
occupying various positions on a state-strength continuum begs the question: to what can 
this variation be attributed? Why is state-building more advanced in some countries than 
in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady declines, or gains 
followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-building trajectories of Africa’s 
states?
7
  The objective of this dissertation is to offer some answers to these questions by 
focusing on one suspected cause of state-building variation – the relative distribution of 
power. To that end, the dissertation will assess whether the way power is distributed 
among states and their neighbors provides incentive or disincentive to regimes in charge 
of states to pursue policies that are conducive or detrimental to state-building.   
What makes the puzzle of sub-Saharan Africa’s state-building variation more 
interesting (and allows for an apples-to-apples comparison) is that Africa’s sub-Saharan 
states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and 
continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Of the sub-
Saharan countries that were colonized (and all but two were), nearly 80 percent became 
                                                 
6
 These statistics were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators datasets, found at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
7
  To illustrate this, using numbers taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators datasets, 
consider the extent to which a state’s citizens have access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities 
– two measures of infrastructure development, which is itself one measure of state strength. Over an 18 
year period, beginning in 1990, Malawi saw the percentage of people with access to improved sanitation 
facilities rise consistently from 42 percent to 56 percent, and the percentage of people with access to clean 
water rise from 40 percent to 80 percent; in contrast, over the same period, the percentage of people in 
Sudan with  access to clean water fell consistently from 65 percent to 57 percent, and the percentage of 
people with access to improved sanitation facilities remained essentially unchanged at 34 percent.    
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independent over the eight-year period of 1960 – 1968. And although the Europeans 
administered their respective colonies somewhat uniquely,
8
 colonialism impacted in 
many similar ways every state that emerged following the bestowment of independence.
9
 
Today, many African states continue to be characterized by economies that are burdened 
by low levels of development and rely on the export of competition-plagued primary 
products, a public sector with poor leadership and weak bureaucracies, and societies that 
to varying degrees identify with their respective ethnic or regional members rather than 
with the state. Yet over the last 50 years, despite economic, political, and social 
headwinds, some states and their leaders have made meaningful advances in state-
                                                 
8
 For a very good overview of the colonial powers’ philosophical and ideological reasons for selecting 
either an indirect or centralized method of governing their colonies, see Crawford Young, The African 
Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 149-154. For an 
explanation that relies less on ideology and more on the facts on the ground – namely demographics, 
population density, and socio-economic status – see A. L. Adu, “Post-Colonial Relationships,” African 
Affairs 66, no. 265 (1967): 296-297. 
9
 Crawford Young nicely captures the fundamental nature of colonialism with a quote from a French 
spokesman in 1912: “That the colonies are made for the metropolis, for the many and varied advantages 
that the metropolis may draw from them, is evident: if colonies, the foundation of which nearly always 
costs the metropolis so much money and sacrifices and which exposes them to such great risks, were not 
made to serve those metropoles, they would have no raison d’etre, and one cannot see by what aberration 
civilized states would dispute them with so much rude jealousy,” taken from Crawford Young, The African 
Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 97.  See also Rene 
Lemarchand, “Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife,” in The Politics of Ethnic 
Conflict Regulation, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (London: Routledge, 1993) for an account of 
the devastating post-colonial impact of the Europeans’ divide and rule policies. See William A. Munro, 
“Power, Peasants and Political Development: Reconsidering State Construction in Africa,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 38, no. 1 (1996): 124-131 for an account of the colonial powers’ incursions 
into the African countryside and the lasting impact on patterns of local authority, stratification, property 
rights, and the division of labor. And see Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The 
Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African Affairs 97 (1998): 329-341 for an argument claiming that the 
colonial legacy is one of “bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client relations, and a complex 
dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and competition…making the full-scale development of both 
capitalism and the nation-state difficult, if not unlikely.” Finally, for an account of some of the Europeans’ 
less harmful enduring contributions – advancements in literacy, a unifying national language, the 
incorporation of Africa into the independent state system, medical advances, and the introduction of a civil 
service – see: A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 95-98; R. Hunt Davis, “Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History,” 
African Affairs 72, no. 289 (1973): 387-389; and Robert J. Cummings, “Africa Between the Ages,” African 
Studies Review 29, no. 2 (1986): 8.   
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building while others have foundered. In a nutshell, the objective of this project is to shed 
new light on why. 
1.2  What Does “State-Building” Mean and How Do We Know it When We See it? 
Before moving forward, an explanation of what is meant by “state-building” is in order. 
The concept is ambiguous and has been used inconsistently in the literature. Variations 
on “state-building” – state craft, state formation, stateness, state-strength, et cetera – are 
used at times synonymously, and at times to refer to entirely different phenomena. 
Perhaps most common is confusion regarding the use of state-building and nation-
building; some scholars (and policy-makers) use these terms interchangeably, whereas 
others contend that nation-building is just one component part of a larger state-building 
process.
10
 Still others argue that the actual objective of the developing countries is nation-
destroying rather than nation-building.
11
 There is also disagreement about what should be 
emphasized in a definition of state-building. For example, is it reasonable to take into 
account the form of government when assessing a state’s position on a state-building 
continuum? That is, should democratic states be considered more advanced simply 
because they are democratic? Or, in defining and measuring state-building, should 
primacy be given to what a state produces in actual results – say, its ability to monopolize 
force within its territory (given that this is perhaps the most basic expectation of a state)? 
In other words, what matters? And even when there is general agreement about what 
should be included in a definition of state-building, there are often disputes over proper 
                                                 
10
 Karin von Hippel, for example, begins her article on external intervention and democracy promotion by 
writing that nation-building “really means state-building,” – a claim with which many state-building and 
nation-building scholars would disagree. In Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed 
Commitment to Nation Building,” The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 96.  
11
 Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24, no.3 (1972): 336. What 
Walker Connor refers to as “nation-destroying” is elsewhere referred to as “nation-building” – that is, 
attempting to form a convergence between the state and the various nations which reside inside its territory.  
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measurement. Consider the critical need for all states to acquire the capacity to 
accumulate revenue. All states need money to pay for basic state activities, but should the 
source of a state’s revenue matter? Should a state that relies on foreign aid or on a 
handful of enclaves within its territory to fund its activities be considered as strong as a 
state that depends on the successful, broad taxation of its population? Unfortunately, 
muddied, narrow, and inconsistent definitions and measurements have made theory-
building difficult as scholars talk passed one another and develop apples-to-oranges 
explanations regarding what matters when it comes to “state-building.”  
1.2a  The Challenge of Defining State-Building 
The primary impediment to reaching a consensus on a meaningful definition of state-
building is, logically, a lack of consensus on what exactly is expected of a state and how 
it is expected to go about meeting those expectations. The Montevideo Convention, 
signed in 1933, articulated just four vague criteria necessary for statehood under 
international law: states were required to possess a defined territory, a population, a 
government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Convention 
was quiet on what was expected of government vis-à-vis the population residing inside 
the territory of the state. Moreover, as Karin von Hippel notes, while the four criteria 
specified in the Montevideo Convention are necessary for the initial recognition of a new 
state, their weakening or disappearance later does not require that the international 
community rescind its recognition of statehood.
12
 In fact, the development of 
international norms protecting juridical sovereignty and non-intervention have allowed 
for even defunct “quasi-states” that have lost control over their territory and prey on their 
                                                 
12
  Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” The 
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 108.  
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populations rather than provide political goods to exist indefinitely.
13
 While at one time 
the majority of states failed and disappeared – and were allowed to do so – today 
international law prohibits the annexation and incorporation by the strong of even the 
world’s most hapless states.
14
  
Looking to international law for an account of the expectations of states provides, 
for reasons laid out above, only minimal and general guidance in developing a definition 
of state-building. Yet, while international law has continued to cleave to the four very 
general requirements laid out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, international norms 
have evolved in such a way as to expand the areas of public and private life over which 
states are expected to exercise jurisdiction.
15
 This supplementation to the Montevideo 
Convention includes not only an expansion of what states ought to do, but what they have 
come to be expected to do – both by fellow states (or, at the very least, those in the 
Global North) and by their own populations. To illustrate this point, Thomas, Meyer, 
Ramirez, and Boli chronicle the expansion of state jurisdiction, organization, and 
authority between 1870 and 1970. They find that states, once primarily responsible for 
national defense and the regulation of trade, have come to be expected to provide a wide 
array of services to their populations that promote human development and go well 
beyond the mere provision of security.
16
 The evolution of the British state provides a 
good, if not exaggerated, example of the expansion of the state and the extent to which 
the normative justness of the state’s role in society has become all but taken for granted. 
                                                 
13
 See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
14
 Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 124. 
15
 For a very good elaboration on this point and an examination of the evolution of views about statehood, 
see Thomas D. Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,” Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 37, no. 2 (1999). 
16
 George M. Thomas et al., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1987), 
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Comparing budget presentations delivered in Britain in 1853 and 2007, Ghani and 
Lockhart show how state obligations ballooned from a minimalist commitment to the 
payment of the military and public debt in 1853, to a broad public spending agenda aimed 
at advancing human development, social welfare, and social justice in 2007.
17
 Indeed, the 
2011 street demonstrations throughout Europe in response to debt-plagued governments 
peeling back their welfare states, the Arab Spring revolts fuelled by populations fed up 
with the inability or unwillingness of their leaders to affect human and economic 
development, and the April 2011 uprising in Uganda sparked by the government’s failure 
to ease the impact of rising commodity prices demonstrate – looking at just the first six 
months of 2011 – the expansive role that populations have come to expect the state to 
play in their lives. Key to all of this – and it is the central argument made in the work of 
Thomas et al. – is that the expanded expectations of state behavior are exogenous to any 




                                                 
17
 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 118-
120. 
18
 In addition to the advancement of economic and human development – and perhaps as or more difficult 
for many states in the Global South - Thomas et al. note that, today, states are also expected to incorporate 
their populations by way of legal citizenship. Yet, writing in 1987, Thomas et al. note that, once citizenship 
has been extended, states may legitimately do as they please with their populations without the fear of 
external intervention. In 2013, of course, even this is no longer true as states are now expected to not only 
incorporate their populations, but to do so without committing human rights violations. The international 
norm of non-intervention that long protected states guilty of committing human rights violations has since 
been significantly weakened. A selective reading of the U.N. Charter coupled with the argument that states 
guilty of human rights abuses implicitly surrender their right to sovereignty has been used to justify 
external intervention. For elaboration, see: Iain Atack, “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” 
Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002), and Julie Mertus, “Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Imperative for 
Intervention in Kosovo,” Human Rights Review 1, no. 2 (2000). For a very good discussion of evolving 
international human rights norms and an account of how states were, as late at the 20
th
 century, permitted to 
employ population transfer as a means of population/citizenship engineering, see: Jennifer Jackson Preece, 
“Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal 
Norms,” Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1998). 
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The preceding paragraphs have made headway in shining light on the question of 
what is expected of states by looking to international law and international norms. Only 
with a thorough understanding of what is expected of states can a meaningful definition 
of state-building be created. Yet context matters, and some academics and political elite 
contend that the evolving and growing expectations put upon states exceed what those in 
the Global South can reasonably be expected to meet.
19
 To take Karel Vasak’s three 
generations of human rights as an example, it is difficult to expect states in the Global 
South to guarantee their populations the “luxuries” of environmentally-friendly 
development or the allocation of resources to preserve and promote cultural heritage – 
third-generation rights – while these states still struggle to provide life-sustaining first 
and second-generation rights. Moreover, the nature or degree of appropriate and desirable 
state intervention is contextual even if what is expected of states is not. While all states, 
for example, are expected to promote the medical well-being of their populations (the 
expectation), there is no single method by which every state is expected to do so; just as 
the British would not agree to swap their government-heavy National Health Service for 
the United States’ current model, there is no political support in the United States for 
healthcare reform that involves anywhere near the role that government plays in the 
British N.H.S. And finally, just as there is disagreement among academics, policy-
makers, activists, and populations on the question of how much ought to be expected of 
states, and no consensus on precisely how a state should go about meeting expectations, 
there is also dispute over whether or when ends can be said to justify means. Take, for 
                                                 
19
 See Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 1995).  Ayoob notes that the young states in the Global South are pressured to rapidly and peacefully 




example, the normative-positivist debate on the value of democratic governance. 
Particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, pressure has been put on states to respect 
civil liberties and democratize (or, at the very least, indicate an intention to move in that 
direction). Yet a reasonable argument can be made that necessary pre-conditions for 
successful democratization do not currently exist in much of the Global South. Charles 
Tilly captures the essence of the problem as follows: “Beyond a very small scale, no 
democracy survives in the absence of substantial governmental capacity."
20
 
Piggybacking on Tilly, Thomas Carothers contends that recent, optimistic thinking on 
democratization is flawed because it assumes high-capacity states. In fact, where states 
are not strong but characterized by insecurity, internal conflict, and a precarious hold on 
power by elites, Carothers writes that “the core impulses and interests of power holders – 
such as locking in access to power and resources as quickly as possible – run directly 
contrary to what democracy-building would have required.”
21
  Worse still is the 
possibility that premature democratization could exacerbate problems in the Global South 
and actually retard rather than advance state-building progression.
22
 The African state, for 
example, has been described as “an association of individuals and a community of 
communities.”
23
 Competition more frequently occurs between communities – ethnic, 
regional, religious – than individuals or policy-centered political parties, and is too often 
played out in a zero-sum fashion. Indeed, African political liberalization has typically 
                                                 
20
 Charles Tilly, “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization,” Sociological Theory, 18, no. 1 (2000): 6. 
21
 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 8. 
22
 Admittedly, this is also an argument frequently made by despots who seek for selfish reasons to avoid 
democratization. See Thomas Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 
(2007). Carothers balances the legitimate need for a capable, effective state with the fear that elites will 
selfishly postpone indefinitely a move toward democracy by recommending gradual democratization rather 
than waiting until all optimal preconditions are entirely in place.  
23
 Richard Joseph, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives,” 
Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 366. 
11 
 
spawned enormous numbers of political parties oriented not around policy platforms, but 
sectarian differences.
24
 Generally, democracy militates against zero-sum games; elected 
leaders must think twice before wielding power in a zero-sum fashion lest they lose the 
next election and find themselves subject to the will of the formerly oppressed.
25
 Yet this 
logic holds only if future elections are guaranteed. In fact, belief in the certainty of 
“another chance” is understandably lacking in many of Africa’s nascent democracies. 
The fear that winners will rule despotically and deprive losers of political, economic, and 
civil rights remains, according to Samual Makinda, “one of the abiding problems of 
political evolution in Africa.”
26
 Given the political and social realities in much of the 
Global South, a push by outsiders to uniformly link state legitimacy at the international 
level with democratic governance might be counterproductive; not only are important 
preconditions absent in many states, but premature democratization has the capacity to 
further pull nations within a state apart rather than forge a convergence between nations 
and the state. Context matters and internal dynamics vary by state. For this reason, when 
assessing “what states are expected to do,” it may be wise not to overemphasize means 
relative to ends; if State-A meets particular human and economic development goals as 
successfully as State-B, yet is less democratic, relies on greater state involvement vis-à-
vis free market principles (another developing international norm), or opts for any other 
method that may run counter to prevailing or developing international norms, it does not 
                                                 
24
 Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 1 
(1997): 79. 
25
 Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense” in The Democracy Sourcebook, 
eds. Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 13. 
26
 Samual M. Makinda, “Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 34, no. 4 (1996): 567. 
12 
 
necessarily make sense to score State-A any lower than State-B merely because of the 
means by which State-A reaches the ends that are expected of it. 
The objective of the pages above has been to examine the evolving debate over 
what is expected of states (all states – because they are states) with the aim of putting 
together a complete and meaningful definition of “state-building.” Yet problems abound. 
International law makes statehood contingent upon just a handful of broad conditions and 
therefore provides only minimal guidance in developing a definition of state-building. 
And the sheer breadth of established, nascent, and as of yet unrealized but desired norms 
that reflect what is (or ought to be) expected of states – both means and ends – adds 
significant substance, but risks both diluting the definition of state-building and 
obfuscating what are the most critically important tasks a state must perform. The key, 
then, is to identify a sufficiently broad, but not too broad, core set of most critically 
important tasks a state must carry out, and the way I propose to do so is by looking to the 
conditions that give rise to state failure and collapse. The logic of this approach is very 
simple: if state failure or collapse is the worst possible outcome for states and their 
populations, it makes sense to classify as “most critical” the tasks carried out by states 
that militate against failure or collapse.
27
 Looking to what states must do to avoid failure 
or collapse provides a meaningful assessment of what are the most critical state activities 
(all states – regardless of context) and can be used to develop an equally meaningful and 
substantive definition of state-building. 
                                                 
27
 “State failure” and “state collapse” are not synonyms; state collapse is often used to refer to an even 
worse condition that follows state failure. Additionally, some might quibble with the claim that state failure 
or collapse is the worst possible outcome for states and their populations. Conceivably, failure or collapse 
could be a blessing for persecuted segments of the population as they might come to find themselves 
beyond the reach of a weakened state. However, in most other cases, the melting away of the state or its 
devolvement into criminal, predatory behavior makes life significantly more difficult for its population.   
13 
 
1.2b  The Imperatives of the State 
The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security:  Robert Rotberg correctly 
writes that states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their 
populations. As a result, these populations eventually come to regard both their 
governments and states as illegitimate and turn instead to non-state actors.
28
 Perhaps the 
most important political good a state provides is the provision of security. Indeed this was 
recognized by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes over 350 years ago. Hobbes 
contends that groups of people come together and willingly surrender individual rights to 
government on the condition that it insulate them from the state of nature – one which 
Hobbes famously classified as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Where states have 
lost either the capacity or willingness to provide security, the human toll has been 
devastating; a recent article in the New York Times reports on a study measuring the rate 
of rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo – by all accounts a failed state with a 
minimal government presence in much of the country – at one rape every minute.
29
 
Where the state loses control over segments of its territory it naturally becomes 
impossible to guarantee the security of its population. In such cases, citizens rationally 
transfer loyalty away from the state and look to sectarian sub-state leaders to fill the 
vacuum.
30
 The case of Laurent Nknuda, a former Tutsi rebel leader in eastern-Congo, and 
the region’s Tutsi minority illustrates this point nicely. With Tutsi in the anarchic eastern 
portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo threatened by an absence of government 
                                                 
28
 Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 
(2002): 85. 
29
 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Congo Study Sets Estimate for Rapes Much Higher,” The New York Times, 11 May 
2011. 
30




protection and marauding militia (those Congolese Tutsi with means crossed the border 
each night to sleep in Rwanda),
31
 Nkunda led a rebel group – aimed ostensibly at the 
protection of Tutsis – that at one point looked strong enough to threaten the central 
government in Kinshasa. 
The Regulation of Social and Economic Life:  Just as states must provide security 
to militate against failure, they must also regulate social and economic life. Effective 
states adopt and implement rules and regulations that protect their populations from the 
dangers that come with industry, commerce, urbanization, and the inevitability of 
asymmetrical information in the marketplace. They lay the necessary groundwork for 
markets to function effectively, and do all of the above predictably, consistently, and 
uniformly throughout their territories. When the state fails to do this, its population 
becomes vulnerable to environmental hazards; food and drug contamination; merchants’ 
businesses suffer as customers, contending with asymmetrical information that favors the 
merchant, invariably doubt the quality of the goods being sold; foreign investment suffers 
as companies become disinclined to invest in a state that cannot predictability and 
consistently guarantee the protection of property rights; and the population often finds 
itself at the mercy of a corrupt bureaucracy that makes decisions and allocates values on a 
personal rather than routinized basis. 
A look to the history of recently failed states reveals a chronic unwillingness or 
inability of government to protect the rule of law and regulate social and economic life. 
Yet it is important to recognize that the state’s failure to provide this political good is not 
only a symptom of state-failure, but a cause; the outright failure of the Congolese state, 
manifested in a war that erupted in 1996 and directly or indirectly killed up to five-
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million people, was preceded by decades of corrupt, personalized rule that deliberately 
gutted the public sector.  And in Sierra Leone, J. Anyu Ndunbe traces back to the 1970s a 
general lawlessness and public-sector decay that ultimately resulted in the early-1990s 
failure of that state.
32
  Much like the effect of the state’s failure to provide security to its 
population, the absence of the rule of law and the failure to regulate social and economic 
life results in a loss of legitimacy, hope, and trust and leads to vulnerable populations 
taking desperate steps in a bid to survive that further undermine the strength of the state.
33
 
Michael Chege captures this nicely in his study of state failure in Sierra Leone. He writes: 
“As economic and institutional decay set in, the regime lost all legitimacy in the eyes of 
the people it claimed to govern. Then, as public institutions led by the organizations of 
law and order imploded, the stage was set for anomie as alienated youths hired 
themselves to rebel leaders and international criminals with a broader agenda.”
34
 
The Provision of Infrastructure:  Adding to the list of the most essential positive 
political goods that effective states adequately provide to their populations – and states 
prone to failure do not – is a functional infrastructure, the facilitation of human 
development, and the forging of a convergence between nations and the state. The 
provision and upkeep of infrastructure (roads, railways, dams, telephone lines, power 
plants, ports, harbors, airports, etc.) is essential to the state’s ability to provide security to 
its population, combat foreign threats, extend administrative control throughout the 
country, promote the human development of its population, and facilitate the proper 
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 When states do not generate sufficient power, hospitals cannot 
provide care, productive work cannot be done at home after dark, and the operations of 
business are disrupted. Indeed, the World Bank finds that power outages cost firms 
unable to afford a backup generator up to 20 percent of their sales.
36
 Where roads are 
decrepit or absent, farmers cannot ship their goods to market and rural populations cannot 
access health and education services located a distance away. And where entry points – 
border crossings and ports – are underdeveloped and undermanned, delays reduce 
efficiency and prove economically costly; the World Bank notes that the 2,500 kilometer 
trip from Lusaka, Zambia to the port of Durban in South Africa takes roughly eight days 
– four for travel and four spent at border crossings. Moreover, a delay of one day at port 
costs a medium-size vessel an average of $35,000 
37
 and, when transporting agricultural 
goods, spoilage associated with a one-day delay reduces exports by roughly six percent.
38
 
As discussed in the introductory paragraph of this chapter, the majority of the 
world’s endangered or failing states are found on the African continent. It is therefore not 
surprising to find that the state of Africa’s infrastructure lags the rest of the world. 
Looking at Africa’s low-income countries compared to their non-African low-income 
peers, African states have just one-third the paved-road density of other low-income 
countries, have the capacity to generate just 12 percent of the power generated in non-
African countries, provide electricity to 14 percent of their populations compared to 41 
percent outside of Africa, and provide a sanitary means of human waste disposal to just 
34 percent of their populations compared to 53 percent outside the continent. A 
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comparison of Africa’s middle-income countries with their non-African middle-income 
peers reveals a similar performance gap.
39
 The suggested causes of Africa’s deficit 
include but are certainly not limited to the perverse effects of enclave economies, civil 
conflict, ineffective governance and institutions, and cumbersome environmental 
realities.
40
 Yet whatever the cause, the reality is that standard of living and state-
effectiveness on multiple levels is significantly impacted by the quantity and quality of 
infrastructure stocks, and states that hope to move on a continuum away from state failure 
must not neglect this aspect of development. 
The Promotion of Human Development:  Also critical to the prevention of state 
failure is investment in and promotion of human development. This includes the 
provision of education resources, healthcare services, and other social programs that 
improve the welfare and life-chances of populations. State investment in the human 
development of its population is key to the creation of a middle class (and all the benefits 
that come with it), upward social mobility, the creation of a skilled labor pool from which 
businesses can draw, and shrinking income and wealth inequality.
41
 States that neglect 
this essential activity risk a calamitous evaporation of legitimacy as the welfare of 
populations declines and it becomes clear that the state has left its citizens to fend for 
themselves.
42
 Indeed, Jean-Paul Azam contends that redistribution of the state’s resources 
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is a core factor in domestic war and peace, and the occurrence of civil conflict is closely 
tied to the state’s provision of services to its population.
43
 Azam focuses in particular on 
the provision of education and its connection to formal sector employment and high 
wages in the cities. Where there is scant opportunity for a good education, rural 
communities have fewer qualified members to send into the cities for employment, and in 
turn receive smaller remittances on which they rely to survive.
44
  Moreover, given the 
explosive mix of ethnicity and politics, states that not only fail to adequately address the 
human development of their populations but also allocate resources in a discriminatory 
fashion are likely to find themselves at particular risk of internal conflict and failure. 
Botswana, one of Africa’s most persistently stable states, provides a good example of 
the benefits yielded from a serious attempt to promote human development. One of 
Africa’s most impoverished states at independence, Botswana has since become a 
regional leader on a host of development indicators. And despite poverty that is 
characteristic of developing countries, the state has retained broad legitimacy in part 
because it has been able to effectively provide its citizens with desirable services. 
According to a series of surveys conducted by the World Bank Institute (WBI), the 





comparison, the Sub-Saharan regional average falls in the 27
th
 percentile. Health and 
education spending make up the largest expenditures in Botswana’s budget. In 2009, 
                                                 
43
 Jean-Paul Azam, “The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 4 
(2001): 442. 
44
 Ibid., 437. 
45
 Data is available at:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp. Government effectiveness 
is measured by the quality of public service provision, quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
competency of civil servants, independence of the civil service from political pressure, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to its public policies. 
19 
 
public expenditures on education accounted for 16.2 percent of the budget 
46
 while 
spending on healthcare made up 16.7 percent.
47
 In fact, Botswana spends more public 
money per capita on healthcare than all but one country in sub-Saharan Africa.
48
 And 
while HIV/AIDS threatens to potentially destabilize the country, here too the state has 
been engaged. Hospitals in Botswana test every patient (unless consent is refused), and 
political elite aggressively promote HIV/AIDS awareness; indeed, Botswana’s former 
president went so far as to publicly reveal that he had himself been tested.
49
 And, finally, 
an urban bias in the provision of services common throughout Africa seems to be less 
pronounced in Botswana;
50
 in 2006, the latest year for which data is available, life 
expectancy at birth for urban residents exceeded that of rural residents by just three years. 
Moreover, rural residents had a crude death rate less than 1.5 times that of urban 
residents, and an infant mortality rate of 5.2 percent compared to an urban rate of 4.2 
percent.
51
 And so, although poverty remains stubbornly high, Botswana has made 
considerable progress since independence and has had a series of governments that have 
made good-faith efforts to promote the human development of the country’s population – 
facts to which Botswana’s consistent stability can in no small part be attributed.  
The Shaping of a National Identity:  Anchoring the list of the most essential 
positive political goods that effective states provide to their populations is perhaps the 
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most important of all – the facilitation of a convergence between nations and the state. 
Africa’s ethnicity problem has received a great deal of attention and academics have 
filled books with proposed causes, effects, and solutions. The scope of the problem is far 
beyond what can be addressed here, but its nature is succinctly captured by the early 19
th 
century Italian statesman Massimo d’ Azeglio. Assessing the state-building process 
underway in Italy, d’ Azeglio wrote: “We have made Italy, now we must make 
Italians.”
52
 What was true of Europe centuries ago is now the reality faced by much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa; with territorial borders fixed, state leaders must work to make the 
geographical map align with the social reality on the ground. Disparate populations 
within a state must come to identify with and maintain loyalty to the state above and 
beyond any sub-state identity. This is not to say that stability and state effectiveness 
depend on the complete subjugation of every sub-state identity, or even necessarily a 
convergence between nations and state as strong as that found in the Global North. Yet 
the state must successfully shape national identity to the extent that governing can be 
carried out without a consistent reliance on force or coercion, secessionist or irredentist 
movements that threaten to break apart the country either do not emerge or are supported 
by only a fringe, and the eruption of ethnic-based intrastate violence on anywhere near 
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Insufficient convergence between nations and state is a significant contributing factor 
to state failure. While it may not be a necessary condition,
54
 the state’s inability to shape 
national identity increases the chances of failure by provoking legitimacy crises, slowing 
social and economic development, and laying the groundwork for intractable civil 
violence. As Joel Migdal argues in his work on the relative strength of states and 
societies, the state is just one among many institutions that attempt to exert control over 
extremely complex societies.
55
 In much of the Global South, given the often weak 
convergence between nations and states, it is a battle that the state often loses. This can 
have a perverse effect on public policy as state elites, aware of their relatively weak 
positions and precarious security environments are often inclined to adopt self-interested, 
defensive, and deferential postures that may facilitate their individual survival, but 
undermine greatly the process of state development.
56
  This reality is captured nicely in 
Pierre Englebert’s quantitative project aimed at explaining Africa’s consistently negative 
showing in empirical studies of economic growth. Not surprisingly, Englebert finds that 
Africa’s history of tepid economic growth can be partially attributed to low levels of state 
legitimacy and the related decisions of state elite to pursue self-serving, anti-growth, neo-
patrimonial policies at the expense of those that are impersonal but also conducive to 
development.
57
 In short then, after 30 years, Peter Ekeh’s conception of the dialectic of 
Africa’s “two publics” continues to ring true; so long as the convergence between nations 
and state remains weak, the state/civic public will inevitably not receive what it is due as 
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resources that should be used to promote political and economic development are instead 
funneled into society/the primordial public.
58
 
An inability to shape national identity not only threatens the state by spawning 
legitimacy crises and impeding development, but by significantly increasing the risk of 
catastrophic civil violence. Englebert, Tarango, and Carter convincingly show over a 40 
year period that both suffocation (bringing together people that have historically lived 
under different systems) and dismemberment (dividing a single group among several 
contiguous states) have a positive effect on the occurrence of civil war, political 
instability, and secession attempts.
59
 The colonial legacy of suffocation and 
dismemberment in sub-Sahara Africa is well known and is a reality to which a great deal 
of civil conflict can be attributed. Yet the case made by some that there is something 
inherently dangerous about diversity fails to tell a large part of the story; in fact, diversity 
becomes dangerous when ethnicity becomes politically salient.
60
 Donald Rothchild 
cleverly makes this case by arguing that the same security dilemma that realists claim 
motivates interstate behavior can also explain domestic intergroup interactions.
61
 Where 
the state is strong, there is healthy convergence between nations and state, and 
individuals can expect fair treatment regardless of ethnicity, intergroup relations are 
generally predictable and peaceful. On the contrary, where states are weak, the 
distribution of resources is influenced by ethnicity, and the state has failed to sufficiently 
                                                 
58
 Peter P. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): see especially pages 108-111.  
59
 Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango and Matthew Carter, “Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution 
to the Debate on African Boundaries,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 10 (2002).  
60
 For a nice overview of this debate, see: Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 1-25. Note also that Englebert et al., cited above, do not control for convergence between 
nations and state, equal treatment, or other variables commonly thought to influence the political saliency 
of ethnicity. 
61
 Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation 
(Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution Press, 1997), particularly pages 1-89. 
23 
 
shape national identity, a climate of fear and suspicion prevails. In such an environment, 
without a credible state-backed security-guarantee, threatened and paranoid sub-state 
leaders have incentive to mobilize their groups for war.
62
 Moreover, once groups are on 
alert, even a local disturbance with ethnic undertones can begin a chain reaction that 
quickly spreads well beyond the site of the initial incident.
63
  
The above text has argued that states failing to sufficiently shape national identity are 
susceptible to destructive civil violence. What makes matters worse is the potentially 
intractable nature of ethnic conflict once it begins. There is a growing literature that 
examines the effect of ethnicity on conflict duration yet, not surprisingly, scholars cannot 
reach agreement on its significance. Positions on the question have tended to be 
influenced by the primordialist/ascriptive versus instrumentalist/political salience debate, 
with advocates of the former arguing for intractability, and the latter arguing against. In 
truth, both are probably partially correct. As McGarry and O’Leary argue, many issues 
that contribute to ethnic violence are to some extent non-tradable. For example: 
autonomy, language, the right to cultural preservation, territorial homelands, social 
respect, and prestige. This has the effect of creating situations perceived to be zero-sum 
over which bargaining and conflict resolution can be difficult.
64
  Yet many issues are not 
as inherently non-tradable as argued. There are middle-grounds between complete 
regional autonomy or less comprehensive multicultural allowances; the outright 
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prohibition of a language or elevating it to an official status; the secession of a group and 
its territorial homeland or state-ordered military occupation; and control of the state or 
the risk of group annihilation. Admittedly, however, deeply suspicious populations and 
insecure states have often been unsuccessful at negotiating tolerable middle-ground 
solutions before enduring a great deal of battlefield destruction. Therefore, intractability, 
while not inevitable, is certainly a fate tempted when ethnic conflict erupts.  
  Finally, the emergence of ethnic conflict may potentially impact the calculations of 
additional groups considering their own confrontations with the state. One of the more 
compelling parts of the collective action literature is that which examines the relationship 
between the initiation of conflict and the perception of risk and reward. While the 
initiation of an uprising against the state is significantly less likely in the face of certain 
defeat, weak states, already plagued by internal conflict, prove tempting grounds for the 
emergence of additional ethnic movements as the risk of an uprising appears to decline, 
and the prospect for success appears to increase.
65
 Tarrow, for example, contends that the 
emergence of contention is even more closely related to a calculation of opportunities-
versus-constraints than to the social and economic deprivation that groups experience,
66
 
while Tilly argues that resource-deprived groups actually tend to act defensively given 
their lack of means with which to mount a challenge against the state. Yet, like Tarrow, 
Tilly qualifies his argument by noting that relatively greater constraints than 
opportunities put less of a brake on collective action when group survival is perceived to 
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 – no source of solace for the state, given the existential nature of much 
ethnic conflict. Therefore, in light of what has been written above, the imperative of 
forging sufficient convergence between nations and state should be clear: states that fail 
to do so risk a snowball effect by which one conflict weakens the state, inviting 
additional challenges, until the state fails entirely. 
The objective of the preceding pages has been to establish the most essential 
activities carried out by the state, with the aim of using that list to craft a substantive and 
meaningful definition of state-building. Adopting a minimalist approach to the question, I 
have argued that if the worst possible outcome for states is failure or collapse, the list of 
“most essential activities” should be limited to those which militate against this fate. In 
doing so, I aim to provide clarity and parsimony to a concept – state-building –  that has 
been muddled to such an extent by value-laden and context-specific contributions that it 
risks losing all meaning and usefulness. It is only with a meaningful definition of state-
building in hand that I can turn to the research question this project will attempt to 
answer: why, over the previous 50 years, despite political, social, and economic 
headwinds, have some states made progress on the state-building continuum while others 
have stagnated or regressed? 
 1.2c  State-Building Defined – But is it Meaningful, and is it a “Process?” 
On the basis of the above list of “most essential” activities, state-building can concisely 
be defined as the process by which the state increases its capacity to protect, regulate, 
construct, develop, and unify. The definition places a decided emphasis on ends (or 
results) rather than means. For example, I do not include “capacity to extract” or “tax-
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ratio” as a measure of state-building, despite the fact that it is common – and at times, the 
only – measure used in the literature.
68
 While tax-ratio may indicate whether or not the 
state is able to penetrate society, and revenue generated from taxation can provide the 
state with resources needed to protect, regulate, construct, develop, and unify, it tells 
nothing about what the state actually does with the revenue it extracts. A state that 
effectively collects revenue from its population but does not reinvest it in a way that 
benefits the public good surely cannot be considered a state-building success. In fact, the 
misappropriation of public money could conceivably work as an impetus for state-failure. 
Similarly, a low level of tax extraction does not necessarily indicate state-weakness; 
Saudi Arabia does not tax the income of its citizens, but is considerably more advanced 
on the state-building continuum than many states that do.  Botswana deliberately kept 
taxes low on its rural population to maintain its loyalty in light of disproportionate 
economic gains made by more affluent classes.
69
 And, as van de Walle points out, certain 
economies simply better lend themselves to taxation than others.
70
 It may therefore be a 
mistake to conclude solely on the basis of successful tax extraction that Congo-
Brazzaville is more advanced on the state-building continuum than Ethiopia, given that 
Ethiopia’s agrarian economy is inherently more difficult to tax than Congo’s natural 
resource economy. Moreover, results will be prioritized when measuring each of the 
components of my definition of state-building. For example, the percentage of a state’s 
budget allocated to education (a possible measure of how well the state promotes human 
                                                 
68
 See, for example, the work of Cameron Thies, who has written extensively on state-building and 
routinely uses tax extraction as his primary measure of state-building progress. For his justification, see: 
Cameron G. Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State-Building in Latin America,” American Journal of Political 
Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 454-459. 
69
 Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Botswana: Comprehending the Exceptional State,” in The African State: 
Reconsiderations, eds. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), 24. 
70
 Nicolas van de Walle, “The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Policies,” in 
When States Fail, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 100. 
27 
 
development) tells us something, but literacy rates tell us more. Measurement issues and 
the benefits and drawbacks of an emphasis on means and ends will be addressed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 3. 
With a definition of state-building in hand, the final issue to consider deals with 
the degree to which it makes sense to consider state-building a “process.”  A potential 
drawback to a definition of state-building cobbled together by the fusion of multiple 
component parts is the possibility that the components may not be meaningfully related 
in a collective way. In other words, each component part might be an important property 
of states, with meaningful commonality stopping there. If true, the meaningfulness and 
cohesion of the definition of state-building would be weakened. Yet, as argued above, I 
believe my definition at least partially avoids this problem by maintaining focus on a 
single, most important objective: developing the capacities necessary to avoid state-
failure. Thus, each component part of my definition is geared toward a common end. 
What is unclear, however, is how strongly (or not) the component parts interact to 
strengthen (or weaken) one another. In other words, to what extent does improvement in 
the provision of security also lead to an improvement in human development? If such 
relationships are found to exist between components, a meaningful “state-building 
process” can truly be said to exist. This question will be addressed and answers suggested 
in Chapter 5. 
1.3  Explaining When, Where, How, & Why State-Building Succeeds or Fails 
State-building in the Global South has become a matter of interest to policy-makers in the 
Global North, academics, journalists, and others. The attention has been driven by both 
humanitarian and security concerns, and the initiation of action to right weakened states 
28 
 
has become more politically feasible in the aftermath of the Cold War and more urgent in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2011 attacks. Academics have been troubled by the 
emergence and endurance of weak, economically-backward rump states in the years since 
decolonization and have written extensively on suggested causes and solutions. Policy-
makers in the Global North, fearful of the national security threats posed by weak states
71
 
and no longer confined by the sphere-of-influence politics of the Cold War, have 
increasingly become advocates for development, good governance and even military 
intervention in cases of extreme state weakness. The end of the twentieth  and beginning 
of the twenty-first century has alone seen the international community intervene in 
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to name just a handful of locations. Even the U.S.-initiated wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq – wars that arguably were neither undertaken to repair nor caused by state 
weakness – became nearly entirely about state-building once combat operations to 
remove the heads of state had succeeded. Yet, although interest in state-building is broad, 
reaching a consensus on its main impediments and facilitators has been difficult. The 
remaining pages in this chapter will briefly review the work that has been done to date 
toward that end, suggest shortcomings to the existing approaches, and preview the 
contribution that this project aims to make toward answering the question of why state-
building advances in some places at certain times but stagnates or regresses in others.  
1.3a  Explaining State-Building Variance: Agency Versus Structure 
Given the breadth of the existing literature on state-building and the wide range of 
facilitators and impediments suggested by policy-makers and scholars, a method by 
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which to organize the debate might be helpful. The method I propose divides 
explanations aimed at accounting for state-building successes and failures into two 
groups: agency and structure. Structural explanations often assume a benevolently-
intentioned political elite hamstrung by adverse conditions they did not create, and 
struggle to overcome. While leadership matters, it is largely non-agency variables – 
geography, artificial borders, ethnic heterogeneity, societal fragmentation, low levels of 
human development, an international system not conducive to state-building, and the like 
– that primarily drive or impede state-building progress. By contrast, agency explanations 
look to leadership and contend that political elite have significantly greater means of 
overcoming structural challenges and building their states than structuralists assume. 
When state-building stagnates or regresses, agency proponents are more inclined to point 
to a failure of leadership. 
Agency:  Agency-oriented attempts to explain where and why state-building 
succeeds or fails strongly emphasize political elites and the decisions they make. While 
decisions are not made in a vacuum and political elites respond to incentive-structures 
shaped by their environments, proponents of the agency approach ultimately look to elite 
behavior to explain where and why state-building succeeds and fails. As Frank Stark 
shows, much of the optimism in Africa at the time of independence centered on the 
personal popularity of political elites, faith in the transformative power of individual 
leaders, and a belief that elites would be able to overcome structural impediments and 
develop their states.
72
  Yet over time, given the glacial progress of state-building in much 
of sub-Saharan Africa, the emphasis has turned to what political elites have done wrong. 
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In addition to attributing blame to incompetence, backwardness, or pathology, segments 
of the literature on state-building have argued that elites perceive a contradiction of some 
sort between their own interests and the imperatives of state-building and make strategic 
decisions that help the former but hurt the latter.
73
 Indeed, there is an abundance of data 
to support the contention that political elites are often not serious about optimally 
developing their states. Especially revealing is the extent to which the abuse of power by 
those in public positions is tolerated. In a 2010 study of public sector corruption, 
Transparency International found that nearly 75 percent of the world’s states scored 
below 5 on a scale of 10 (highly clean) to 1 (highly corrupt).
74
 The data on sub-Saharan 
Africa is even grimmer, with no state except Botswana achieving a score above 5, and 56 
percent of region’s population having reported paying a bribe to at least one civil servant 
in the year 2010.
75
 By comparison, the next largest regional rate – in the Middle East – 
was 36 percent. Political elite have also deliberately undermined bureaucratic 
institutional structures lest they be used by potential rivals to develop constituencies of 
their own.
76
 Illustrating the reality of calculated bureaucratic neglect, but also great 
paranoia, the regime in Sierra Leone felt compelled to rely on the private mercenary 
group Executive Outcomes, rather than the national army, to repel rebels from the 
outskirts of its capital during a low-point in its mid-1990s civil war. Political elite have 
been willing to go so far as to advance their personal interests out of civil war. Paul 
Collier cites evidence in Sierra Leone of state elite collaborating with rebels as a means 
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of personal financial enrichment.
77
 And in Ivory Coast, the president and members of his 
regime used the chaos generated by the 2002 civil war to consolidate control over the 
cocoa industry and divert 170 million dollars into private regime coffers.
78
 
Structure:  Structuralists disagree with agency assertions that state-building 
stagnation or regression is the result of political elites that have little interest in 
developing their states and only work to do so when and to the extent that they personally 
benefit.  Instead, structuralists are inclined to contend that political elite have more 
benevolent intentions but confront barriers to state-building that they did not create and 
are hard-pressed to surmount. Making matters more difficult for elite is that they are not 
only faced with a multitude of structural impediments – artificially drawn borders that 
took no account of ethnic group distribution; the consequences of divide-and-rule 
governance of the colonial period; the chicken and egg problem of weak institutions 
coupled with simultaneously low GDP and legitimacy; strong societies relative to weak 
states; restive border areas; and territories that are either so geographically large that 
impoverished states find it beyond their means to extend authority beyond areas close to 
the capital city, or so small as to make the creation of markets and populations of scale 
impossible – but are also expected to defy history and build their states peacefully and 
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While structuralists are in agreement regarding the nature of what facilitates or 
impedes state-building, there is no consensus on the likelihood of overcoming structural 
impediments. Optimists contend that state-building merely takes time and are not 
invariably disheartened by the outbreak of civil conflict, legitimacy crises, and other 
manifestations of state-weakness. Rather, these disruptions should be interpreted not as 
evidence of state-failure, but as evidence of a nascent state-building process underway.
80
 
Pessimists, however, are inclined to believe that structural impediments are more difficult 
to surmount and, in cases, state-building efforts counterproductive. Richard Joseph 
contends that the continent’s difficult political geography has in many cases already 
resulted in the practical irrelevance of official state borders, with reconfiguration in order 
if there is to be hope of functional states one day emerging.
81
 Others go further and 
lament a status-quo that props up hopelessly unviable states, while arguing that state-
building would better be facilitated if the legal and diplomatic underpinnings of the 
international system were modified. In cases of extreme state-weakness, Jeffrey Herbst 
urges the international community to consider decertification and the repeal of state 
sovereignty,
82
 while Helman and Ratner propose that states be placed into United Nations 
trusteeships.
83
   
1.3b  The Merits and Shortcomings of Agency and Structure 
While there are merits to both agency and structural attempts to explain what facilitates 
or impedes state-building, neither category is without its shortcomings. Explanations 
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drawing on structure surely shed light on very real obstacles faced by elites as they move 
to develop their states. It is difficult to dispute that diversified economies endowed with a 
skilled labor force fare better for development than those driven by natural resources 
extracted from just a handful of locations within a state. Or, that states with borders more 
accurately reflecting social realities on the ground are more amenable to peace, or that 
political elite afforded more time and flexibility by the rules and norms governing the 
interstate system might ultimately produce better-developed states.  Yet the problem with 
structural explanations is their determinism. In fact, there are many cases where states 
with daunting structural environments have excelled (at least relative to other developing 
states), while states with friendlier environments have foundered.
84
 Botswana, for 
example, has drawn on diamond mining – accounting for over 30 percent of GDP and 
nearly 70 percent of export earnings – to become one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most 
developed countries.
85
 Meanwhile Somalia is internally fractured to such an extent that it 
has not had a functioning central government in 20 years despite 85 percent of the 
population sharing membership in the Somali ethnic group. Time is also an unhelpful 
way to explain state-building variation among states in the Global South given that many 
states gained their independence at approximately the same time, yet some have since 
fared considerably better than others. Yet this is not to say that structure tells us very little 
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about state-building and where it is and is not likely to succeed; in fact, it has a great deal 
of potential. There is, however, often a need for more nuance and a recognition that state-
specific intervening variables are also meaningfully at work.
86
  
 Just as structure by itself provides an incomplete explanation of state-building 
progression, stagnation, and regression, agency approaches also require 
complementation. This is not to say that elites alone do not have extraordinary capacity to 
affect their states’ development. Mobutu Sese Seko of the former-Zaire is believed to 
have embezzled over five-billion dollars during his 30-year presidency, and his deliberate 
strategy of sabotaging the public sector is well-known.
87
 Zimbabwe’s transformation 
from one of Africa’s most prosperous states to one of its most fragile can largely be 
attributed to the leadership decisions of its president, Robert Mugabe. Yet elites do not 
operate in a vacuum and their decisions (and the impact of their decisions) are often 
conditioned by environment. To take economic development as an example, a great deal 
has been written about the importance of good-governance, the promotion of market-
friendly institutions, and policies that favor an otherwise-minimally intrusive state.   Such 
an agency-centered approach, however, fails to consider larger structural issues and the 
impact they have on what even the best-intentioned elites can reasonably be expected to 
deliver. Economic development is affected by the quality of governance – agency – but 
also by structural building-blocks of the economy over which agency may have little 
immediate control. Structural variables including the skill-level of the workforce, the 
physical size of the country (making markets of scale feasible or unfeasible), and the 
nature of exports (competition-plagued primary products versus industrial or service-
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sector goods) conceivably matter to economic development as much as agency. 
Similarly, institutions, central to economic development, can be destroyed by the actions 
of political elite (agency) but also severely hamstrung by populations unwilling to 
recognize as legitimate the authority of their governments to make and enforce laws and 
regulations (structure).
88
 The Global South further suffers from low GDP (structure) 




1.3c  The Symbiotic Relationship of Agency and Structure 
The preceding paragraphs have examined agency and structural attempts to explain 
where and why state-building succeeds or fails. The reality is that each, on its own, often 
has only partial explanatory power. A more complete explanation demands recognition 
that structure and agency affect one another and calls for consideration of the relationship 
between the two, centered on the assumption that one cannot be thoroughly understood in 
isolation from the other. Consider one component of my definition of state-building, the 
regulation of social and economic life, as an example. One might point to a state in which 
this component of state-building is weak, cite weak institutions, unenforced laws, and 
bureaucratic agencies staffed on the basis of nepotism rather than merit, and conclude 
that state leadership (agency) is to blame – and not entirely unreasonably. Yet a 
compelling case can be made that the decisions of leadership (agency) are strongly 
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influenced by the nature of structure. An insecure regime, primarily interested in its own 
survival, may look at the fragmented society over which it attempts to exercise control 
and conclude that weak bureaucratic agencies better serve its interests in that they are less 
likely to be used by potential rivals to form constituencies hostile to the regime. Further 
contributing to such a calculation are the rules (structure) that govern the international 
system. States today exist in an environment in which borders are fixed, annexation is 
impermissible, and sovereignty is granted to all states regardless of their capacity or 
willingness to effectively govern their territories. With state continuity guaranteed, 
political elites may feel more free to neglect or even deliberately sabotage the 
development of their states while narrowly focusing instead on their own survival. Not 
surprisingly, the nature of agency’s decisions have the potential to make structure even 
more of a threat (which in turn affects agency), completing the feedback loop.
90
  Thus, 
considering the example of the regulation of social and economic life, an understanding 
of what may ostensibly appear to be a case of poor leadership is thoroughly enriched 
when considering agency along with structure. Each aspect of state-building, from the 
success with which the state provides security to its population, to the extent to which 
human development is promoted, is best understood by considering the effect of structure 
on agency, and vice-versa. Each matters a great deal and alone can tell only part of the 
story.   
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1.3d  Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power as Mediator 
To this point I have argued that state-building progression can best be understood by 
assessing how agency and structure impact one another. Whether state-building 
progresses or not depends heavily on the agency-structure dynamic. But what precisely is 
responsible for shaping the dynamic in such a way as to yield state-building success in 
some cases, and stagnation or decline in others? In other words, if the relationship 
between agency and structure matters to state-building, what mediates the relationship? 
To refer back to the example of the regulation of social and economic life, can a 
particular variable be identified that compels state elites to build institutions where, in the 
absence of the variable, elites would calculate that their interests are better served by 
keeping institutions weak? Can the same variable explain corresponding shifts in the 
level of threat posed by structure to agency? And is a similar pattern between agency, 
mediator, and structure found when my other four components of state-building are 
considered? As discussed in the initial sections of this chapter, Africa’s sub-Saharan 
states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and 
continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Yet state-
building progression has been uneven. The objective of this project is to uncover a 
solution to this puzzle by looking to states’ agency-structure dynamics and assessing the 
impact of a mediating variable by which I hypothesize the dynamics are shaped – relative 
power among states.  
1.4  Conclusion and an Outline of Chapters 2 – 5 
Chapter 1 set out to accomplish several objectives. It began by showing that the 
conventional-wisdom perception of Africa as a destitute monolith is an inaccurate 
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portrayal of the continent. In fact, the range between Africa’s weakest and strongest 
states is broad, with considerable variation in strength among those states falling 
somewhere in between as well. It then moved to introduce the research question that this 
project will attempt to answer: that is, why is state-building more advanced in some 
countries than in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady 
declines, stagnation, or gains followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-
building trajectories of Africa’s states? The chapter then laid out a number of problems 
with the way state-building has been assessed to this point – centered primarily on the 
inability of scholars, policy-makers, activists, and others to reach a consensus on what is 
expected of the state and what tasks ought to be considered the most critical. In an 
attempt to avoid getting bogged down by these broad and disparate “wish-lists” while 
bringing some much-needed cohesion and meaning to the debate, a minimalist approach 
to defining and measuring state-building was urged; if state failure or collapse is the 
worst possible outcome for states and their populations, it makes sense to classify as 
“most critical” those tasks carried out that militate against this fate. A list of five tasks 
was compiled: the provision of security and monopolization of the legitimate use of 
force; the regulation of social and economic life; the provision and maintenance of 
infrastructure; the promotion of human development; and the shaping of a national 
identity. Finally, Chapter 1 concluded by discussing the benefits and shortcomings of 
agency and structural approaches to explaining state-building variance, while arguing that 
a mediator – the relative distribution of power among states – should be expected to 
meaningfully influence the agency-structure dynamic.  
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Chapter 2 will assess in detail the role that relative power is expected to play in 
the relationship between agency and structure, and thus also where state-building is likely 
to progress, stagnate, or decline. It will conclude with the presentation of three 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 will lay out the methodology employed in this dissertation to test 
the relationship between the distribution of power among states and state-building 
proficiency and conclude by presenting the findings of those tests. Chapter 4 will 
piggyback on the results of the tests carried out in Chapter 3 and dig a bit deeper. In 
doing so, Chapter 4 will assess the impact of relative power on state-building when 
neighbor-specific variables, time-specific variables, border-specific variables, and 
domestic-specific variables are each factored into the equation. Chapter 5 will conclude 
the dissertation by reviewing its findings, assessing the possible policy implications of 
















2.0  Introduction: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power 
In the latter part of Chapter 1 I suggested that the catalysts and retardants of state-
building be organized into two categories: agency and structure. I went on to argue that 
state-building’s successes and failures cannot be thoroughly understood unless agency 
and structure are considered together, as one affects the other. I concluded Chapter 1 by 
introducing the central argument to be tested in this project – that the relative distribution 
of power among states shapes what takes place within states – namely how the agency-
structure dynamic plays out – and therefore influences where state-building advances, 
stagnates, or declines. 
 To test my hypothesis I will focus on states in sub-Saharan Africa and limit my 
examination of the impact of relative power on state-building to states sharing contiguous 
borders.  This approach has a handful of benefits. Limiting my analysis to sub-Saharan 
Africa will enable me to assess why states with similar social, economic, and political 
circumstances build their states with varying degrees of success. An examination limited 
to contiguous neighbors has both theoretical and policy benefits; on the theoretical side, I 
aim to fill a void in the existing literature that has placed a premium on work assessing 
the role that the Global North plays in advancing or retarding the state-building progress 
of the Global South, or on scholarship that looks nearly exclusively inside a state to 
assess why its state-building project has progressed, stalled, or regressed. What has 
largely been ignored and is poorly understood is that role that region and, in particular, 
contiguous neighbors play in the state-building process. Where the impact of neighbors 
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has been addressed, it has often been done anecdotally rather than empirically. An 
emphasis on contiguous neighbors has practical benefits as well. The reality of interstate 
relations in sub-Saharan Africa is that, with few exceptions, states do not have the 
capacity to project force beyond their contiguous neighbors. Moreover, so-called “spill-
over” effects emanating from domestic politics disproportionately affect contiguous 
states.  To include dyads of states in my study that cannot conceivably threaten each 
other’s security – state or regime – (in which case the relevance of relative power would 
be minimized) would risk generating results that do not show a relationship that actually 
exists.
1
 Finally, as to the potential policy benefits of this research, evidence of a 
relationship between relative power and state-building might serve as a guide by which 
foreign aid is better-allocated. Critics of the deployment of foreign aid to developing 
states have lamented, not entirely unreasonably, that the results have been disappointing 
given the amount of money invested. Evidence of a relationship between relative power 
and state-building could facilitate better-targeted giving in which aid is not only 
distributed to a target state, but to its neighbors in an effort to create a relative power 
distribution friendlier to state-building.  
 Meanwhile, Chapter 2 will proceed as follows: I will begin by briefly reviewing 
perhaps the most famous explanation of state-building in which an external variable is 
linked to the internal agency-structure dynamic – Charles Tilly’s use of interstate war to 
explain state-building in early-modern Europe. I will then adjust Tilly’s basic framework 
and present my own theory of state-building for the twenty-first century in which an 
alternative agency-structure dynamic is proposed, and relative power is swapped for 
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interstate war. Next I will review a number of assumptions essential to my theory, and 
conclude by introducing the specific hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3. 
2.1  Altering the Agency-Structure Dynamic: Charles Tilly and Interstate War 
Since the 1992 publication of Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, and European States, 
the assertion that “war makes the state and the state makes war” has become one of the 
most thoroughly debated in the state-building literature.
2
 Tilly’s argument, centered on 
the state-building process in early-modern Europe, is beautifully simple: faced with a 
hostile international environment, political elite had to develop a sufficiently powerful 
defensive capability or face certain elimination. The development of a suitable defense, 
however, was financially costly and left rulers with no choice but to turn to their 
populations for the necessary revenue. To compel a population resistant to central 
authority and with limited national identity to provide the resources needed to build a 
defensive capability, the state took on the role, as Tilly put it in an earlier work, of a 
neighborhood mobster; in exchange for revenue, the state provided its population with 
protection against external threats, both legitimate and embellished.
3
 Capturing the power 
of war, Jeffrey Herbst asserts that “fighting wars may be the only way whereby it is 
possible to have people pay more taxes and at the same time feel more closely associated 
with the state.”
4
 In short, the threat of external annihilation forged a relationship of 
mutual dependence in which the state relied on society, and society came to rely on the 
state. 
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2.1a  Interstate War and its Relationship to State-Building 
Interstate war (or its threat) had a profound impact on the agency-structure dynamic in 
early-modern Europe which ultimately gave rise to the emergence of well-developed 
states.  The “war makes states” literature has tended to emphasize three ways in particular 
by which interstate war shaped the agency-structure relationship and facilitated state-
building: it spurred a convergence between nations and state; compelled and enabled 
states to increase their administrative capacities and penetrate their societies; and 
produced a “ratchet” effect whereby the scope and strength of the state, enlarged during 
war, did not revert to its pre-war size after hostilities had ended. Emile Durkheim nicely 
captures the effect of war on nationalism, writing that it “force[s] men to close ranks and 
confront a common danger, the individual thinking less of himself and more of the 
common cause.”
5
 Chris Hedges expands on Durkheim by linking war to the filling of an 
emotional void. He writes: “Lurking beneath the surface of every society…is the 
passionate yearning for a nationalist cause that exalts us, the kind that war alone is able to 
deliver.”
6
 The threat of interstate war also compels a state to penetrate society but, at the 
same time, produces a society more agreeable to the infringement. To extract sufficient 
resources to pay for war, a state must develop a sophisticated administrative capacity 
throughout its territory. Yet while essential to the collection of taxes and the defense of 
the state from outside aggressors, a greater administrative capacity benefits state-building 
far more broadly. And finally, war produces a ratchet effect whereby states, having 
invested in developing a greater administrative capacity during times of war, continue to 
spend what is necessary to maintain that capacity’s upkeep. Similarly, populations that 
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have relented to taxation in the face of immediate threats come to see a greater tax burden 
as acceptable and it overtime becomes normalized. 
2.1b  Interstate War and its Relationship to State-Building: Today’s Global South  
Charles Tilly’s theory of war and state-building encounters significant problems when 
applied to today’s Global South. In fact, Tilly has argued that his theory is non-
generalizable and is not intended to explain state-building outside of early-modern 
Europe (although this has not entirely discouraged scholars from trying). Primarily 
responsible for the limited scope of Tilly’s theory is a change in the nature of the 
international system. During the period of European state-building sovereignty was not 
guaranteed but earned; territorial boundaries remained unchanged only if they could be 
defended, military conquest was common, and states that could not generate the resources 
to defend themselves were absorbed by more powerful entities. Consequently there was 
tremendous incentive for states under these circumstances to not only bargain with their 
populations, but to strengthen administrative capacity in order to successfully fight wars. 
Out of this international environment emerged strong, centralized European states. 
Today, rules governing the state-system are such that Tilly’s “war makes states” 
theory of state-building is significantly more difficult to apply. Whereas sovereignty once 
had to be earned, today it is bestowed upon all states as a condition of their recognition as 
states by the international community.
7
 And while interstate war was common and 
territorial borders changed regularly as strong states preyed on the weak, today interstate 
war is rare and the alteration of borders is prohibited by both international law and norms. 
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In fact, of the seven principles in Article 3 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
charter, five relate to juridical sovereignty, peaceful negotiation of disputes, and respect 
for territorial integrity.
8
 The founding president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, captured the 
motivation for border preservation as follows: “Our borders are so absurd that they must 
be regarded as sacrosanct.”
9
 Indeed, in the 48 years since the OAU was founded, 
internationally-recognized border changes in sub-Saharan Africa resulting from war have 
occurred just once.
10
 In total just four interstate wars have been fought in the years since 
independence.
11
 As a result of such a profound change in the nature of the international 
system, the model presented by Tilly in which a dangerous, war-prone environment 
mediates the agency-structure relationship in a manner conducive to state-building is no 
longer entirely relevant; instead, a compelling case can be made that the current laws and 
norms governing the international system impact the agency-structure dynamic in ways 
detrimental to state-building. 
2.1c  Assessing the Relevance of Tilly: Agency, Structure, and the Twenty-First Century  
In light of an international environment that discourages war and forbids territorial 
conquest, many who adhere to Tilly’s “war makes states” theory are understandably 
pessimistic about the prognosis for state-building in the Global South. Herbst has argued 
that war is essential to state-building, as necessary fundamental changes to the agency-
structure dynamic are impossible to achieve without it.
12
 Atzili contends that the illegality 
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of territorial conquest has deprived states of the opportunity to pursue territorial 
expansion – once an incentive to develop capacity.
13
 Sorensen claims that negative 
sovereignty or guaranteed state survival removes the incentive to build strong states 
capable of surviving over the long term, and Eriksen argues that the absence of war 
coupled with external sources of funding (foreign aid) eliminates the need for elites to 
strengthen their states’ administrative capacities to extract resources and build reciprocal 
relationships with populations from which taxes would be extracted.
14
 In short, the 
existing state system in which war is rare, borders are fixed, annexation is impermissible, 
and sovereignty is bestowed upon all states regardless of their capacity produces a state 
elite with scant reason to link state strength with state survival, and a society lacking the 
impetus to tie its own physical well-being to the strength of its state.
15
  
Despite the limitations of Tilly, not every adherent to the war-makes-states model 
is equally pessimistic about the prospects of state-building in the Global South. Cameron 
Thies, in a series of articles, has tested the effects of a less threatening international 
incident – rivalry – on state-building, and finds that it is positively correlated with tax 
extraction.
16
 And Taylor and Botea apply Tilly to two historically war-prone states in the 
Global South, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and discover that the model is generalizable 
provided that the existence of a core ethnic group (the exception in many states) and a 
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revolutionary ideology precede the onset of war.
17
 Still, external variables, whether war 
or rivalry, inserted into Tilly’s model cannot have the impact they did in early-modern 
Europe when applied to today’s Global South. This is a point that Thies concedes by 
noting that states remain weak despite his finding of a relationship between interstate 
rivalry and tax extraction.
18
 Similarly, Eriksen finds that even war is of limited use in 
strengthening today’s states, as involvement in the Second Congo War did little to 
compel its participants to better-centralize state power or increase state control over 
society.
19
 The problem almost certainly lies in today’s limited nature of war; for Tilly to 
work, nothing short of war that threatens the existence of the state and population 
residing within it is sufficient to adequately shock the agency-structure dynamic. Yet, for 
reasons laid out above, war of this nature is out of the question. Long-term rivalries and 
limited wars may very well move the state-building needle, but a replication of what 
occurred in early-modern Europe is not possible in the Global South today. 
Although neither the external context of states in early-modern Europe nor the 
nature of the state-building process undertaken can be replicated today, some things from 
centuries ago do remain the same. Namely, a group of states again finds itself in the early 
stages of state-building with some having made advances on the state-building continuum 
and others having stagnated or declined. Additionally, just as the external environment 
advanced the state-building trajectories of early-modern European states, I contend that it 
continues to have the potential to do so today in the Global South – albeit in different 
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ways,  influencing the agency-structure dynamic in an entirely different manner than 
what was proposed by Tilly, and with necessarily more muted results.
20
 The remainder of 
this chapter will lay out my theory explaining the state-building variation seen in the 
Global South generally and in sub-Saharan Africa particularly by drawing on relative 
power between states to capture where and why state-building has progressed, stagnated, 
or declined. In doing so I will first lay out what I believe to be the nature of the agency-
structure dynamic dominant inside the states of today’s Global South. I will then argue 
that relative power between those states has the capacity to alter their agency-structure 
dynamics, and I will conclude by assessing the impact of the alteration on state-building 
progression. 
2.2  The Agency-Structure Dynamic in the Twenty-First Century Global South 
The nature of the agency-structure dynamic common in today’s Global South is 
considerably different than that which characterized the states that successfully developed 
in early-modern Europe. In a truly Hobbesian international environment, survival of the 
state, its regime, and its inhabitants depended on a pact between agency and structure, 
discussed above, in which each provided the other with essential resources. Out of this 
relationship emerged developed nation-states. Today no such international environment 
exists and neither regime survival nor the survival of society depends on a strong state. In 
fact, a strong state apparatus is often perceived as threatening, demonstrated by the 
calculated weakening of states by their regimes and attempts to escape the state by their 
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societies. The symbiotic relationship between agency and structure, at one time 
benefiting both while facilitating state-building, yields decidedly different results today; 
with survival no longer dependent upon a strong state, structure can resist the 
encroachments of agency and agency can prioritize short-term regime interests rather 
than interact with structure in a manner that might ultimately strengthen the state.  The 
relationship becomes one in which agency reacts to difficult and threatening structural 
conditions by adopting a method of governance geared toward regime survival in the 
near-term, but which has the unintended effect of making structure even more threatening 
over the long-term. Contrary to the agency-structure dynamic that produced strong states 
in early-modern Europe, the prevalent dynamic today is a recipe for state weakness or 
failure. 
2.2a  The Impact of Structure on Agency 
Turning to the specifics of the agency-structure dynamic common to states in sub-
Saharan Africa, it makes sense to begin with an assessment of the effect that structure has 
on agency. Africanists have paid structure a great deal of attention, and with good reason. 
The continent’s structural challenges are well-known: borders, drawn in Berlin at the 
onset of colonialism, were crafted with the objective of preserving intra-European peace 
rather than reflecting social reality as it existed on the ground. Indeed, Feyissa and 
Hoehne calculate that 42 percent of the total length of Africa’s land borders consists of 
parallels, meridians, and equidistant lines.
21
 Former Nigerian leader Obafemi Awolowo’s 
classification of Nigeria as a “mere geographical expression” captures the reality nicely.
22
 
                                                 
21
 Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, “State Borders and Borderlands as Resources,” in Borders 
and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa, eds. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne 
(Suffolk: James Currey, 2010), 3. 
22
 David Welsh, “Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa,” International Affairs 72, no. 3 (1996): 478. 
50 
 
Consequently, at independence, Africa’s leaders were left to confront not only 
populations that did not identify with their own states or regimes, but often identified 
more strongly with those outside their borders. The geographical size of Africa’s states 
has also been problematic, with many states drawn too large – the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, perhaps the most egregious example, is the size of Western Europe – 
containing populations too dispersed to enable either the adequate provision of 
infrastructure or the exercise of social and economic control by the state.
23
  In other 
cases, states are too small to allow for the creation of markets of scale. Arguments 
claiming that structure influences the capacity of elites to deliver on socio-economic 
development are a bit more controversial, with proponents pointing to problems believed 
to be associated with a state’s subordinate position within the global economy, or even 
the geographical location of many sub-Saharan African states. Jeffrey Sachs, for 
example, argues that a state’s distance from the equator affects its prospects for socio-
economic development, with tropically-located states at a relative disadvantage.
24
    
While a long list of structural challenges confronts political elites in sub-Saharan 
Africa, common to each is the capacity to severely undermine regime legitimacy. The 
impact of structure on regime legitimacy is perhaps most evident where state elite attempt 
to penetrate society and centralize state control but find their encroachment rebuffed by 
local centers of power seeking to preserve their own rules and values.
25
 Confronting 
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precisely this scenario, the former president of Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo, once 
lamented that “…the decisions we take do not manage to reach the entire territory,” and 
called on the West to “disarm the rebels who prevent my decisions from reaching the 
whole country.”
26
 Society may resist state encroachment for a number of reasons, ranging 
from a belief that submission to state penetration would jeopardize individual or group 
security, to a desire to keep the state from expropriating for itself locally-generated 
revenue. The latter is a particular problem in sub-Saharan Africa, with the World Bank 
putting the size of the region’s informal sector – economic activity neither taxed nor 
regulated – at roughly 41 percent that of GDP.
27
 It is, however, the (arguably 
understandable) refusal of segments of society to recognize the state as the only 
legitimate purveyor of force that has led to so much of the continent’s misery. 
Demonstrating a refusal to cede control to the state, the 2006 mobilization of the CNDP 
in eastern-Congo, a powerful rebel group headed at the time by Laurent Nkunda, was an 
outgrowth of fear that the state would not offer protection to Tutsis against a massacre by 
Hutus. Describing the Congolese Tutsi as facing a “time bomb,” one local Tutsi justified 
the presence of Nkunda’s militia to Human Rights Watch as follows: “…We are not 
asking for much, just survival.”
28
 Whatever the reason, the decision to escape from or 
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directly challenge the state reflects a belief that one’s lot is better off without it.
29
 The 
implications for regime legitimacy are clear.  Structure, however, does not only cause the 
crises of legitimacy that threaten political elites but also reflects them. That is, just as 
structure impacts agency, agency impacts structure. It is to the impact of agency on 
structure that I will now turn. 
2.2b  The Impact of Agency on Structure 
To understand what drives regime behavior as it relates to structure in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is necessary to recognize three truths: first, in an environment in which state 
survival is guaranteed, the primary concern of any regime is its own survival. Second, 
due in part to the nature of structure discussed above, regimes face crises of legitimacy. 
And third, points one and two contribute to an atmosphere of extreme regime insecurity. 
It is likely not a surprise that regimes value their own continuity, yet regime survival is a 
particularly acute concern in sub-Saharan Africa given the ill will generated by the 
authoritarian and often brutal methods by which many regimes have governed.  In an 
insightful quantitative study on the ultimate fates encountered by Africa’s political 
leaders, John Wiseman writes: “The number of times I had to type ‘assassinated,’ 
‘executed,’ ‘imprisoned,’ ‘tortured,’ and ‘exiled’ was, by simple repetition, a constant 
reminder of an unpalatable but inescapable feature of politics in all too many states.”
30
 
Not only do fallen regimes have to contend with retribution from their own populations, 
but loss of diplomatic immunity that comes with the position of head of state can also 
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result in punishment abroad. The indictment of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir by the 
International Criminal Court is speculated to have played a role in his decision to remain 
in power rather than retire.
31
 Thus, to understand agency’s interaction with structure, one 
must take into account the imperative of regime survival coupled with what are often low 
levels of legitimacy and high levels of regime insecurity. What has emerged from this 
equation is a method of governance – aptly characterized as “personal rule”
32
 – that 
emphasizes the protection of the regime in the near-term, yet impacts structure in such a 
way as to make regime survival more tenuous, regime legitimacy more precarious, and 
state-building progression less robust over the long-term. 
Governance in sub-Saharan Africa, generally speaking, can be characterized in 
two ways: first, it is profoundly personal; that is, who gets what, when, and how is 
determined by the particular whims of a state’s regime coupled with its strategy to retain 
power. Ties between regimes and a monolithic “public” are weak; instead, regimes 
selectively form links with natural allies in society whose active support can be counted 
on, as well as with threatening strong-men whose acquiescence can be bought. In short, 
the aim of the regime is to secure enough loyalty to prolong its survival. Second, it 
follows that administrative efficiency is not valued, the consistency that comes with 
strong institutions is not a priority, and formal rules that govern politics and the economy 
are disregarded.
33
  As in the Global North’s most developed states, constitutions exist, 
bureaucratic agencies are staffed, and legislative bodies convene to pass laws. Yet, in 
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sub-Saharan Africa, these key components of the state suffer from varying degrees of 
“hollowness.”
34
 Cruise O’ Brien puts it as follows: “Between the ambitions of the elite 
and the survival stratagems of the masses, the state often appears to survive essentially as 
a show, a political drama with an audience more or less willing to suspend its 
disbelief.”
35
 Put differently, “the state is a government of men and not laws.”
36
  
Three conditions, introduced above, are behind the nature of governance in so 
much of sub-Saharan Africa: regime survival is the imperative; regimes enjoy sub-
optimal levels of legitimacy; and regime insecurity often runs high. Yet too often “poor 
governance,” including a poorly performing civil service, regulatory policies that 
constrain the private sector, and tolerance of corruption, is attributed to pathology or a 
deficiency in the intellectual wherewithal of the regime in charge of the state. If only 
ethical individuals could topple regimes that use the state as a means of personal 
enrichment and crony empowerment, the argument goes, the quality of governance would 
improve and with it the socio-economic development of the state’s population. Equally 
misguided is the notion that “poor governance” is the result of a dearth of expertise, 
potentially remedied by a crush of international organizations tasked with assisting in the 
construction of an institutional framework that mirrors that found in the Global North.  In 
fact, the first attribution is wishful thinking, and the second contains an incorrect 
conclusion following from a faulty premise. The reality is that the tendency to interpret 
personal rule and the ills that come with it as the product of pathological leaders is 
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misguided. It is not an aberration, but the way Africa works.
37
  Political elites govern the 
way they do because structure is the way it is; behavior appearing to reveal the “aberrant 
personalities”
38
 of political elites is often actually a calculated, deliberate, and even 
rational response to low levels of legitimacy, high degrees of insecurity, and the 
imperativeness of survival. 
It is the nature of structure and its impact on agency that compels Africa’s 
political elite to reject institutionalism and turn to personal rule. Were the state strong 
enough to penetrate and create separation from society on its terms, regime security 
would be less endangered, the policy-making process would be more insulated from 
pressure by society’s strong-men, and political elites would feel freer to develop and then 
govern within institutions. Indeed, such a state-society balance is credited with enabling 
the institutionalization of public policy in Botswana.
39
  Yet the relationship between state 
and society in much of sub-Saharan Africa does not mirror that found in Botswana. 
Confronting threatening elements in society they cannot defeat outright, regimes attempt 
to pay off or co-opt key strongmen by incorporating them into the state apparatus.
40
 
Natural allies of regimes – often group-based and centered on ethnicity – are similarly 
rewarded for their loyalty. Yet society’s strongmen, not powerful enough to seize control 
of the state, also benefit from personal politics. With constituencies of their own, and the 
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cherished status of patron dependent on their ability to secure resources for constituents, 
access to the fruits of the state can be invaluable.
41
  Thus, far from achieving a degree of 
insulation from society and a free hand to institutionalize the workings of the state, 




The environment described above is not conducive to institutionalism, as 
institutionalism threatens rather than advances the immediate interests of power-holders 
in both the state and society. Political elite, preoccupied with their survival and tasked 
with the challenge of managing society’s strongmen, reasonably conclude that it is faster, 
cheaper, and safer to buy the compliance of powerful individuals or groups than it is to 
accumulate legitimacy by developing and then governing within the confines of strong 
institutions.
43
 Militating against institutionalism is a lack of powerful, mobilized 
constituencies for reform.
44
 The upending of a system of personal rule would 
immediately threaten vested interests in both the state and society, yet the implementation 
of institutionalism and the emergence of its socio-economic benefits would take time.
45
 
Thus it is a gamble that insecure political elites are reluctant to take. Moreover, formal 
institutions are themselves a threat to political elites as they can be used by potential 
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rivals to develop constituencies of their own. Migdal speaks to the elaborate steps taken 
by political elites to keep the bureaucracy clipped, from frequently shuffling officials 
between agencies to prevent the coalescence of personal loyalties, to staffing the most 
sensitive departments with regime loyalists rather than the best and brightest.
46
 Society’s 
strongmen, like political elites, also stand to lose from the abandonment of personal rule. 
Strongmen have come to rely on patronage from the state in the form of money and jobs 
to distribute to their clients.
47
  As their status depends on the ability to meet the needs of 
constituents, a transformation of the relationship between state and society threatens 
strongmen personally. 
To this point what has been emphasized is the impact of structure on agency and 
its manifestation in agency’s decision to govern by personal rule. The effect of personal 
rule on structure has been narrowly assessed, with a focus on how it impacts society’s 
strongmen. Yet its influence extends much further, drastically shaping structure and 
impacting the lives of every member of society. Njuguna Ng’ethe, arguing for more 
research on leadership style and its effect on the state, writes that identity, legitimacy, 
penetration, participation, resource distribution, and the success and failure of economic 
development are each linked to leadership and governance.
48
 Indeed personal rule 
uniquely affects each of Ng’ethe’s structural variables; it is, however, a myopic way to 
govern and over the long term has the unintended effect of reinforcing and even 
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strengthening a structural environment hostile to the security of political elites. Regime 
legitimacy ultimately suffers as there is invariably insufficient patronage available to 
meet the needs of everyone, forcing the regime to discriminate against certain groups. 
Moreover, rather than usurp the influence of strongmen, their use by the state as a conduit 
through which to channel patronage to society actually increases their stature and power. 
Also affected by personal rule is the development of the nation-state, essential to long-
term political stability. Larry Diamond nicely captures how political elite, lacking 
sufficient patronage to neutralize all threats, rely on the manipulation of ethnicity and pit 
groups against each other to divert attention from the regime.
49
 Posner, arguing that 
group identity is situational, strategic, and affected by one’s environment, contends that 
ethnicity becomes politically salient when it is linked to the distribution of resources by 
the state.
50
 And Mengisteab argues that minority groups, lacking confidence that their 
interests will be advanced, will never incorporate into a non-neutral state – the very 
definition of a state that shuns institutionalism.
51
 Far from enhancing the security of 
political elites, personal rule increases competition for control of the state as livelihoods 
come to depend on it. Finally, personal rule is detrimental to socio-economic 
development. Aside from the fact that a vibrant private sector depends on the 
predictability, stability, and security that comes with institutionalism, personal politics 
shuns long-term planning and extensive investment in the enhancement of bureaucratic 
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capacity on which state-sponsored socio-economic development depends.
52
 Thus, while 
personal rule may make sense as a short-term strategy for political elites who confront 
threating structural environments and are desperate to survive, it ultimately affects 
structure in ways that exacerbate their insecurity. 
In sum, state elites in sub-Saharan Africa have long opted for a strategy of 
personal rule in which governance through institutions is shunned, and patronage 
networks, often centered on ethnicity, thrive. Elites make this choice because they are 
vulnerable and insecure and calculate that personal rule optimizes their chances of 
survival. Yet what may be good for regime survival in the near term runs counter to what 
is necessary for state-building to excel in the longer term. The configuration of and 
reliance upon patronage networks prevents the state from separating itself from society. 
Moreover, the inevitably unequal distribution of patronage from the state to society’s 
various strongmen over time breeds resentment and works against the forging of 
convergence between nations and the state. Finally, to the detriment of social and 
economic development, deliberate efforts to cripple the bureaucracy coupled with the 
refusal to govern through institutions deprive the private sector of the consistency and 
predictability it covets, and encourages the misallocation of the state’s resources. Thus, 
the consequence of regime insecurity over time is less rather than more robust state-
building.   
The objective of Chapter 2 thus far has been to illustrate how the symbiotic 
relationship that exists between agency and structure impacts the state-building process. 
In doing so I first reviewed the work of Charles Tilly in which an external shock – a 
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Hobbesian international environment – is attributed to the shaping of the agency-structure 
dynamic in a way that promoted state-building in early-modern Europe. I then assessed 
the relevance of Tilly to today’s Global South in light of a fundamentally different 
international environment. Lacking the threat of state-annihilating interstate war, the 
relationship between agency and structure in today’s Global South has developed very 
differently than it did in early-modern Europe, with significant implications for state-
building. Next, I turned to the agency-structure dynamic in the Global South and 
reviewed what I believe to be the impact of structure on agency, particularly the role it 
plays in contributing to the crises of legitimacy and environments of insecurity 
confronted by Africa’s political elite. Structural conditions that are fixed (that is, unlikely 
to change) – namely arbitrarily-drawn borders and difficult geography – influence the 
extent to which another structural element, society, accepts as legitimate the regime in 
charge of the state.  Regime illegitimacy manifests itself in a number of ways, from 
attempts by society to escape the reach of the state by disappearing into the informal 
sector of the economy, to initiating armed conflict with the state in an effort to change the 
regime in power. Finally, I assessed the impact of agency on structure and argued that 
agency, responding to a threatening structural environment, opts for a method of 
governance – personal rule – that serves its needs in the near-term, but impacts structure 
in ways that make it more threatening over the long-term. 
2.3  Revising Tilly: Relative Power and State-Building in the Twenty-First Century 
To this point I have argued that state-building progression can best be understood by 
assessing how agency and structure impact one another. Whether state-building 
progresses or not depends heavily on a state’s agency-structure dynamic. But what 
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precisely is responsible for shaping the dynamic in such a way as to yield state-building 
success in some cases, and stagnation or decline in others? In other words, if the 
relationship between agency and structure matters to state-building, what mediates the 
relationship? To refer back to the example of the regulation of social and economic life, 
can a particular variable be identified that compels state elites to build institutions where, 
in the absence of the variable, elites would calculate that their interests are better served 
by keeping institutions weak? Can the same variable explain corresponding shifts in the 
level of threat posed by structure to agency? And is a similar pattern between agency, 
mediator, and structure found when my other four components of state-building are 
considered? As discussed in the initial sections of this chapter, Africa’s sub-Saharan 
states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and 
continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Yet state-
building progression has been uneven. The objective here is to uncover a solution to this 
puzzle by looking to states’ agency-structure dynamics and assessing the impact of a 
mediating variable by which I hypothesize the dynamics are influenced – the relative 
distribution of power among states. The remainder of Chapter 2 will lay out precisely 
how I suspect relative power can affect the agency-structure dynamic internal to states 
and how the impact on the agency-structure relationship is likely to affect where state-
building advances or declines. In doing so, it will note two assumptions that are central to 
my theory, and conclude by putting forward a handful of testable hypotheses to be 





2.3a  State-Building: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power 
At the outset it must be said that relative power, or any exogenous variable for that 
matter, is unlikely to have a transformative impact on the agency-structure relationship 
on par with the Hobbesian international environment emphasized in the work of Charles 
Tilly. The international environment in which the states of early-modern Europe 
developed proved a great boon to state-building because it tied the survival of regimes to 
their ability to overcome structural obstacles, penetrate society, and develop their states, 
and tied the welfare of society to the strength of their regimes and states. Yet absent the 
chronic threat of interstate war and territorial conquest, a similarly robust drawing-
together of regimes and societies is not likely. Society today has much less to lose than it 
once did, and it is no longer confronted with the choice of uniting behind a devil it knows 
or risking conquest by a devil it doesn’t.  Concerns associated with relative power (that 
is, the power of other states relative to one’s own) are simply unlikely to be great enough 
to compel society to mobilize behind the state and its regime. Yet this is not to say that 
exogenous variables no longer have the capacity to influence what happens inside states; 
in fact, there is good reason to believe that concerns associated with relative power can 
move the needle when it comes to state-building. Although relative power itself is 
unlikely to alter the way society would otherwise interact with the state (including its 
regime), it poses a very real threat to regimes and influences how they decide to go about 
interacting with structure (including society). And how regimes, or agency, interact with 
structure has a great impact on state-building’s progression, stagnation, or decline. Given 
the dismissal of the notion that society is threatened by the power of other states, the 
theory that relative power matters to the agency-structure dynamic (and thus to state-
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building) hinges on the case that relative power matters a great deal to political elites. 
Before the precise mechanism by which relative power is believed to impact state-
building can be laid out, the case that it matters to political elites must be established. I 
turn here now. 
2.3b  Assumption #1: States are Fearful of their Immediate Neighbors 
Central to every major theory of international politics is the assumption that states view 
with fear or suspicion the intentions of other states. Whether attributed to an unsavory 
human nature as emphasized by traditional realists, or to the insecurity and uncertainty 
that comes with anarchy as emphasized by neo-realists and neo-liberals, common to each 
theory is the belief that states are compelled to take seriously their defenses against the 
ambitions of other states.
53
 Given that threats travel most easily over short distances and 
many states are simply unable to project force far beyond their own borders, states have 
historically been most fearful of their contiguous neighbors.
54
 Yet scholars of the Global 
South have found fault with mainstream international relations theory on the grounds that 
it may have explained power politics in Europe, but does not capture the nature of the 
state or its external behavior in the Global South today. In a break with traditional 
international relations theory, Mohammed Ayoob contends that the nature of state 
behavior in the Global South is largely a manifestation of security predicaments that 
originate internally, rather than externally.
55
  Similarly, John Clark notes that the neo-
realist assumption of internal order and external anarchy (which compels states to fear 
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one another) should be inverted when assessing the Global South.
56
 In fact, the idea that 
states meaningfully interact at all has been called into question. The active formation of 
alliances – an assumption of mainstream international relations theory – is noticeably less 
common outside the Global North.
57
 And, as the initial pages of this chapter noted, the 
outbreak of interstate war has been rare and norms protecting the preservation of borders 
rigidly respected. The quantity of interaction not directly related to state security has been 
similarly scrutinized. Intra-African trade volume ranks among the lowest in the world 
with only 10 percent of Africa’s trade occurring exclusively between members of the 
continent, compared to rates of 40 percent in North America and 60 percent in Western 
Europe.
58
 Taken all together, it is understandable that Douglas Lemke felt compelled to 
preface his own study of interstate politics in the Global South with the following 
concession: “I am well aware there may not be much interaction among underdeveloped 
states to either understand or anticipate in the first place.”
59
 Given the dearth of 
traditional interaction among states coupled with what appears on the surface to be a 
generally peaceful and non-cut throat international environment, it is not surprising to 
find scholars of the Global South calling into question the generalizability of mainstream 
international relations theory or the assumptions on which it is based. 
 While critics of mainstream international relations theory correctly point to 
disparities between the expected and actual behavior of states in the Global South, it 
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would be a mistake to take the critiques too far and conclude that states and elites exist in 
semi-vacuums, face minimal danger from, and need not worry about the intentions and 
capabilities of one another. Alliance-formation in sub-Saharan Africa, while not robust as 
that found in the Global North, is also not altogether absent. For example, regional 
security institutions have historically been weak in the Horn, East and Central Africa, yet 
relatively coherent and active in West and Southern Africa.
60
 And while intraregional 
trade significantly lags the rest of the world, it is not for an absence of trade-friendly 
institutions; in fact, all but two African states have membership in a regional trade 
agreement, and many states in more than one.
61
 Moreover, to argue that states in the 
Global South have only rarely fought interstate wars is not to say that they are incapable 
of doing so, or will not do so more frequently in the future. Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
independent for just 50 years, making for a relatively short period of observation. Of the 
50 years, the first 30 fell during the Cold-War – a period during which sphere-of-
influence politics and the risk of turning a cold war hot may have limited the viability of 
waging war. And although interstate war in sub-Saharan Africa has been remarkably rare, 
militarized interstate disputes (MID) stopping short of war have not. Indeed, of the 42 
states in sub-Saharan Africa, all but one have been involved in an MID with a contiguous 
neighbor at some point since independence.
62
 This is hardly surprising given that 
conditions on the continent are ripe for interstate conflict as young, insecure states have a 
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particularly high potential to generate regional volatility.
63
 Particularly inflammatory are 
disputes over territory, which sub-Saharan Africa has in abundance.
64
 62 percent of states 
in the region with at least one land border are currently involved in a territorial dispute 
with another state, and in many cases have disputes with more than one state.
65
 Desperate 
regimes might also opt to provoke neighboring states in an attempt to generate nationalist 
sentiment at home and distract from domestic problems.
66
  And while draconian 
outcomes such as the incorporation of losers by winners are no longer probable 
consequences of interstate war, the risks to political elite remain great. Of Africa’s four 
interstate wars, one – the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania – resulted in the overthrow of 
the regime, and another – the Second Congo War – likely would have had the same result 
had neighboring allies not come to the aid of Congolese president Laurent Kabila.  
While the prevalence of formal state-to-state interaction such as the formation of 
alliances, trade, and interstate war has to date been relatively underwhelming in sub-
Saharan Africa, non-formal cross-border interaction occurs frequently. This takes the 
form of non-state actors in separate states interacting with one another (such as a rebel 
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group in Uganda collaborating with a rebel group in Rwanda), or states interacting with 
non-state actors in neighboring states (such as the government of Ethiopia providing aid 
to an insurgency in Eritrea). In fact, such non-formal cross-border interaction poses as 
much or more of a threat to state and regime security as formal state-to-state interaction. 
Largely giving rise to the robustness of non-formal cross-border interaction is the chronic 
condition of domestic insecurity coupled with three (not necessarily mutually-exclusive) 
realities in sub-Saharan Africa: borders on the continent are extremely permeable; 
internal conflict is endemic to the region and easily spills over borders; and state and non-
state actors have a history of calculated intervention into the affairs of their neighbors. 
Each of these circumstances has the capacity to threaten the primary objective of Africa’s 
regimes – survival – and thus compels a preoccupation with one’s neighbors. 
Permeable Borders:   The inability of states to project authority into their 
hinterlands coupled with the unaffordable administrative costs of border patrol has made 
Africa’s borders among the most porous in the world.
67
 Levan Griffiths calculates that the 
continent’s 50,000 miles of border are protected by just 345 official road crossing points, 
amounting to one official crossing point for every 145 miles of border.
68
 Of all official 
crossing points – whether road, rail, or waterway – 40 percent have no government 
presence at the actual border, with custom posts often set back as far as 60 miles.
69
 
Consequentially, individuals have been able to move across borders with relative ease. 
The impact of border permeability on state and regime security has ranged from 
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negligible to catastrophic. Nomadic herdsmen cross borders as their animals graze, and 
populations on one side of a border visit socially with populations on the other side at no 
cost to the state or its regime. More problematic is the prevalence of smuggling, made 
easy by permeable boundaries, as governments are denied tax revenue on goods illicitly 
moved in and out of their states. But, without question, the greatest threat posed to 
regimes by porous borders is the ease with which they can be crossed by armed, non-state 
actors seeking to wage war against their governments. By way of example, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group that fought an 11-year civil war with 
the government of Sierra Leone, was based on the Liberian side of the border and 
invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Similarly, rebels in 2006 used bases along the Chad-
Sudan border to organize and launch an invasion that quickly spread to the capital city of 
N’Djamena. In these cases and others, rebels took advantage of foreign support and 
easily penetrable borders to carry out attacks against the regimes in charge of their states. 
Spillover: The propensity for domestic conflict to spill over borders compels 
political elites in sub-Saharan Africa to preoccupy themselves with the internal politics of 
their neighbors. Indeed, the literature shows that African states possess traits that amplify 
their risk of both producing and becoming victims of conflicts that spill over borders. 
Central among these traits is the absence of a convergence between nations and states. 
Englebert et al. find that states with borders that partition previously unified populations 
are at an elevated risk of interstate conflict.
70
 Similarly, Miller finds that a region’s 
propensity for interstate peace or war is best explained by the success with which its 
members have formed nation-states, and Carment corroborates the finding by showing 
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that domestic conflicts centered on ethnicity are disproportionately likely to stoke 
interstate violence.
71
 The nation-state - interstate war connection may be explained by 
kin-country syndrome, or by the tendency of ethnic civil wars to produce large numbers 
of destabilizing refugees.
72
 Spillover, even if it does not trigger interstate hostilities, can 
produce domestic instability in its recipient states.  Sambanis finds that the probability of 
a state experiencing ethnic civil war rises if its neighbors are also engaged in wars of the 
same type.
73
 This may be partially attributable to a demonstration effect given that the 
internal political circumstances of states are very similar across sub-Saharan Africa, and 
“lesson-drawing…takes place constantly”.
74
 Lemarchand attributes the heightened 
political salience of ethnicity in Burundi – ultimately erupting in genocide – to the 
demonstration effect of the 1959-1962 Rwandan Revolution. As persecuted Rwandan 
Tutsis fled across the border into Burundi and shared their horrifying experiences, it 
became clear to Burundi’s Tutsis that control of the state must be kept from the hands of 
Hutus lest they face a similar fate.  Indeed, Lemarchand writes that “no other event did 




External Intervention: While the formation of interstate alliances in sub-Saharan 
Africa has not been particularly robust, states have aggressively allied with rebel groups 
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engaged in conflict with the regimes of their neighbors. To note just a handful: Sudan has 
supported the LRA in Uganda and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in Ethiopia, and 
Uganda and Ethiopia the SPLA in Sudan; Uganda allied with the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front which ultimately moved into Kigali and assumed power, and soon after teamed up 
again to assist the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, 
which toppled then-Zairian president Joseph Mobutu; Sudan has aggressively supported 
Islamist movements in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt; the RUF, which at 
one point in its civil war effectively overthrew the government of Sierra Leone, was 
backed heavily by Liberia; and sheer exhaustion prevents a listing of the myriad central-
African states that have either been affected by or sponsored the LRA, PRA, ADF, 
Interahamwe, ex-FAR, FNCL, and ex-CNDP  – all operating out of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
76
 Indeed, Christopher Clapham writes that the proliferation of 
African insurgencies and the willingness of neighboring states to lend their support have 
“blurred the distinction between government and insurgency.”
77
  
Behind the decision to support insurgencies in neighboring states is a calculation 
that doing so will increase regime security. As with domestic policy, foreign policy 
decisions are made primarily with an eye toward the advancement of regime longevity, 
rather than what is necessarily in the best interest of the state.
78
 Therefore, political elites 
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will opt to intervene in the affairs of their neighbors in order to bolster their standing at 
home, or to retaliate for or deter additional intervention by neighboring states into their 
own internal affairs. Given the outsized role of ethnicity in domestic politics, namely the 
extent to which regimes rely on ethnic constituencies to maintain their grips on power, it 
is not surprising to find that ethnicity plays a role in shaping the foreign policies of 
Africa’s states;
79
 Saideman finds that ethnic ties between the constituents of African 
regimes and the rebel groups fighting next door strongly influence the decision of 
regimes to provide rebels with support.
80
 And Lemarchand captures the strength of the 
link between ethnicity, regime security, and foreign policy in declaring the foreign 
policies of Tutsi heads of state in the Great Lakes region largely reducible to “The friends 
of the Tutsi are our friends, and the friends of the Hutu are our enemies.”
81
 
The preceding pages have provided at least some evidence for the case that 
Africa’s political elite have good reason to fear their neighbors despite a relative dearth of 
formal state-to-state interaction. While formal interstate interaction may not be 
particularly robust, conditions in sub-Saharan Africa are such that political elites at the 
helm of states must nevertheless view with utmost skepticism the intentions and behavior 
of proximate states.  What largely compels Africa’s political elite to fear their neighbors 
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is a chronically insecure domestic landscape coupled with the reality of permeable 
borders, a tendency for conflicts to spill into neighboring states, and conditions that favor 
the calculated intervention of state and non-state actors into the affairs of their neighbors. 
In this context, non-formal cross-border interaction between groups of non-state actors, 
or states and non-state actors, has thrived. The capacity of such interaction between 
neighbors to circumvent the primary objective of every regime – survival – has not been 
lost on Africa’s political elite. 
2.3c  Assumption #2: States are Preoccupied with the Relative Power of Their Neighbors 
Perhaps no concept has received more attention from students of international relations 
than power. Although there is no consensus on precisely how power drives interstate 
relations, from its effect on when states will cooperate with one another, to when they 
will go to war, no interstate phenomena can be fully explained without considering the 
role played by power; indeed, power and interstate politics are inextricably linked. The 
centrality of power to the study of international relations is straightforward: power is 
immensely important to all states.  Samuel Huntington concisely but thoroughly captures 
the imperative of power as follows: “Power enables an actor to shape his environment so 
as to reflect his interests. In particular, it enables a state to protect its security and 
prevent, deflect, or defeat threats to that security. It also enables a state to promote its 
values among other peoples and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its 
values.”
82
 Or, as Waltz puts it, power “provides the means of maintaining one’s 
autonomy in the face of force that others wield.”
83
 It is, in short, a currency that states 
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must possess if they wish to dictate – rather than have dictated to them – the terms of 
their relations with other states.  
 The role of power in international relations becomes significantly more 
complicated when we move beyond merely assessing its value to states, and turn instead 
to questions related to its distribution. Namely, to what extent are states preoccupied not 
only with their own power, but with the power of other states? If state A gains two units 
of power but state B gains three units, does state A celebrate its gain of two units, or does 
it lament the outcome given that state B gained an additional unit? In other words, do 
states ask “will both of us gain?” Or do they ask “who will gain more?”
84
 Power can only 
be understood in relative terms. On the one hand it is a finite resource; every one of the 
world’s states cannot simultaneously accumulate power. Instead, any accumulation of 
power by one state necessarily results in other states losing power. This is not necessarily 
to say that every state cannot simultaneously become richer or more militarily mighty in 
absolute terms. Each of the world’s states might simultaneously accumulate five units of 
economic or military growth, but the net effect would be a wash and the distribution of 
power would not change. In addition, the fact that power is not employed in a vacuum 
compels it to be understood in relative terms. Any foreign policy decision made by any 
state, including the decision to do nothing, is conditioned by its cache of power and 
inevitably impacts fellow states.  Therefore, because power is neither accumulated nor 
employed in a vacuum, it is meaningless to simply say “state A is powerful.” Because 
power is not an end but a means to the same end pursued by every state (the realization of 
its values, whatever they may be), “state A is powerful” is only meaningful when 
“powerful” is considered in terms of “powerful” relative to whom.  
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Given the way power works, a state that asks only “will I gain?” and fails to 
concern itself with “who will gain more?” opens itself up to the possibility of losing its 
autonomy from and influence over other states. As Huntington puts it, “to ask whether 
primacy matters is to ask whether power matters.”
85
 Yet states are not invariably 
threatened by every exchange that results in a loss of some relative power. Instead, states 
define each unique situation and act on the basis of that definition.
86
 In taking into 
account the circumstances surrounding an exchange, coupled with specific knowledge of 
the other states involved, states calculate not only whether another’s gains can be used to 
their disadvantage, but whether they are likely to be.
87
 If state A believes that an increase 
in the relative power of state B may threaten its security, it will surely move to keep state 
B from making a gain or move to protect itself from fallout associated with the gain once 
it is made. But if the nature of the relationship between state A and state B is such that 
neither believes its security is likely to be threatened by the other, the distribution of 
power should matter less. In short, the prioritization of relative power is dependent upon 
the nature of the relationship between states, and the level of confidence those states have 
that their security vulnerabilities will not be exploited. 
Relative Power in Sub-Saharan Africa:  An adjustment to realism proposed by 
Stephen Walt in which he argues that states actually fear and respond to threats rather 
than power has gone a long way toward explaining otherwise-puzzling behavior in the 
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Global North. If fear of power by itself motivated the behavior of states, one would 
expect to find, among other things, the Canadian side of the border among the most 
militarized in the world, significant integration of Europe nonexistent, and U.S. 
preponderance following the termination of the Cold War immediately challenged.  But 
with threats prioritized rather than power, and states in the Global North confident that 
their security will not be threatened by one another, destabilizing behavior associated 
with the security dilemma has been negligible, tremendous cooperation has taken place, 
and power disparities have been allowed to grow largely unchecked. Yet the relaxed 
threat environment that has shaped the interactions of states in the North has not been 
replicated in the Global South generally, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. This is due 
to a diametrically divergent set of conditions that characterize both the internal and 
external environments of the two groups of states. Whereas states in the North are 
internally coherent, states in the South are fractured and regimes chronically insecure; 
whereas the security of borders in the North is relatively strong and the survival of 
regimes is not threatened by activity emanating from the territory of neighbors, the 
presence of myriad cross-border threats poses an immense challenge to the welfare of 
regimes in the South; and while a long history of interaction and  growing integration has 
forged trust and tied the fates of states in the North, nothing close exists in the South.  
Mohammed Ayoob writes of the extreme nervousness with which states in the South 
view the activities of their neighbors, and contends that a harmony of interests is 
“conspicuous by its absence.”
88
 Even friendships are precarious and fleeting. Only two 
years after facilitating the installation of Laurent Kabila as president of the Democratic 
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Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda invaded in a bid to remove him. And once 
inside the DRC, the two states had a bizarre falling-out which saw their militaries fight 
battles with one another that nearly escalated to war. Until that point very close – 
Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni supported the Rwandan insurgency that led to Paul 
Kagame becoming president, and years earlier Kagame served in Museveni’s rebel army, 
ultimately becoming his intelligence chief – Museveni reportedly believed that a 
Rwandan invasion was imminent.
89
 Indeed, the debate over whether states fear power or 
threats – an enormous preoccupation of mainstream international relations theory – is 
largely irrelevant in sub-Saharan Africa where power and threats are one and the same.  
Given that each state in sub-Saharan Africa, assuming reach, both threatens and is 
threatened by its fellow states, every state must preoccupy itself with the question of 
relative power. This holds true whether one accepts the unitary actor view of states, or 
believes instead that the foreign policies of states in the Global South are aimed more 
squarely at supporting regime survival than promoting a broader set of national security 
interests.
90
 Both the national security of states as well as the interests of their regimes can 
be threatened by powerful neighbors. Because cross-border interaction can either 
alleviate or exacerbate domestic security challenges, and Africa’s regimes have a long 
history of intervening abroad in a bid to shore up security at home, the distribution of 
power among states is especially salient.
91
 A power disadvantage may invite cross-border 
intervention by reducing the risk that the intervening states will face damaging 
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retaliation. Likewise, a power advantage may serve as a deterrent; Christopher Clapham 
writes that much of the counter-insurgency strategy of apartheid-South Africa and the 
former Rhodesia centered on raising likely punitive costs to a level that would compel 
their neighbors to deny territorial bases to threatening insurgents.
92
 In addition, a region’s 
most powerful members are uniquely positioned to manage regional conflicts in ways 
that benefit themselves.
93
 This perk is particularly valuable given the outsized impact of 
the external environment on domestic security.  
Evidence of the importance of relative power to political elites in sub-Saharan 
Africa can be found in the interstate jostling that takes place within regional 
organizations. Contrary to arguments that claim states in sub-Saharan Africa do not 
aspire to regional domination and seldom compete with one another,
94
 the success or 
failure of regional organizations often hinges on whether its member-states can work 
through concerns associated with relative power. The inability of Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Kenya to establish a mutually-agreeable hierarchy contributed to the destruction of the 
East African Community in the 1970s.
95
 And although the West African region has 
integrated to an extent not seen elsewhere on the continent, preoccupation with relative 
power abounds.  Characteristic of the region is a Nigerian state that endeavors to be seen 
as in indispensable leader, and a countervailing group of francophone states that may 
benefit from the resources provided by Nigeria, but are at best apprehensive, and at most 
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fearful of its hegemonic aspirations.
96
 Indeed, the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in 
Liberia’s civil war – largely funded and led by Nigeria – was opposed by Ivory Coast in 
part to deliver a setback to Nigeria.
97
 
The objectives of this section have been to make clear the importance of power, 
demonstrate that power is only meaningful when thought of in relative terms, and flesh 
out the conditions under which states are likely to fear and respond to one another’s 
power. In doing so, I have accepted Stephen Walt’s argument that states do not 
instinctively fear power, but threats. In other words, the prioritization of relative power is 
dependent upon the nature of the relationship between states and the confidence those 
states have that their security vulnerabilities will not be exploited. For example: domestic 
stability, an absence of cross-border activity that threatens the security of regimes, and 
trust generated by a long history of interaction and integration has minimized the 
importance of relative power among states in the Global North. Yet the reality of a 
completely different internal and external environment in sub-Saharan Africa has made a 
distinction there between power and threat largely meaningless. The nature of the 
continent’s internal and external security climates – and one feeds the other – compels 
paranoid political elites to adopt the hardline realist position that all power must be 
feared, as every state (with reach capability) is an immediate or potential threat.  
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2.3d  The Hypothesized Impact of Relative Power on State-Building 
In arguing that the political elite of sub-Saharan Africa have good reason to fear the 
power of their neighbors, I have spoken to the deeply insecure internal and external 
environments in which states in sub-Saharan Africa exist, and discussed how the power 
of one’s neighbors might be used to threaten regime security. Having done so, I am now 
in a position to lay out the specific hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3. Hypotheses that 
speculate on the relationship between relative power and state-building can be grouped 
into two very general categories: those that suggest political elites will feel threatened by 
the power of their neighbors and respond in ways that facilitate state-building, and those 
that suggest political elites will feel threatened by the power of their neighbors and 
respond in ways that are detrimental to state-building.  
 Threatened Facilitators: A threatened facilitator considers the power of his 
neighbors to be a security threat – that is, a threat to the regime if not to the state – and 
responds with behavior that facilitates state-building. As laid out above, threats 
commonly emerge from activity that originates in neighboring states, spills over borders, 
and impacts structure in recipient states in ways that threaten the security of the regimes 
in charge of those states. The objective of the threatened facilitator is to reduce the threat 
posed by powerful neighbors by increasing regime legitimacy at home. In doing so, a 
leader aims to make the structure of his state less of a threat by bringing as broad a 
segment of society as possible under regime control and minimizing the pool of 
disenfranchised and disgruntled individuals that could otherwise be employed by 
neighboring states to destabilize the regime. To do so a leader might commit to, among 
other things, the provision of positive political goods to the population, the adoption of 
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policies that aim to unify disparate populations, and the prioritization of good 
governance. All, in theory, should build domestic support and increase regime legitimacy 
while reducing the viability of external interference and minimizing the damage that can 
be done to the regime. Thus:  
 H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage 
relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded 
differently, relative state-building progression will increase as states lose power 
relative to neighbors. 
Threatened Impeders: Like the threatened facilitator, the threatened impeder is 
fearful of the power of his neighbors but responds with policies that ultimately retard 
rather than facilitate state-building. Aware that structure may be used by powerful 
neighbors to destabilize the regime, the threatened impeder opts to shore up regime 
security by neutralizing structure. Yet his attempts to do so rely not on building 
legitimacy through the institutionalization of politics, the broad provision of positive 
political goods or the promise of good governance, but on personal politics and the 
selective cooptation of opponents. While this strategy may shore up regime security in 
the near-term, it will not fundamentally transform structure and runs counter to the 
imperatives of state-building. Thus:  
 H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage 
relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded 
differently, relative state-building progression will decrease as states lose power 
relative to neighbors. 
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The initial sections of Chapter 2 discussed at length the nature of the agency-
structure relationship in sub-Saharan Africa and concluded that political elites, driven by 
the goal of regime survival, opt for patrimonial rather than institutional rule in the face of 
threatening structural environments. It therefore stands to reason that political elites will, 
to the detriment of state-building, double down on personal rule when an already-
threatening structural environment is made more dangerous by the presence of powerful 
neighbors. With the survival of regimes in immediate jeopardy but the longevity of states 
guaranteed, political elites simply will not prioritize the development-friendly, 
legitimacy-building strategies that are costly in the near-term and take time to bear fruit. 
Instead, in the face of threats, allegiance to the near-term safety and expediency of 
personal politics is far more likely. While the notion that a threatening international 
environment retards rather than facilitates state-building runs counter to the theories of 
Charles Tilly and those who have since tried to make variations of Tilly work in the 
Global South, it does reflect the reality of politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore I 
expect to find no evidence of support for H1 but do expect to find H2 substantiated. 
By way of extension, I suspect that preponderant states will show a greater 
tendency toward state-building. Given that a power disadvantage is believed to further 
threaten political elites and provoke a doubling-down on the state-building-adverse 
strategy of personal rule, it reasons that preponderance will reduce the threat posed by 
neighbors to political elites and therefore the perceived need to rely more strongly on 
personal rule. This is of course not to say that a favorable power distribution will be 
sufficient to compel political elites to abandon personal rule altogether. Regime 
insecurity brought on by a difficult structural environment will persevere whether or not 
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states are more powerful than their neighbors. What I argue is that preponderance will 
make structure less threatening and a more pronounced move toward personal rule less 
urgent. Therefore:  
 H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage 
relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their 
neighbors. Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states 
as they gain power relative to their neighbors. 
2.4  Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter 2 set out to make the case that relative power plays a central role in the state-
building process underway in today’s Global South. To this end I first laid out how the 
symbiotic relationship between agency and structure has impacted the state-building 
process, both historically and today. In doing so I briefly reviewed the work of Charles 
Tilly in which an external shock – a Hobbesian international environment – is suggested 
to have shaped the agency-structure dynamic in a way that promoted state-building in 
early-modern Europe. I then assessed the relevance of Tilly to today’s Global South in 
light of a fundamentally different international environment. Lacking the threat of state-
annihilating interstate war, the relationship between agency and structure in today’s 
Global South has developed very differently than it did in early-modern Europe, with 
significant implications for state-building. Next I turned to the agency-structure dynamic 
as it exists in today’s Global South and laid out what I believe to be the impact of 
structure on agency, and vice-versa. To sum it up, structure contributes mightily to the 
crises of legitimacy and insecurity confronted by Africa’s political elite. Agency in turn, 
responding to a threatening structural environment, opts for a method of governance – 
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personal rule – that serves its needs in the near-term, but impacts structure in ways that 
make it more threatening over the long-term. I then proposed that a mediator – relative 
power – can be expected to meaningfully influence the agency-structure dynamic and 
thus when and where state-building will progress, stagnate, or decline. Chapter 2 
concluded with an examination of two assumptions key to my theory – that states in sub-
Saharan Africa both fear their neighbors and take seriously relative power – and then laid 
out three hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3. It is to the testing of these hypotheses and 





3.0  Introduction: Testing the Link Between Relative Power and State-Building 
The objective of the first two chapters of this dissertation has been to lay the groundwork 
necessary to carry out the task of Chapter 3: to test the relationship between relative 
power and state-building and thereby shed light on the question of why state-building 
progresses in some states, but stagnates or declines in others. In doing so I first defined 
precisely what is meant by “state-building” and sought to provide some cohesion to a 
question that has produced an unwieldy array of answers. I then assessed both the internal 
workings of states in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the nature of the external environment 
in which Africa’s states exist. On the basis of these assessments, I hypothesized that 
state-building performance is influenced by the relative distribution of power among 
states. More specifically, that states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors 
will prove to be less prolific state-builders than states at a power advantage.  
In fact, tests of my hypotheses produced a mixed bag of results. Results were 
consistently in line with expectations when state-building was measured in terms of the 
promotion of human development, yet somewhat contradictory when measured in terms 
of the regulation of social/economic life, and the provision of infrastructure. And no 
statistically significant relationship of any kind between the relative distribution of power 
and state-building progression was found when state-building was measured in terms of 
the monopolization of force/provision of security, or the shaping of a national identity. 
Independent variables included in my models did tend to explain a good deal of variance 
in the dependent variable. When state-building was measured in terms of how well the 
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state promotes human development, the total variance in state-building explained by the 
models ranged from 12 to 25 percent, depending on how power was calculated and 
whether or not hegemons were included or excluded. When state-building was measured 
in terms of the provision of infrastructure, the range was 35 to 42 percent, and when 
state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, the amount 
of variance accounted for ranged from 20 to 25 percent.  
That said, Chapter 3 will proceed as follows: first I will present my dependent, 
independent, and control variables and lay out how they will be operationalized and 
coded. Next I will discuss the methodology employed to test my hypotheses. And finally 
I will present in detail the results of the tests and discuss their implications. 
3.1  The Research Design 
In examining the impact that the distribution of power in one’s neighborhood has on 
state-building, I will look at the entirety of sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of its 
island states (Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Cape Verde) as these 
states have no contiguous neighbors. I will also exclude the north-African states of Egypt, 
Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. These states identify politically more with the 
Middle East than with Africa, are significantly wealthier, have different colonial 
histories, and confront agency-structure realities that diverge from those common to 
states south of the Sahara desert.  And, finally, I exclude Somalia. Because my argument 
assumes an integral role for central government in the state-building process and Somalia 
has been altogether-without for over two decades, its inclusion in this project would be 
inappropriate. That leaves a total of 41 states to be included in my project. My analysis 
will begin with data from the first year that two contiguous states are both independent 
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(therefore the inclusion of the Chad-Sudan relationship would first occur in 1960) and 
end with data from 2007. The year 2007 was selected as an end-point because it is the 
final year for which data on the independent variable – relative power – is available.  
The decision to define region (or neighborhood) narrowly – as dyads of states that 
share a border, rather than as the group of states that make up West, Central, South, or 
East Africa, or even all of sub-Saharan Africa – was made given the very limited reach of 
most African states. The reality is that most African states lack the capacity to project 
force much beyond their immediate borders. Moreover, most non-state threats to regimes 
travel most easily across immediate borders. It therefore does not make sense to assume 
that states that cannot conceivably reach one another threaten one another.
1
 
Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation, neighborhood is best limited to 
contiguous states. 
I have opted to aggregate all annual time-series data into five-year observations. 
In the handful of instances where data is unavailable for all five years of an observation, I 
take the mean when data exists for three or more years, and drop observations where it 
exists for less than three years. While the aggregation of data must be carefully 
considered as it risks masking meaningful variation within the aggregated span of time, in 
this case the benefits far outweigh the risks. First, change occurs very slowly, both in the 
distribution of power among neighbors (the independent variable) and also in my five 
measures of state-building (the dependent variable). The aggregation of annual data into 
observations of five years better captures meaningful trends and reduces the risk that an 
observation is skewed by a one-time statistical inaccuracy or anomaly. Moreover, it takes 
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time for political elites to sense a shift in the relative distribution of power, act on the 
shift, and for that action to manifest in state-building advancement or retardation. 
Looking, for example, for an impact on state-building in Liberia in 1995 based on a shift 
in the relative distribution of power during the same year assumes first that political elites 
both sense and react to annual shifts, and second that reactions yield immediate results. 
Neither scenario is probable. Instead, elites are likely to perceive and respond to a trend 
in the distribution of power over more than a single year, and it is sure to take some time 
before their corresponding actions impact state-building progression. Therefore, I 
aggregate data into five-year observations and then lag the independent variable to allow 
it an opportunity to demonstrate (or not) an impact on the dependent variable.  For 
example, the distribution of power among Liberia and its neighbors in the period 1990 – 
1994 is predicted to impact my five measures of state-building in Liberia in the period 
1995 – 1999. 
3.1a  The Dependent Variable 
Opting for a minimalist definition – that is, one centered on the most essential tasks that 
states must carry out to avoid failure or collapse – I have defined state-building as the 
process by which states monopolize force and provide security; regulate social and 
economic life; provide infrastructure services; promote human development; and shape 
national identity. As noted in Chapter 1, my approach deviates methodologically from 
others common in the literature in that I define state-building quite broadly – compared, 





 Conversely, there are of course much broader definitions and many other 
components of state-building that might have been included. My decision to focus on 
only the five components is not to say that they are the only components that matter; yet, 
in choosing the five components, I have attempted to provide a definition of state-
building that has a logic to it, is broad enough to capture the general state of the state, but 
is not so broad and inclusive that it renders “state-building” nearly meaningless. Relative 
to more narrow definitions, my approach makes it significantly more difficult to neatly 
measure state-building and classify states as either strong or weak, as state strength is 
likely to vary depending on the particular component being measured. It does, however, 
provide a more nuanced and honest picture of state-building and thus makes the trade-off 
worthwhile. 
 The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security:  There is perhaps 
no better sign that a state has lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of force and is 
unable to provide security to its population than the presence of large-scale political 
violence. Not only does the existence of internal violence demonstrate quite clearly that 
the state is not entirely in control of its territory, but it poses a threat to the security of its 
population on a magnitude unlike anything else. To measure the degree to which a state 
monopolizes the legitimate use of force and provides security to its population, I will 
draw on the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset produced by the 
Center for Systemic Peace.
3
  The MEPV dataset provides annual time-series data on all 
major episodes of internal political violence for every country in sub-Saharan Africa 
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more useful as it is ends-oriented rather than means-oriented. 
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89 
 
beginning with the year of independence.  To merit inclusion in the dataset, an episode 
must be characterized by the sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups 
resulting in at least 500 directly-related deaths. Given that the magnitudes of all episodes 
of internal political violence are of course not equal, episodes in the MEPV dataset are 
coded on an 11-point ratio scale (0-10, with a score of 0 indicating no MEPV and 10 the 
most severe MEPV) on the basis of how thoroughly the normal networking and 
functioning of society was disrupted. Factored into this calculation are the extent of 
fatalities, population dislocations, resource depletion, and the psychological trauma 
incurred by populations. I have opted to take the 11-point scale generated by the Center 
for Systemic Peace and dichotomize it. For every five-year period during which a state 
averages an MEPV score greater than 1.5, I assign a score of 0 indicating the absence of a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of the force and the inability to provide security to the 
population. For every five-year period that a state averages an MEPV score between 0 
and 1.5, I assign a score of 1 to indicate the presence of security and the monopolization 
of the legitimate use of force. I choose an MEPV score of 1.5 as the cutoff given that a 
move from category 1 to category 2 on the MEPV scale represents an escalation of the 
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more frequent violence (2), it is quite clear that after a score of 2, the state has lost all capacity to routinely 
provide security to its population and monopolize the legitimate use of force. Categories 2-10 assume that 
the state has lost this capacity, and instead capture only how much and what type of violence the population 
has endured. I am less interested in this for the purpose of my dissertation. By way of example, the MEPV 
dataset codes Somalia a 5 on its scale of 1-10. Clearly the government of Somalia since 1991 has at times 
controlled no more than a few city blocks and lost complete capacity to provide security and monopolize 
force (which is what I wish to measure), yet because the country has not endured inordinate violence, it 
received a code of 5 rather than a code closer to 10. To use the more ordinal data in my dissertation would 
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 The Regulation of Social and Economic Life:  I draw on the “regulatory 
quality” variable from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset 
to measure how well states regulate social and economic life within their borders.
5
  
Specifically, the variable captures how effectively states adopt and implement policies 
that ultimately promote private sector development.  The WGI dataset provides annual 
time-series data and is the most sophisticated and thorough source available; regrettably, 
however, the first year for which it provides data is 1996. The fact is that time-series data 
on governance and regulation is very scarce until the mid-1990s. Transparency 
International, for example, did not initiate its Corruption Perception Index until 1995 and, 
although Economic Freedom of the World has time-series data for various economic 
indicators dating back to 1970, it also provides no data on economic regulation or quality 
of governance until 1995. Yet, given the importance of this component of state-building, 
I believe it makes more sense to include it in the project despite the total of just 114 five-
year observations than it does to ignore it altogether. 
The Provision of Infrastructure:  Measuring the provision and quality of 
infrastructure over time in sub-Saharan Africa poses a challenge as comprehensive time-
series data going back more than a few years and covering a wide array of infrastructure 
stocks is scarce.  Data on the existence and quality of roads, for example, is available 
only intermittently beginning in 1990 and availability varies widely by country.  
Similarly, although data on various measures of energy production dates back to the early 
1970s, availability is limited to just half the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. And where 
data is both comprehensive in its coverage and longitudinally-sufficient, it often does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
paint a misleading picture of what it is that I am actually trying to measure (not the extent of violence, but 
the government’s capacity to prevent it). 
5
 The dataset is available at : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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capture what this dissertation requires. For example, consider data on the percentage of 
people who have access to a sanitary means of human waste disposal. The World Bank 
provides time-series data for every country in sub-Saharan Africa dating back to 1990. 
While ostensibly a very good measure of infrastructure breadth and performance, the 
reality of sanitation throughout sub-Saharan Africa is that it is a household issue largely 
ignored by government. Less than half of Africa’s largest cities have waterborne sewer 
systems, and more than half of the continent’s countries reported no spending on 
sanitation at all.
6
 Therefore, what is ostensibly solid data on the provision of 
infrastructure actually captures individual or household means and initiative rather than 
government performance, as governments across the continent have shunned 
responsibility for developing sanitation infrastructure.  
Yet despite the obstacles laid out above, good data does exist for a handful of types 
of infrastructure and thus makes possible a general assessment of state performance. In 
measuring state performance, I draw on data that captures the number of fixed telephone 
lines per 1,000 people, as well as the percentage of a state’s population that has access to 
clean water. Both types of infrastructure are essential to people’s lives, and both are 
characterized by heavy state involvement. The availability and comprehensiveness of 
data is also good. Annual time-series data on fixed telephone lines, provided by The 
World Bank, is available for every country in sub-Saharan Africa from 1975 through 
2007. Data on access to a source of clean water is less thorough but still adequate; The 
World Bank provides data for every country in sub-Saharan Africa every five years, 
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beginning in 1990 and ending in 2007.
7
 To combine data on fixed telephone lines and 
access to clean water into a single measure of infrastructure provision, I first standardize 
both variables (to prevent fixed line numbers which can be quite large from 
overwhelming numbers on access to clean water which can be no greater than 100) and 
then take the sum of the standardized fixed-line and water z-scores for each year. As with 
all other variables, annual data is then aggregated into five-year observations. 
The Promotion of Human Development:  How well the state promotes the 
human development of its population will be measured by GDP per capita (held constant 
at year 2000 levels) and life expectancy at birth. Annual time-series data for each 
variable, taken from the World Development Indicators dataset, is available for every 
country in sub-Saharan Africa. Data is generally available from independence through 
2007 but in a handful of cases GDP per capita data does not become available until the 
mid-1980s. Even so, in these few cases, there are nearly 25 years for which data on life 
expectancy and GDP are both available. My measure of human development closely 
mirrors the United Nations’ well-known Human Development Index (HDI) but I opt not 
to use it and exclude variables that capture educational attainment.
8
 My reason has to do 
with data availability; education accounts for one-third of the HDI yet data on education 
does not consistently become available in sub-Saharan Africa until between 2000 and 
2005. Consequently, over 25 percent of states in sub-Saharan Africa have no HDI score 
until the year 2000 or 2005. While the need to exclude education attainment from my 
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 The HDI measures human development in terms of health, standard of living, and knowledge. Heath is 
captured by life expectancy; standard of living is captured by GNP per capita; and knowledge is measured 
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measurement is not ideal, it is likely indirectly captured by GDP per capita. Therefore, 
taken together, life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita should serve as an accurate 
proxy for how well the state promotes human development. To generate a single measure 
of how well the state promotes the human development of its population, I take the sum 
of each state’s annual standardized z-score for GDP per capita and life expectancy and 
aggregate it over a five-year period. 
 The Shaping of a National Identity:  Anchoring the list of state-building 
components is the shaping of a national identity. Of the five components of state-
building, national identity – or, the extent to which a convergence between nations and 
state is forged – is the most difficult to measure. The source of the difficulty is that 
nationalism is a sentiment; whereas the provision of infrastructure can easily be measured 
by looking at tangibles such as the number of working telephone lines or the percentage 
of a population with access to a clean source of water, the same cannot be said for the 
degree to which a population identifies with sub-state groups vis-à-vis the state.  
Recognizing the sub-optimality of using a proxy to measure nationalism, Afrobarometer 
initiated a first-of-its-kind series of public opinion surveys in which, among other 
questions, Africans were asked how closely they feel to their ethnic groups relative to 
their states.
9
 While a great first step toward measuring nationalism by going directly to its 
source, the Afrobarometer data has its shortcomings. First, it provides data for just 18 of 
42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 18 countries for which data is available, in no 
case does it precede the year 1999 and in most cases does not become available until the 
mid-2000s. Moreover, simply asking people how closely they feel to their ethnic groups 
relative to their states can produce misleading results as responses may be influenced by 
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what is taking place when the question is asked. For example, respondents in sub-Saharan 
Africa are more likely to identify with their ethnic groups when a national election is 
near.
10
 Therefore, given the shortcomings of data acquired through the administration of 
public opinion surveys to date, I must rely on a proxy to capture how closely nations and 
the state converge. In doing so I have drawn heavily on data from the Polity IV project, 
particularly its assessment of the regulation and competitiveness of political participation 
within states. 
The characteristics of political participation within states, as measured by Polity 
IV, are a very good indicator of how closely nations and states converge. By assessing 
how members of a population organize and conduct themselves in the course of 
competing for state power or attempting to influence public policy, much can be revealed 
about how people self-identify, and where the greatest value in identification and 
association is believed to lie – that is, with one’s sub-state group or the broader 
population of the state. Unlike traditional measures of nation and state convergence such 
as the ELF index which captures only how diverse a state is but says nothing about how 
nations actually relate to one another and to the state, data that speaks to the nature of 
political competition is solidly centered on results. The Polity IV project measures the 
condition of political competition annually, from independence through 2007, in every 
state on a scale that ranges from suppressed (only very minimal political activity is 
permitted outside the regime) to institutionalized electoral (stable and inclusive political 
groups compete for political influence in an open electoral system free of coercion). 
Between these two extremes are categories of political competition that range from 
                                                 
10
 Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, Political Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa 
(December 2007) Afrobarometer Working Paper 89. Available at www.afrobarometer.org 
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intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions (characterized by zero-sum politics 
and political activity that is ordered around exclusionary parochial or ethnic-based groups 
that have incompatible interests) to far more inclusive environments in which remnants of 
parochial or ethnic factionalism still exist, but politics is not perceived to be zero-sum 
and political organizations are largely big-tent.
11
   
 For the purpose of my dissertation I have used Polity IV data to assign every 
country an annual score of either 1 (adequate convergence between nations and the state) 
or 0 (absence of adequate convergence between nations and the state). The Polity data 
was, in places, sufficient to assign a code of either 1 or 0; for example, annual 
observations coded by Polity as factional/restricted, factional/competition, electoral 
transition: persistent conflict/coercion, and institutionalized electoral received codes of 0, 
0, 1, and 1 respectively. Coding became more difficult where political competition was 
suppressed or restricted (and coded as such by Polity IV) as the absence of political 
competition logically prevented an assessment of how it was carried out. This was quite 
common in sub-Saharan Africa from the years surrounding independence until the early 
1990s when the continent underwent a wave of political liberalization. In such cases 
where an assessment of nation and state convergence was not possible by looking at the 
Polity IV data, I relied on country histories, evidence of ethnic conflict, evidence of 
political and economic discrimination, and instances of protests and rebellions to 
determine whether to assign a score of 0 or 1.  I was able to confidently do so every year, 
                                                 
11
 The Polity IV coding scale is as follows: 1) Suppressed; 2) Restricted; 3) Imposed Transition: Loosening 
or Tightening Restrictions; 4) Uninstitutionalized; 5) Gradual Transition from Uninstitutionalized; 6) 
Factional/Restricted; 7) Factional/Competition; 8) Electoral Transition: Persistent Conflict/Coercion; 9) 
Electoral Transition: Limited Conflict/Coercion; 10) Institutionalized Electoral. For a detailed description 




from independence through 2007, for all but seven states.  Of these seven states, data 
necessary to make an assessment of nation and state convergence becomes available in 
the 1970s, 1980s, or very early 1990s. This allows, at minimum, 20 annual observations 
for every country on the continent. As is the case with every other variable, I have 
aggregated annual data into five-year observations. In the overwhelming majority of 
cases, this proved to be no problem. In a select handful of cases, however, a five-year 
period contained years during which a state received a score of 1, and years during which 
that state received a score of 0. To reconcile the discrepancy I assigned a five-year period 
a score of “1” if it was composed of three or more annual observations receiving scores 
of “1.” The same applies to the assignment of scores of “0.”  
3.1b  The Independent Variable 
The relative distribution of power among contiguous states is expected to influence when 
and where state-building advances, stagnates, or declines. To capture how power is 
distributed I draw separately on three measures: the Composite Index of National 
Capability data (CINC) produced by The Correlates of War project; GDP per capita, and 
GNP per capita. These measures are the overwhelming choices of those who study (and 
measure) national power, yet none are entirely without problems. CINC data is by far the 
most comprehensive, factoring into its calculation of national power a country’s total 
population, urban population, military size, military expenditure, energy consumption, 
and iron and steel production.
12
 Yet reliance on CINC data, at least given the research 
design of this dissertation, may be problematic for two reasons: first, despite what is 
ostensibly a very comprehensive measure of national power, CINC scores are likely to be 
                                                 
12
 To calculate a CINC score, a state’s percentage of the world’s total power in each of the six components 
is calculated. Then, those six percentages are summed and divided by six. 
97 
 
driven by just one of their components – population size. And second, due to the makeup 
of CINC data, there appears to be a sub-optimal amount of variance in states’ relative 
power positions. In other words, a state that is determined by CINC data to be relatively 
weak in 1960 is likely to remain relatively weak in every year that follows.  Given the 
potential drawbacks of CINC data, I also opt to run analyses of the impact of the 
distribution of power on state-building using GDP and GNP in lieu of CINC. While not 
as comprehensive as CINC, the calculation of relative power based on GDP and GNP 
does avoid the pitfalls associated with a reliance on CINC scores. It should also be noted 
that GDP, GNP, and CINC are highly correlated.    
In every case, whether the independent variable is calculated using CINC, GDP, 
or GNP, a state’s relative power position is calculated by dividing its own power score by 
the sum of its power score and its neighbors’ power score.  This generates a number 
between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating complete relative weakness, and 1 indicating complete 
dyadic preponderance.
13
     
CINC scores are available for all 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa, every year, 
from independence through 2007. GDP and GNP scores are also available for every state 
in sub-Saharan Africa, but in places do not become available until sometime after 
independence. Because change in capabilities occurs slowly and states are not likely to 
adjust policy on the basis of yearly fluctuations (not least in part because one year is 
hardly enough time to perceive a change in capabilities), I have opted to measure relative 
power in five-year increments. This simply requires calculating the average capabilities 
score of each state in a contiguous dyad over a five-year period. Additionally, in 
                                                 
13
 Results did not fundamentally change when tests were replicated using a dummy-coded independent 
variable with power parity set at a ratio of 70 percent or greater. 
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calculating how a state measures up to its neighbors, I aggregate relative power data for 
all contiguous states and generate what amounts to a neighborhood score. It simply 
makes little sense to assess the power distribution of contiguous dyads in isolation from 
one another. For example, Uganda has five contiguous neighbors: The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Tanzania. In the year 2007, using CINC 
data, Uganda was preponderant relative to Rwanda, approaching parity relative to Kenya 
and Tanzania, and significantly weaker relative to the DRC and Sudan. While relative 
strength vis-à-vis Rwanda should enhance the degree to which Uganda perceives itself as 
secure, weakness relative to the DRC and Sudan can be expected to have the opposite 
effect. Given that all neighbors matter, a dyadic breakdown of the distribution of power 
makes it impossible to conclude anything more than “Uganda is stronger than some of its 
neighbors and weaker than others.”  A much more enriching approach that sheds greater 
light on Uganda’s overall relative power position aggregates data on each of its neighbors 
and generates an overall neighborhood score. To ensure that the methodology discussed 
in this paragraph is clear, I provide the following table to demonstrate how Uganda’s 
relative power position was calculated (in this case, using CINC data) for the five-year 




Uganda’s relative power score of .3816827 indicates that it is relatively weaker than its 
neighbors over the five-year period 2003 – 2007. 
One concern that needs to be addressed is the potentially obfuscating impact of 
sub-Saharan Africa’s regional hegemons. Given the outsized power of just a handful of 
states, a contiguous state can find itself preponderant relative to every neighbor but the 
regional hegemon, yet still receive a relative power score that indicates relative weakness. 
This occurs because the national capabilities of the hegemon are so disproportionately 
large that its CINC, GDP, or GNP score overwhelms and masks all but its own 
relationship with the state in question. By way of example, consider the power 
distribution between Cameroon and its neighbors from 1990 – 1994 according to CINC 
data. The first table includes Nigeria, a regional hegemon and contiguous neighbor to 
Cameroon, while the second does not: 
Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC_2 Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC_2
2003 UGA DRC 0.0013608 0.0035385 2006 UGA DRC 0.0012962 0.0042208
2003 UGA KEN 0.0013608 0.0015017 2006 UGA KEN 0.0012962 0.0017243
2003 UGA TAZ 0.0013608 0.0017803 2006 UGA TAZ 0.0012962 0.0019128
2003 UGA RWA 0.0013608 0.0007061 2006 UGA RWA 0.0012962 0.0007268
2003 UGA SUD 0.0013608 0.0024405 2006 UGA SUD 0.0012962 0.0025986
2004 UGA DRC 0.0013214 0.003556 2007 UGA DRC 0.0013199 0.0041745
2004 UGA KEN 0.0013214 0.0015931 2007 UGA KEN 0.0013199 0.001777
2004 UGA TAZ 0.0013214 0.001843 2007 UGA TAZ 0.0013199 0.0019317
2004 UGA RWA 0.0013214 0.0007141 2007 UGA RWA 0.0013199 0.0005813
2004 UGA SUD 0.0013214 0.002527 2007 UGA SUD 0.0013199 0.0030763
2005 UGA DRC 0.0012872 0.0034654







2005 UGA TAZ 0.0012872 0.0018837 0.0013171 0.0021337 0.3816827
2005 UGA RWA 0.0012872 0.0007248






Excluding Nigeria, in no year between 1990 and 1994 did any of Cameroon’s six 
contiguous neighbors have a larger CINC score. Put differently, Cameroon was more 
powerful than five of its six neighbors in each year from 1990 through 1994.  Yet, due to 
the outsized strength of Nigeria, Cameroon appears to be relatively weak with a relative 
power score of 0.373. However, when Nigeria is selected out, Cameroon presents as 
Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC__2 Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC__2
1990 CAO EQG 0.00079 0.000038 1993 CAO EQG 0.000773 0.000041
1990 CAO NIG 0.00079 0.006165 1993 CAO NIG 0.000773 0.00653
1990 CAO GAB 0.00079 0.000185 1993 CAO GAB 0.000773 0.000184
1990 CAO CEN 0.00079 0.000202 1993 CAO CEN 0.000773 0.00021
1990 CAO CHA 0.00079 0.000598 1993 CAO CHA 0.000773 0.000533
1990 CAO CON 0.00079 0.000311 1993 CAO CON 0.000773 0.000391
1991 CAO EQG 0.000811 0.00004 1994 CAO EQG 0.000776 0.000035
1991 CAO NIG 0.000811 0.006433 1994 CAO NIG 0.000776 0.006948
1991 CAO GAB 0.000811 0.000194 1994 CAO GAB 0.000776 0.000166
1991 CAO CEN 0.000811 0.000246 1994 CAO CEN 0.000776 0.00021
1991 CAO CHA 0.000811 0.000634 1994 CAO CHA 0.000776 0.000605
1991 CAO CON 0.000811 0.000372 1994 CAO CON 0.000776 0.000336
1992 CAO EQG 0.000769 0.000041







1992 CAO GAB 0.000769 0.000179 0.0007838 0.0013157 0.373327
1992 CAO CEN 0.000769 0.000214
1992 CAO CHA 0.000769 0.000582
1992 CAO CON 0.000769 0.000353
Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC_2 Year State_1 State_2 CINC_1 CINC_2
1990 CAO EQG 0.00079 0.000038 1993 CAO EQG 0.000773 0.000041
1990 CAO GAB 0.00079 0.000185 1993 CAO GAB 0.000773 0.000184
1990 CAO CEN 0.00079 0.000202 1993 CAO CEN 0.000773 0.00021
1990 CAO CHA 0.00079 0.000598 1993 CAO CHA 0.000773 0.000533
1990 CAO CON 0.00079 0.000311 1993 CAO CON 0.000773 0.000391
1991 CAO EQG 0.000811 0.00004 1994 CAO EQG 0.000776 0.000035
1991 CAO GAB 0.000811 0.000194 1994 CAO GAB 0.000776 0.000166
1991 CAO CEN 0.000811 0.000246 1994 CAO CEN 0.000776 0.00021
1991 CAO CHA 0.000811 0.000634 1994 CAO CHA 0.000776 0.000605
1991 CAO CON 0.000811 0.000372 1994 CAO CON 0.000776 0.000336
1992 CAO EQG 0.000769 0.000041







1992 CAO CEN 0.000769 0.000214 0.0007838 0.000276 0.7395735
1992 CAO CHA 0.000769 0.000582
1992 CAO CON 0.000769 0.000353
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convincingly preponderant relative to its five remaining neighbors with a relative power 
score of 0.739.  
Dealing with the effect of regional hegemons is complicated because they 
certainly do alter the security considerations of their neighbors. Yet, as illustrated above, 
their inclusion in relative capabilities calculations potentially provides a misleading 
account of the way power is truly distributed.  I will therefore run two analyses – one 
with all regional hegemons included, and one with regional hegemons selectively selected 
out.
14
 In certain cases where states have few contiguous neighbors it makes no sense to 
select out regional hegemons. Swaziland, for example, is bordered by just Mozambique 
and South Africa. Given that it accounts for one-half the total number of states 
contiguous to Swaziland, the inclusion of South Africa can hardly be said to distort the 
true picture of how power is regionally distributed. In cases where states border any of 
the regional hegemons and have a total of five or more contiguous neighbors, I select out 
the hegemon.  
3.1c  The Control Variables 
To get an unadulterated picture of how the distribution of power among states affects 
state-building, it will be necessary to control for three variables: gross domestic 
product,
15
 the population density of a state, and the state’s total population. The need to 
control for GDP is straightforward: while a large GDP by no means guarantees that a 
state’s wealth will be distributed fairly and productively, a state with greater financial 
                                                 
14
 When CINC data is employed, states considered to be regional hegemons include Algeria, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, and South Africa. When GDP and GNP are used to measure national power, regional hegemons 
include Gabon, Libya, Equatorial Guinea (beginning in 1997 when GDP and GNP spike due to the 
discovery of oil), Botswana, and South Africa. 
15
 GDP will only be controlled for when CINC data is used to measure national power; it is not appropriate 
to control for GDP when national power measurements are derived from GDP or GNP. 
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resources at its disposal will have the means to develop not enjoyed by its poorer 
neighbors. By holding GDP constant, the true impact of relative power on state-building 
will be better illuminated. For similar reasons it is necessary to control for the population 
density of a state (that is, the number of people per square kilometer of land area). An 
immensely large state with a dispersed population will find the economics of providing 
infrastructure throughout its territory to be particularly daunting, and will simply have a 
more difficult time reaching its population to shape national identity, provide security, 
regulate social and economic life, and promote human development. Finally, I control for 
total population. As population rises, the burden on the state to provide political goods 
grows to levels not experienced by states with smaller populations. By holding 
population constant, I eliminate from consideration the possibility that weak (or strong) 
state performance on my five measures of state-building is merely a consequence of the 
number of mouths a state has to feed. All three control variables have been logged. 
3.2  The Procedure and Results 
Chapter 2 concluded by laying out three hypotheses about the impact of the regional 
distribution of power on state-building progression. The first hypothesis adopted a 
“threatened facilitator” logic and predicted that the insecurity caused by an unfavorable 
neighborhood distribution of power would compel political elites in charge of relatively 
weaker states to work harder to broadly provide positive political goods and develop their 
states in a bid to increase their legitimacy and security. Therefore, H1 predicted that state-
building progression would rise as a state’s power relative to its neighbors declined. 
Arguing that this is not the way politics in sub-Saharan Africa work, I doubted the 
likelihood of finding support for this hypothesis. The second hypothesis took the opposite 
103 
 
approach and predicted that political elites in charge of relatively weak states would 
behave like “threatened impeders” rather than facilitators and take steps to increase 
regime security that simultaneously undermine state-building. Therefore, H2 predicted 
that state-building progression would decline as a state’s power relative to its neighbors 
declined.  In light of my understanding of the way African politics work, I accepted this 
hypothesis. Finally, the third hypothesis is essentially an extension of H2 and posits that 
state-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to 
neighbors than in states at relative power disadvantages. I expect to find support for H3.  
 Because this project takes the unusual but necessary step (see Chapter 1) of 
dividing the dependent variable (state-building) into five component parts, each of the 
five components of state-building must separately be regressed on the independent 
variable (the relative distribution of power). This will of course generate five sets of 
results. As discussed above, I have lagged the independent variable to allow it time to 
affect (or not) the dependent variable. Because there is no way to know precisely how 
long it should take for political elites in charge of states to respond to their relative power 
positions and for those responses to manifest themselves in state-building growth or 
decline, I test models with lags of both five and 10 years. For certain components of 
state-building (the development of infrastructure, for example, given that it is slow and 
labor-intensive), it makes sense to assume that progress or decay might take longer to 
manifest itself. Ten years should be enough time to ensure that I am not missing an effect 
that actually exists, but not so long that I am discovering something spurious. Yet as it 
turns out, in no case was a relationship for any set of variables found to be statistically 
significant at two lags but insignificant at one lag. In a handful of cases statistical 
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significance found at one lag (five years) evaporated at two lags (10 years). This indicates 
that a lag length of one is appropriate and results reported below are therefore generated 
from models with a one-period lag of the independent variable. Finally, I generate 
separate models that both include and exclude Africa’s regional hegemons given that 
their outsized power can arguably paint a misleading picture of how power is truly 
distributed in a region. 
 Before the results of tests that assess the impact of relative power on state-
building are presented, three conditions that may influence results must be addressed. The 
first deals with possible autocorrelation – often an issue in time-series data. Observations 
must be independent of each other, yet knowing, for example, how Uganda performed on 
some measure of state-building in 1976 tells a lot about how it performed on the same 
measure one year later. In other words, the 1977 observation may not be entirely 
independent of the 1976 observation. Because autocorrelated data has the potential to 
skew results, it is a good idea to apply a correction. I do so in the appendix of this 
dissertation by replicating tests while employing Prais-Winsten GLS rather than OLS. It 
turns out that results are similar whether possible autocorrelation is corrected for or not. 
A second possibility to consider is that of finding greater state-building 
advancement in states that began the state-building process from less advanced positions. 
It may be that certain states see more robust advancement in state-building not because of 
their relative power positions, but because they simply have more room to advance. Take, 
for example, Ethiopia and Botswana between 1986 and 1990 and consider how 
proficiently each provided a clean source of water to their populations (one measure of 
the quality of infrastructure provision). In Botswana, 93 percent of the population had 
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access to a clean source of water during this five-year period, yet in Ethiopia the number 
was just 17 percent. Clearly the potential for growth in Ethiopia dwarfed that of 
Botswana. Therefore, the possibility that gains or losses in relative power may not 
entirely drive the extent to which state-building advances or declines cannot be entirely 
discounted. Some states are simply in a better position to grow more rapidly given their 
slower starts.  
A final concern is the possibility that the independent variable (the relative 
distribution of power - calculated by CINC, GDP, and GNP) is itself a function of state-
building. In other words, state-building advancement or decline results in a more or less 
favorable relative power position. While endogeneity is a possibility, concern might be 
more warranted if the independent variable were a CINC score, GDP or GNP alone, 
rather than a ratio derived from a CINC score, GDP or GNP. In other words, it is one 
thing to say that GDP or GNP increases as states monopolize force, regulate social and 
economic life, provide infrastructure, promote human development, and shape national 
identity. But it is another to say that a state’s regional share of power increases as it 
makes absolute advancements in the monopolization of force, regulation of social and 
economic life, provision of infrastructure, promotion of human development, and shaping 
of a national identity. It may, but it also may not. Equally or more important is what takes 
place in neighboring states. State A may make state-building advances which play a role 
in growing its own GDP, but if neighboring states do the same at similar or greater rates, 
State A’s relative power position will erode despite any advancements it has made. In 
short, while endogeneity may conceivably bias results, it is no sure thing that a state’s 
regional power position is a direct function of its state-building robustness. 
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3.2a  The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security
I use a linear probability model to test the relationship between the distribution of power 
and the monopolization of force and the provision of security.
1
 The model can be written 
as Y = α + β1Χ1 + ε where Y is a latent variable that measures how thoroughly the state 
monopolizes force and provides security, and Χ1 (the distribution of power) is continuous 
and has a possible range of 0 to 1. The results of this procedure, with and without the 
inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
respectively. 
Table 3.1: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table 3.2: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































                                                 
1
 Of my five components of state-building, three are measured with continuous data while data for the 
remaining two (the monopolization of force, and the shaping of national identity) are structured 
dichotomously. In the latter two cases I opt to use linear probability models rather than logistic regression 
for the sake of consistency. As a check, I also ran a logistic regression for each and found no change in 
either the direction of the coefficients or the models’ statistical significance.  
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In no case, regardless of whether CINC, GDP, or GNP is used to calculate how 
power is distributed, is the relative power coefficient statistically significant. This holds 
true whether or not Africa’s regional hegemons are included or excluded from the 
models.  Coefficients are, however, positive as predicted by Hypotheses 2 and 3, yet large 
p-values indicate that there is no meaningful relationship between a neighborhood’s 
distribution of power and how effectively its regimes monopolize the legitimate use of 
force and provide security to their populations.  
3.2b  The Regulation of Social and Economic Life 
I test the relationship between the distribution of power and the regulation of social and 
economic life using ordinary least squares regression. The model can be written as:        
Y = α + β1Χ1 + ε where Y is a variable that measures how well the state regulates social 
and economic life, and Χ1 represents the relative distribution of power. Possible values of 
the independent variable again range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing total relative 
weakness, and 1 representing total relative strength. The results of these procedures, with 
and without the inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 
3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
Table 3.3: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 























































Table 3.4: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal a statistically significant, negative relationship between 
the distribution of power variable and the regulation of social and economic life when 
CINC scores are used to measure how power is distributed. The relationship holds 
whether or not the powerful influence of Africa’s hegemons is included in the models. 
These findings support the “threatened facilitator” logic behind Hypothesis 1, but indicate 
that Hypotheses 2 and 3 should be rejected.  Yet an entirely different picture emerges 
when the distribution of power is measured by GDP or GNP rather than CINC data. 
When the independent variable is derived from GDP or GNP, a positive and strongly 
significant relationship is consistently found to exist between the distribution of power, 
and how well states regulate social and economic life. This finding was expected and 
lends support to the “threatened impeder” logic behind Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
3.2c  The Provision of Infrastructure 
Consistent with what has been done above, I test the relationship between the distribution 
of power and the provision of infrastructure using ordinary least squares. The model 
structure is written as Y = α + β1Χ1 + ε where Y is a variable that measures the extent to 
which the state provides infrastructure services to its population, and Χ1 represents the 
relative distribution of power. The results of this procedure, with and without the 
inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Table 3.5: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table 3.6: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































The model in which hegemons are included and CINC scores are used to calculate 
the distribution of power (Table 3.5) generates a negative coefficient for the distribution 
of power variable. This would provide support for Hypothesis 1, but the minimum 
threshold of statistical significance is not met. However, when the outsized impact of 
Africa’s hegemons is removed (Table 3.6), a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the relative distribution of power and the effectiveness with which states provide 
infrastructure to their populations emerges at the p < .10 level. The negative coefficient 
indicates that as states gain power relative to their neighbors, the extent to which they 
provide infrastructure services to their populations suffers. This unexpectedly indicates 
that Hypothesis 1 should be accepted, and calls for the rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
Yet when both GDP and GNP are used in lieu of CINC data to measure the 
distribution of power, an entirely different relationship materializes. The coefficient on 
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the independent variable becomes positive and highly significant (p < .001) in every case 
– regardless of whether regional hegemons are included or excluded. Support is thus 
found for Hypotheses 2 and 3, as expected. 
3.2d  The Promotion of Human Development 
I test the relationship between the distribution of power and the promotion of human 
development using ordinary least squares. Again, the model can be written as:                 
Y = α + β1Χ1 + ε where Y is a latent variable that measures the condition of human 
development, and Χ1 represents the relative distribution of power. The results of these 
procedures, with and without the inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, can be found 
below in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. 
Table 3.7: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table 3.8: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Whether CINC scores, GDP, or GNP is used to measure how power is relatively 
distributed, findings show a statistically significant, positive relationship between the 
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independent variable and how effectively the state promotes human development. That is 
to say that as states increase their share of power relative to neighbors, they more 
effectively promote the human development of their populations. Support is thus found, 
as expected, for Hypotheses 2 and 3, while Hypothesis 1 – oriented around the 
assumption of a “threatened facilitator” – can be rejected. 
3.2e  The Shaping of a National Identity
A linear probability model is used to assess the relationship between the distribution of 
power and the formation of a national identity. The model can be written as                     
Y = α + β1Χ1 + ε where Y is a latent variable that measures whether or not convergence 
exists between nations and the state, and Χ1 represents the relative distribution of power. 
The results of this procedure, with and without the inclusion of Africa’s regional 
hegemons, are found below in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. 
Table 3.9: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table 3.10: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 




















































Negative coefficients on the independent variable appear to lend unexpected 
support to the “threatened facilitator” logic behind Hypothesis 1, yet the relationship 
between the distribution of power and the forging of a national identity in all cases failed 
to meet the threshold of statistical significance. 
3.3  Assessing the Relationship Between Relative Power and State-Building 
This dissertation set out to fill a void in the existing state-building literature which has to 
date focused extensively on the role played by the Global North in the South’s 
development, or on the role of the South itself – namely its missteps – in its own 
development. Less thoroughly studied has been the impact of region and, in particular, 
contiguous neighbors.  In moving to fill this void, I first accepted the premise that 
insecurity generated by difficult structural conditions provides incentive to political elites 
to govern in ways that are personally expedient, but run counter to the longer-term 
demands of state-building.  I then suggested an addition to the theory of “personal rule” 
by bringing the external, namely region, into play.  Arguing that political elites in sub-
Saharan Africa have good reason to be threatened by the activities and intentions of their 
neighbors, I suggested that an unfavorable distribution of power would further undermine 
regime security and compel political elites to turn even more sharply toward personal rule 
and away from a method of governance that is conducive to state-building.  
   Tests of my hypotheses produced results that varied by the component of state-
building assessed and the measure of national power – CINC, GDP, or GNP – employed. 
Some components of state-building were found to be readily influenced by the regional 
distribution of power, while others were not. How well a state regulates social and 
economic life, provides infrastructure services to its population, and promotes human 
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development all clearly appear to be impacted by relative power, while no such case can 
be made for how effectively a state monopolizes force or shapes national identity. 
Generally speaking, the expected relationship between the distribution of power and 
state-building was more likely to materialize when GDP or GNP was used to calculate 
national power than when CINC scores were employed. For example, when GDP and 
GNP were employed, support was found for the “threatened impeder” logic behind 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the case of three of five components of state-building, but just one 
of five components when CINC data was used. And in no case did the use of GDP or 
GNP to measure national power produce findings that lent support to the “threatened 
facilitator” assumption behind Hypothesis 1 (which I expected to be able to reject), yet 
for two components of state-building some support for Hypothesis 1 was found when 
CINC data was used to capture the distribution of power (how well the state regulates 
social and economic life and provides infrastructure services). That results diverged so 
profoundly in places depending on how relative power was measured was a bit of a 
surprise, yet likely owes to the overwhelming influence of total population in the CINC 
scores. The table below concisely captures the findings of Chapter 3. An empty cell 
indicates that no statistically significant relationship was found. A checkmark indicates 
that support was found for the relevant hypothesis. For the reader’s convenience I re-list 
the three hypotheses below. Again, I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 1, and 
accept Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. 
 
H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. 
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H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to 
their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage. 
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Monopolize Force –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Social/Economic Life –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Provide Infrastructure –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 
Human Development – 
with Hegemons 
         
Human Development –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
National Identity –      
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Unexpectedly, no statistically significant relationship of any kind was found 
between the regional distribution of power and the monopolization of force and 
provision of security. It appears, therefore, that the national capabilities of a state 
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relative to its neighbors plays no role in how effectively the state monopolizes force and 
provides security to its population. Also surprising was the statistically significant 
negative relationship found between the distribution of power and the regulation of 
social and economic life when CINC data was employed, implying that relatively weak 
states perform best on this measure of state-building. Yet results were reversed when both 
GDP and GNP were swapped for CINC scores and strong support was found for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 as expected. The same relationship was found between the 
distribution of power and the provision of infrastructure with results generated from 
CINC scores unexpectedly lending partial support to H1, but results falling completely 
into line with expectations when GDP and GNP were employed. Results were again 
consistently in line with expectations when the impact of relative power on the 
promotion of human development was assessed. And, finally, no statistically 
significant relationship of any kind between the regional distribution of power and the 
forging of convergence between nations and states was found. 
 The at-times contradictory results presented above make it difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions about the relationship between relative power and state-building. 
Looking at my five components of state-building, in just one instance does a hypothesis 
find support across all three measures of national power. Instead, conclusions at times 
depend heavily on which indicator of national power is employed. As the table above 
shows, support was found for Hypotheses 2-3 in the cases of three of the five components 
of state-building when GDP and GNP were the indicators used. In the remaining two 
cases – the monopolization of force/provision of security and the forging of a national 
identity – no relationship of any kind was found. Yet when CINC scores were substituted 
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in, these findings were directly contradicted in two cases – where state-building was 
associated with the regulation of social and economic life, and the provision of 
infrastructure services – as support for H1 was found. 
 Given the inconsistencies laid out above, the “true” impact of relative power on 
state-building will in places depend on the reader’s preferred method of measuring 
national power. I have indicated that I believe GDP and GNP are the better measures. All 
three measures are highly correlated. Yet, while CINC scores are made up of a handful of 
important components of state-strength, the population components risk overwhelming 
all other properties. Moreover, due to the structure of CINC scores, states are more likely 
to remain confined to one relative power position. In other words, variance is smallest 
when CINC scores are employed. Yet while GDP and GNP are arguably the most 
appropriate measures of national power for this project, all three have been included so 
the reader may decide for herself.  
3.4  Summary and Conclusion 
The objective of Chapter 3 was to test the relationship between relative power and state-
building with the aim of shedding light on why state-building progresses in some places 
at some times, and stagnates or declines in other places at other times. Results provide 
some evidence that neighbors do at times matter and the regional distribution of power 
plays some role in the decision to adopt policies that either support or retard the state-
building process. While an interesting finding by itself, context is lacking. Chapter 3 has 
shown that the regional distribution of power appears to affect progress on certain 
components of state-building, but it says little about any additional circumstances that 
cause it to matter more or less. Chapter 4 will move beyond a very general assessment of 
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the impact of relative power on the state-building process and explore whether the 























4.0  Introduction: Relative Power & State-Building Revisited: Does Context Matter? 
In Chapter 3 I tested three hypotheses that made very general predictions about the 
impact of relative power on state-building. I hypothesized that the regional distribution of 
power influences the state-building process, but built no additional context into my 
models. Yet drilling down a bit further is sure to tell more of the story. One way to do so 
is by incorporating interaction terms into the models. Rather than assume that the 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable is the same in all cases – a 
limitation of the standard additive multiple regression model – an interactive model 
allows for the possibility that the impact of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable will change as levels of other variables change. In other words, the impact of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable may be conditional on the level of some 
additional moderating variable. By including an interaction term, a more thorough 
understanding of the circumstances under which variables relate to each other can be 
gained. 
With this in mind, the theory-building potential of my project may be enriched by 
assessing whether certain moderating variables affect how strongly the regional 
distribution of power impacts the state building process. That is, when certain conditions 
are met (or not met), does the distribution of power increase (or decrease) the propensity 
of states to pursue policies that are friendly to state-building? In other words, are relative 
power concerns likely to be greatest for states at certain times and under certain 
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circumstances? The objective of Chapter 4 is to shed light on when and where relative 
power matters the most. 
4.1  Uncovering the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power & State-Building 
At the outset is bears saying that the objective of Chapter 4 should not be perceived to 
contradict or hedge against the argument made above that all states in sub-Saharan Africa 
must necessarily suspect their neighbors and take the distribution of power very 
seriously; it is only to assess whether or not conditions unique to certain neighborhoods 
and certain states affect the degree to which neighbors are feared, the regional 
distribution of power serves as a source of preoccupation to political elites, and state-
building is ultimately affected. That said, I test the effect of relative power on state-
building in the company of four additional types of insecurity-breeding variables: those 
that capture the level of conflict in each state’s neighborhood; the vulnerability of each 
state’s borders; the international norms in vogue at a given time that regulate interstate 
behavior, and the domestic instability in each state. Ultimately, although each was 
expected to influence the relationship between relative power and state-building, just two 
– border vulnerability and domestic instability – were consistently found to do so. 
4.1a  The Hypothesized Impact of Context on the Salience of Relative Power  
Neighborhood Conflict  
A host of problems confronted by young states – ranging from domestic insecurity and 
the propensity of neighbors to fan the flames, to the prevalence of interstate territorial 
disputes – have made sub-Saharan Africa a particularly volatile region. As spoken to at 
length in Chapter 2, the intentions and behavior of contiguous neighbors must necessarily 
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preoccupy political elites to an extent not necessary in most of the Global North. Yet, 
while no state in the region is sufficiently strong or internally secure to take lightly its 
immediate neighbors, some areas on the continent have proven less-threatening than 
others. For example, Sudan has been engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (stopping 
short of war) with at least one neighbor for a total of 24 years since it became 
independent. Contrast the international security situation of Sudan with that of Malawi 
which has had just one MID lasting a total of only one year. Consistent with the logic laid 
out in Chapters 2 and 3, the impact of relative power on state-building is likely to be 
affected by the tranquility of one’s neighborhood. When threat-levels are more muted, the 
impetus for rulers to adopt policies that run counter to the imperatives of state-building 
should weaken. Conversely, states that exist in particularly threatening neighborhoods 
should find their regimes more inclined to opt for policies that may increase regime 
security in the near-term, but set back the state-building agenda. Therefore:  
 H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression 
will be more muted when there is a recent history of neighborhood conflict than 
when there is no recent history of neighborhood conflict. 
Border Vulnerability  
A primary threat to the security of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa stems from the 
continent’s lengthy, largely-unpatrolled international borders. With over 50,000 miles of 
border protected by just 345 official road crossing points,
1
 borders are easily penetrated 
by armed state and non-state actors seeking to destabilize regimes. Yet border 
vulnerability is not distributed evenly across the continent; Djibouti, for example, has 
                                                 
1
 Levan Griffiths, “Permeable Boundaries in Africa,” in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and 
Opportunities, eds. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (New York: Pinter, 1996), 72. 
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international borders that total 305 miles while Democratic Republic of Congo must 
contend with a figure over 17 times as large – 5,225 miles. Because shorter borders are 
easier to patrol than longer borders, it reasons that regimes in charge of states with the 
former will feel more secure than those in charge of states with the latter. Given the 
damage that can be done to regimes by threats originating across borders, regimes in 
states with shorter borders to patrol should perceive their neighborhoods to be less 
threatening than regimes in states with longer borders. Therefore:  
 H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression 
will be less robust in states with longer borders than in states with shorter 
borders. 
International Norms   
In addition to both a state’s history of militarized conflict and the vulnerability of its 
borders, the international norms in vogue at a particular time should affect precisely how 
threatening the power of its neighbors is perceived to be. At center here is the pressure 
placed on states in sub-Saharan Africa to both respect the human rights of their 
populations and liberalize politically. Careful not to overstate the progress that has been 
made, the states of sub-Saharan Africa have, since the end of the Cold War, acquiesced 
somewhat to the demands of the Global North and taken steps to democratize and better-
protect the human rights of their populations. While still extremely sensitive to external 
intervention in internal affairs, democratic and human rights norms have even found their 
way into the governing documents of regional organizations. In a near total break with 
the Organization of African Unity charter ratified in 1963, its successor organization, the 
African Union, cites among its objectives the protection of human rights and the 
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promotion of democratic principles, popular participation, and good governance. In fact, 
the African Union Constitutive Act makes explicit the right of the AU to intervene in 
member states in cases of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.
2
 While 
Christopher Landsberg’s claim that we are witnessing “nothing short of a major 
restructuring of Africa’s governance ethos and intervention in defense thereof” 
3
 is 
certainly overstated, the fact that sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention have 
become more conditional in the years since the end of the Cold War must surely alarm 
the continent’s political elite. This is particularly true given that the issues on which the 
right to be left alone increasingly hinge – democratic governance and the protection of 
human rights – are those with which African regimes struggle most mightily. Therefore:  
 H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression 
will be more muted in the years following the Cold War than in years during 
which the Cold War was ongoing. 
Domestic Instability   
To this point in Chapter 4 I have hypothesized that the nature of states’ unique 
relationships with their neighbors affects the degree to which they are preoccupied with 
the distribution of power. The relative distribution of power should matter more to states 
with a recent history of militarized interstate disputes, long borders, and in the years 
following the end of the Cold War. Yet just as the international context should matter to 
the salience of the distribution of power, so should politics at home. As argued in Chapter 
2, domestic politics are closely linked to the preoccupation of regimes with their 
                                                 
2
 The African Union Constitutive Act is available at: 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Constitutive_Act_en_0.htm 
3
 Christopher Landsberg, “The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism,” in West Africa’s Security Challenges: 
Building Peace in a Troubled Region, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 125. 
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neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa; regime insecurity brought on by a legitimacy deficit 
characterizes the internal reality of Africa’s states, and is often made worse by the actions 
of neighbors. The distribution of power among states comes into play because a power 
disadvantage might invite cross-border meddling by neighbors who have less reason to 
fear damaging retaliation. Conversely, a power advantage serves as a deterrent.  Given 
that the fear of neighbors is driven in part by the threat they pose to regime security, it 
reasons that the preoccupation with neighbors will decline as regime security increases. 
In other words, if the regime in charge of state A feels insecure because of its own 
domestic crisis of legitimacy, it has good reason to worry that the actions of a 
meddlesome neighbor – say, mobilizing segments of the population against the regime –
will make the crisis worse, potentially resulting in its overthrow. On the other hand, if the 
regime in charge of State A enjoys a greater degree of domestic legitimacy and security 
to begin with, it should have less reason to worry that its fate may be threatened by its 
neighbors.
4
 Therefore:  
 H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression 
will be less robust in states with greater domestic insecurity than in states with 
less domestic insecurity. 
4.2   The Procedure and Results 
To assess whether or not relative power affects state-building differently in the presence 
or absence of certain moderator variables, multiplicative interaction terms were created 
and hierarchical regression was performed. The initial model can be written as                
                                                 
4
 Again, this is not to contradict the argument made in Chapter 2 that  all states in sub-Saharan Africa are 
characterized by certain structural conditions that make for precarious regime security. It is only to say that 
regimes in some states are better-off than others.   
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Y = α + β1Χ1 + β2Χ2 + ε where Y is a variable that measures state-building progression, 
Χ1 represents the relative distribution of power, and Χ2 represents the moderator variable. 
The complete model, with the multiplicative interaction term included, is written as        
Y = α + β1Χ1 + β2Χ2 + β3Χ1Χ2 + ε 
F statistics were calculated to determine whether models containing interaction 
terms meaningfully increased the variance accounted for in the dependent variables 
above and beyond the models excluding interaction terms. A failure to generate 
statistically significant F statistics indicates that models including interaction terms are no 
better than those excluding interaction terms; that is, no meaningful interaction can be 
said to exist. On the other hand, in cases where f-tests generated statistically significant F 
statistics, it can be concluded that moderator variables have a meaningful impact on the 
relationship between relative power and state-building. The results of all f-tests can be 
found in the results tables below. 
 Procedurally, much of the methodology in Chapter 4 mirrors that of Chapter 3. 
Again, each state’s relative power position has been calculated using CINC scores, GDP, 
and GNP, and results are reported for each measure. And I again generate separate 
models that include and exclude Africa’s regional hegemons given that their outsized 
power may arguably paint a misleading picture of how power is truly distributed in a 
region.  
Results tables, found below, have been produced to show the impact that each of 
the four moderator variables have on the relative power – state-building relationship. In 
every case I report coefficients for the independent variable (β1), the moderator variable 
(β2), and the interaction term (β3), along with standard errors. Coefficients should be 
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interpreted as conditional; that is, β1 represents the effect of a one-unit increase in X1 
(relative power) on Y (state-building progression) in the sole case where X2 (the 
moderator variable) has a value of zero. And β1 + β3 should be interpreted as the effect on 
a one-unit increase in X1 on Y in the sole case where X2 has a value of one. Given that 
three of the four moderator variables assessed here are dichotomous – with possible 
values of either zero or one – interpretation generally is very easy. But in the case of 
border vulnerability where border length – a continuous variable – is used as a proxy, the 
values of zero and one are essentially meaningless; clearly in no case does the sum of a 
state’s borders amount to zero or one mile in length. Therefore, in the case of border 
vulnerability, more meaningful values of X2 will have to be plugged into the equation            
β1 + β3(X2) to gauge how an increase or decrease in border length affects the relationship 
between relative power and state-building.  
Finally it bears saying that at first glance, making sense of the results below and 
drawing comprehensive conclusions may seem like a daunting task given that national 
power is measured three different ways, state-building is broken down into five 
components, and hegemons are both included and excluded. Yet the complexity is 
partially unavoidable but also less of an impediment than it may appear. As Chapter 1 
spelled out, “state-building” simply cannot be reduced to a single, simple-to-measure 
proxy variable for the sake of methodological tidiness – at least as I have defined it. 
Doing so inevitably fails to adequately capture what is in fact a complex, multifaceted 
process, and renders conclusions about “state-building” spurious. Therefore, making 
sense of the impact of moderator variables on five separate components of state-building 
is a necessary burden. Also appearing to complicate the interpretation of results is the use 
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of three separate measures of national power. This can lead to messy conclusions such as 
“X2 has a particular effect on the relationship between X1 and Y when X1 is calculated 
using CINC scores, but no effect when GDP is used, and an altogether different effect 
when X1 is generated using GNP.”  Yet it is a mistake to conclude, on the basis of 
contradictory results, that no sense can be made of the findings; the fact is that the three 
measures of national power are not of equal quality and results generated by each are not 
intended to be compared. In Chapter 3 I laid out my concerns about the use of CINC data 
and expressed a preference for the use of GNP. Yet use of CINC scores, GDP, and GNP 
are all common enough in the literature that I have decided to run models in which each 
are employed and simply allow the reader to decide for herself which results to prioritize. 
The point is, findings are not meant to be compared across measures of national power 
and should certainly not be discredited when unanimity is absent.
4.2a  Neighborhood Conflict 
I rely on data from the Correlates of War’s Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset 
to classify neighborhoods as prone to conflict or prone to peace.
1
 A MID is defined as a 
“case[s] of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by 
one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, 
official forces, property, or territory of another state.”
2
 The MID project is immensely 
useful given that threatening interstate behavior takes many forms that often stop short of 
war. Indeed the notion of an “African Peace” drawn from the fact that the continent has 
seen just four interstate wars since independence is turned on its head by the MID data; 
                                                 
1
 Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
2
 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart M. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: 




between just 1993 and 2001, Africa had 63 intra-continental militarized interstate 
disputes.
3
  The MID dataset includes all 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa, is in time-series 
format, and begins with the year of independence and ends with an observation for 2001. 
I have created a dichotomous MID variable by assigning a score of 1 to states in each 
year during which they were engaged in a MID with a contiguous neighbor, and a score 
of 0 in each year during which they were not. Further, because the perception of a 
neighborhood threat is unlikely to entirely dissipate immediately after normal peaceful 
relations are restored, I have also assigned a code of 1 to the first five years following the 
conclusion of a MID. For example, the MID dataset shows that Zimbabwe was engaged 
in an MID in the year 1988 but in no years after. Yet it makes little sense to assume that 
all was forgotten by 1989. Instead, the Zimbabwean regime likely continued to feel 
threatened given what took place in 1988, not least in part because of the possibility that 
hostilities might be reignited. Assigning a score of 0 to the year 1989 – implying that the 
Zimbabwean regime had as much reason to fear its neighbors as states long at peace – 
would therefore be misleading. By assigning a code of 1 to years 1989 – 1993, I account 
for the window during which trust between Zimbabwe and its neighbors was gradually 
restored. 
Tables 4.1 – 4.6, found below, present the expected effects of neighborhood 
conflict (with MID history serving as a proxy) on the relative power – state-building 
relationship. Looking at each of my five individual components of state-building 
separately, neighborhood conflict was found to affect the relative power – state-building 
relationship as follows: 
                                                 
3
 Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart A. Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding 
Rules, and Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, no. 2 (2004): 136.  
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1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security    
In no instance was neighborhood conflict found to have a statistically significant impact 
on the relative power – state-building relationship when the component of state-building 
under assessment was the monopolization of force and provision of security. This held 
true regardless of how the distribution of power was calculated (using CINC scores, 
GDP, or GNP), or whether Africa’s regional hegemons were included or excluded in 
models.  
2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life     
Again, neighborhood conflict was in no case found to have a statistically significant 
impact on the relationship between relative power and state-building, this time when the 
component of state-building assessed was the regulation of social and economic life.  
3) The Provision of Infrastructure    
Once again the existence of neighborhood conflict was not found to have a statistically 
significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship, regardless of how 
the distribution of power was calculated, or whether hegemons were included or excluded 
in models. 
4) The Promotion of Human Development    
Only in the model in which national power was measured by GNP and hegemons were 
included was neighborhood conflict found to mediate the relative power – state-building 
relationship (Table 4.5). Because the value of β1 was larger than β1+ β3, H1 is confirmed 
as expected. That is, there is evidence that as states comparatively gain power, state-
building progresses more robustly when there is no history of neighborhood conflict than 
when there is such a history. 
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5) The Shaping of a National Identity    
In just one case, where CINC scores were employed to calculate national power, was 
neighborhood conflict was found to have a statistically significant effect on the relative 
power – state-building relationship when state-building was measured in terms of 
strength of national identity (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Yet counter to expectations, the value 
of β1 is in every case smaller than the value of β1+ β3, indicating that relative power gains 
coupled with a history of neighborhood conflict leads to more robust state-building 
progression than relative power gains coupled with neighborhood tranquility. 
Table 4.1: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.2: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 

























































Table 4.3: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.4: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.5: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.6: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































4.2b  Border Vulnerability 
Given that the resource-strapped states of sub-Saharan Africa should have a more 
difficult time adequately patrolling lengthier borders than shorter borders, I assess border 
vulnerability by looking at border length. Data on border length comes from the Centre 
for the Study of Civil War and is available for each of the 42 states in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
4
 I aggregate the length of each state’s international borders, convert data from 
kilometers to miles, and then take the log of border length in miles. Because border 
length is a continuous variable and in this case X2=0 is meaningless, assessing its impact 
on the relative power – state-building relationship is slightly more complicated than 
simply looking at β1 and β1+ β3. Instead I take low, medium, and high values of logged 
border length and plug them into the equation β1+ β3(X2) to get an intuitive sense of how 
an increase or decrease in border length affects the relative power – state-building 
relationship. 
Tables 4.7 – 4.12 below lay out the extent to which border vulnerability and the 
regional distribution of power were found to interact and affect state-building. The 
interactive effect on each of my five components of state-building is as follows: 
1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security    
Only when national power was measured using CINC scores was border vulnerability 
found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building 
relationship (Tables 4.7 and 4.8). The nature of the impact was as anticipated; a 
strengthening relative power position coupled with shorter borders was found to be better 






for state-building than a strengthening relative power position coupled with longer 
borders. H1 is therefore supported. 
2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life     
When state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, 
border vulnerability was found to be a statistically significant moderator variable 
regardless of how national power was computed. Yet, how exactly border vulnerability 
was found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship depended on which 
measure of national power was employed. As expected, when CINC data was employed 
(Tables 4.7 and 4.8), shorter borders coupled with a strengthening relative power position 
was found to be associated with more robust state-building than longer borders coupled 
with relative strengthening. Yet when GDP and GNP were used to measure national 
power (Tables 4.9 – 4.12), shorter borders coupled with relative strengthening was 
unexpectedly found to disproportionately hurt state-building progression. That is, state-
building was found to advance more robustly when borders were longer rather than 
shorter. Therefore, H1 is supported when CINC scores are employed, but rejected when 
GDP and GNP are employed. 
3) The Provision of Infrastructure   
Once again, border vulnerability was found to impact the relative power – state-building 
relationship across all three measures of national power, yet exactly how it did so 
depended on which measure of power was employed. When power was calculated using 
CINC scores, state-building was found to advance more robustly when relative 
strengthening was coupled with shorter borders than with longer borders (See Tables 4.7 
and 4.8). This finding was expected and lends support to H1. However, when GDP and 
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GNP were used to calculate national power, results were reversed; state-building was 
unexpectedly found to advance at a greater rate when borders were longer rather than 
shorter (Tables 4.9 – 4.12). Support for H1 therefore erodes when GDP and GNP are 
swapped for CINC scores. 
4) The Promotion of Human Development    
Border vulnerability was found to moderate the relationship between relative power and 
state-building when both GDP and GNP were used to calculate national power (Tables 
4.9 – 4.11). In the case of GDP, models containing and excluding hegemons alike were 
statistically significant. Yet models in which GNP was used to measure national power 
were statistically significant only when hegemons were included; the selecting-out of 
regional hegemons resulted in an erosion of significance. Unexpectedly, in every case, 
state-building advancement was found to be more muted when relative power gains were 
coupled with shorter borders than longer borders. H1 is thus rejected. 
5) The Shaping of a National Identity    
Border vulnerability proved to be a statistically significant moderator variable when 
state-building progression was measured by the strength of convergence between nations 
and state, and GDP and GNP (but not CINC) were used to measure national power 
(Tables 4.9 – 4.12). Yet unexpectedly, state-building progression was shown to suffer as 






Table 4.7: Interact – Border Length – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.8: Interact – Border Length – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.9: Interact – Border Length – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.10: Interact – Border Length – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































Table 4.11: Interact – Border Length – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.12: Interact – Border Length – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































4.2c  International Norms 
Tables 4.13 – 4.18 lay out the impact that one particular international norm, 
sovereignty/non-intervention, was found to have on the relative power – state-building 
relationship. As explained above, I associate the Cold War years with a period of time 
during which the norm of non-intervention was on a more secure footing, and the post-
Cold War years with a period of relative weakening. Coding the Cold War variable was 
straightforward with each observation receiving a code of 1 if it fell during the Cold War, 
and a code of 0 if it fell after. Looking at each of my individual components of state-
building separately,
5
 the relative strength and weakness of the norm of sovereignty/non-
                                                 
5
 Data assessing how well a state regulates social and economic life does not become available until after 
the Cold War ended. It is therefore impossible to test for an interaction effect and I exclude this component 
of state-building from my analysis. 
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intervention was found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship as 
follows: 
1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security   
In no case, regardless of how national power was measured or whether hegemons were 
included or excluded, was the norm of non-intervention found to mediate the relationship 
between the distribution of power and state-building progression.  
2) The Provision of Infrastructure   
Tables 4.13 – 4.18 reveal that in no instance, regardless of how national power was 
measured, was the norm of non-intervention found to have a statistically significant 
impact on the relative power – state-building relationship when the component of state-
building under assessment was the provision of infrastructure.  
3) The Promotion of Human Development   
Again, in no case was the norm of non-intervention found to have a statistically 
significant effect the relative power – state-building relationship. It did not matter how 
power was measured or whether Africa’s regional hegemons were included or excluded. 
4) The Shaping of a National Identity    
When state-building was measured in terms of the bond forged between nations and state, 
a statistically significant interactive effect was identified when CINC data was used to 
measure national power and hegemons were excluded from the model (Table 4.14). Yet 
the value of β1 was unexpectedly greater than the value of β1+ β3, indicating that a more 
favorable relative power position is associated with more robust state-building in the 
post-Cold War era than when the Cold War was ongoing. This finding contradicts H1. 
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Table 4.13: Interact – Cold War – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.14: Interact – Cold War – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.15: Interact – Cold War – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.16: Interact – Cold War – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 























































Table 4.17: Interact – Cold War – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.18: Interact – Cold War – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































4.2d  Domestic Instability 
To measure domestic instability and regime security I use as a proxy a state’s history of 
coup d’états.  Data on the occurrence of coups is available from the Center for Systemic 
Peace in time-series format, from independence through 2007, for each state in sub-
Saharan Africa.
6
 The data not only captures successful coups, but unsuccessful and 
plotted coups as well (I will refer to coups, successful or not, as coup events). The 
prevalence of coup events may demonstrate that a regime is popularly legitimate or 
illegitimate, or that a leader has or has not successfully consolidated his position in power 
to an extent that potential challengers do not believe that the probability of a successful 
coup is greater than the probability of failure. More generally, frequent coup events can 
indicate that there is something specific about the politics of a state that makes it difficult 
                                                 
6
 Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
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to rule. In any case, whether or not a coup is attempted tells us something about how 
secure a regime perceives itself to be; because its own survival is a priority and a coup 
d’état directly endangers that objective, the extent to which a regime perceives itself to be 
secure or insecure should correspond to the volume of recent coup activity. 
Contingent on whether or not a state experienced a coup event in a given year, I 
assign every state a code of 0 (the regime is not especially insecure) or 1 (the regime is 
especially insecure). The data compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace is in time-series 
format, yet needs to be modified slightly in order to truly capture how secure a regime 
perceives itself to be. For example, there was an attempted coup in Burundi in 1966 but 
none in 1967. In light of the coup attempt just one year earlier, it would be far-fetched to 
argue that the regime felt secure in 1967 simply because no coup attempt occurred in that 
year. In fact, the coup event in 1966 was still surely close in mind. To account for the 
negative effect of a recent coup event on how regimes perceive their own security, I 
assign a code of 1 to the first five years following a coup event whether an event occurred 
in those years or not.  Burundi, therefore, receives a code of 1 for the years 1967 – 1971. 
Tables 4.19 – 4.24, found below, lay out exactly when and to what extent 
domestic insecurity and the regional distribution of power interact to affect state-building. 
Looking individually at each of my five components of state-building, the extent to which 
states have been afflicted with coup d’état events was found to affect the relative power – 
state-building relationship as follows: 
1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security    
There is some evidence that the relative power – state-building relationship is mediated 
by coup event history when GNP (but not CINC or GDP) is employed to measure 
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national power (Table 4.24). When hegemons are excluded from models, a statistically 
significant relationship exists at the p < .10 level. Because β1 is positive and β1+ β3 is 
negative, the indication is that state-building declines as states gain power relative to 
neighbors when there is a recent history of coup events, but advances as expected when 
there is not. That β1+ β3 is smaller than β1 indicates that state-building advances more 
robustly when relative strengthening is coupled with an absence of recent coup events. 
Support is therefore found for H1. 
2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life    
There is additional evidence that coup event history mediates the independent-dependent 
variable relationship when state-building progression is measured by how effectively 
social and economic life is regulated.  While no statistically significant interaction effect 
was found when CINC data was used to measure national power, the use of GDP and 
GNP produced consistently significant results (Tables 4.21 – 4.24). As expected, the 
value of β1 is in all cases larger than β1+ β3. This indicates that relative power gains are 
associated with greater state-building advancement when there is no recent history of a 
coup event than when there is such a history. Support is thus found for H1. 
3) The Provision of Infrastructure    
Coup event history was found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative 
power – state-building relationship when the component of state-building under 
assessment was the provision of infrastructure. A significant relationship was found when 
both GDP and GNP were used to measure national power, no matter whether hegemons 
were included or excluded from models. Values in all cases were positive as expected, 
indicating that state-building advances as states gain power relative to their neighbors. 
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And in all cases the value of β1 exceeded that of β1+ β3, indicating that state-building 
advances more when states have not experienced recent coup events. Support is thus 
found, as expected, for H1. 
4) The Promotion of Human Development    
In no case, regardless of how national power was measured or whether hegemons were 
included or excluded, was coup event history found to mediate the relationship between 
the distribution of power and state-building progression. 
5) The Shaping of a National Identity    
Compelling evidence that coup event history mediates the relationship between relative 
power and state-building was found when state-building progression was measured in 
terms of how strongly nations and states converge. Tables 4.21 – 4.24 indicate that a 
statistically significant interaction effect exists when both GDP and GNP are used to 
measure national power. The inclusion or exclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons from 
models does not alter this finding. In all cases the value of β1 exceeded the value of β1+ 
β3, indicating that state-building advancement is more robust as states gain power relative 
to neighbors when there is no recent coup event, compared to when there is a history of 







Table 4.19: Interact – Coup History – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.20: Interact – Coup History – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table 4.21: Interact – Coup History – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.22: Interact – Coup History – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































Table 4.23: Interact – Coup History – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table 4.24: Interact – Coup History – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































4.3   Assessing the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building 
Early in section 4.2 I noted the apparent complexity of the chapter’s findings. For one 
thing, the fact that national power is measured three different ways (using CINC scores, 
GDP, and GNP) might seem to make it difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions 
about interaction effects given that results tend to vary across measures. However, as 
addressed above, interpretation becomes quite manageable (and more appropriately 
undertaken) when results associated with each of my three measures of national power 
are assessed separately and not directly compared. At least not in a first cut. In other 
words, it makes more sense to select a single measure of national power (again, my 
preferred measure is GNP) and draw conclusions about interaction effects based upon 
findings generated when that particular measure was employed. The alternative approach 
– attempting to compare results across measures of national power and then throwing up 
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one’s hands and declaring the findings of Chapter 4 meaningless or hopelessly lacking in 
credibility because results were found to vary – makes considerably less sense. 
 With the aim of bringing together the findings of Chapter 4 and making the 
interpretation of results a bit easier, I have created two summary tables. Both tables are 
divided into three columns – one for each measure of national power (CINC scores, GDP, 
and GNP). The first summary table is designed to depict the circumstances under which 
support was or was not found for Hypothesis 1. Recall that H1 predicted that state-
building progression would be less robust when relative strengthening was coupled with 
greater levels of neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, erosion of the norm of 
sovereignty/non-intervention, and domestic instability. Interpretation of the table is 
straightforward, with a checkmark indicating support for the hypothesis, an “X” 
indicating the hypothesis was rejected, and an empty field indicating the absence of a 


















While the summary table above neatly presents the circumstances under which H1 
was corroborated or rejected, it does not depict whether state-building actually advanced 
or declined in absolute terms as a result of relative power – moderator interactions; it 
only indicates whether or not state-building declined more in the presence or absence of 
certain moderating circumstances. State-building, for example, may have been found to 
advance in absolute terms whether or not a state recently experienced a coup event; this is 
valuable information not captured by the summary table. Instead, all that is discernible 
from the table is whether state-building progression held up better in the face of a recent 
coup event or in its absence. Whether or not state-building advanced or declined in 
absolute terms is unknowable. 
To remedy this issue I have produced a second results table, found below. 
Interpretation is straightforward and is as follows: A field containing a “plus” mark 
indicates that state-building was found to advance. A “minus” indicates decline. By way 
of example, consider where state-building is associated with the monopolization of 
force/provision of security and the distribution of power is calculated using GNP: state-
building is found to advance (indicated by a “plus”) where relative strengthening is 
coupled with the absence of domestic instability, but decline (indicated by a “minus”) 
where it is not.  
Recall, moreover, that a primary objective of Chapter 4 was to shed a bit more light 
on the specific findings of Chapter 3. Where, for example, Chapter 3 found that the 
relative distribution of power by itself did not impact the state-building process, did that 
finding change when certain moderator variables were introduced? Similarly, where 
relative power alone was found to affect state-building progression, what impact if any 
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were moderator variables found to have on that relationship? In short, the findings of 
Chapter 4 need to be meshed with those of Chapter 3. To visually depict whether or not 
(and if so, how) the findings of Chapter 3 changed when moderator variables were 
introduced, I have color-coded the results table below. Fields colored orange identify 
areas where a relationship between relative power and state-building only materialized 
once moderator variables were added to models.  In other words, areas where Chapter 3 
failed to show that relative power by itself had any statistically significant impact on 
state-building progression. Fields colored blue identify areas where relative power alone 
was found by Chapter 3 to have a statistically significant impact on state-building 
progression. The question in these cases is whether the introduction of moderator 
variables altered how state-building progression was impacted.   
For ease of comparison I re-post results tables from Chapter 3. Recall that a 
checkmark indicates support for a hypothesis, and an empty field indicates the absence of 
a statistically significant relationship. The three hypotheses from Chapter 3 are re-posed 
below. Recall that I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 1, and accept Hypotheses 2-
3. 
 
H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-
building progression will increase as states lose power relative to neighbors. 
 
H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-
building progression will decrease as states lose power relative to neighbors. 
 
H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to 
their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors. 
Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states as they gain power 






















In all, perhaps most noticeable about the two summary tables of results are the large 
number of fields that are empty, indicating that moderator variables often had no 
statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship. Yet 
although my four moderator variables were overall not as influential as expected, and did 
not at all times alter the relative power – state-building relationship in the direction 
predicted, some clearly behaved as expected more often than others. Moreover, the extent 
to which state-building was impacted by an interaction between the distribution of power 
and moderator variables varied across my five components of state-building. Summary 
findings are as follows:  
 Mattering least among the four moderator variables was the degree of reverence for 
the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention which was scarcely found to affect the 
relative power – state building relationship; its interaction with the independent 
variable affected just one of five components of state-building when national power 
was measured using CINC scores, and had no impact on any component of state-
building when GDP and GNP were employed.  
 Mattering most among the four moderator variables was border vulnerability which, 
when interacted with the independent variable, was found to affect three components 
of state-building when CINC scores were used to measure national power, and four 
components of state-building when GDP and GNP were used.  
 Regardless of how national power was measured (using CINC scores, GDP, or GNP), 
moderator variables were more likely to matter when state-building was associated 
with the regulation of social-economic life and the forging of a national identity, and 
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less likely to matter when associated with the monopolization of force, the provision 
of infrastructure, and the promotion of human development. 
Not only does the summary table help to flesh out which moderator variables most 
often impacted the relative power – state-building relationship, or which components of 
state-building were most frequently affected, but it also neatly lays out how interactions 
between moderators and the independent variable were found to impact state-building 
progression. A complete rundown of results need not be recited again – however there are 
a few general takeaways worth mentioning: 
CINC  
 In no instance did the neighborhood conflict, international norms, or domestic 
instability moderators impact the relative power – state-building relationship the way 
H1 predicted they would. 
 Border vulnerability was the moderator variable that most consistently affected the 
relative power – state-building relationship as expected. 
 No moderator variable was found to impact the relationship between relative power 
position and the forging of a national identity as expected.  
GDP 
 Neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, and international norms moderator 
variables were in no places found to impact the relative power – state-building 
relationship in the way H1 anticipated. 
 When found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship, the domestic 
instability moderator in every case did so as predicted by H1. 
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  In no case was any moderator variable found to impact the relationship between 
relative power and how effectively states monopolize force and provide security to 
their populations. 
GNP 
 The border vulnerability moderator variable was found to impact the relationship 
between relative power and four components of state-building, but never as predicted 
by H1. 
 The neighborhood conflict moderator variable was found to have a statistically 
significant effect on the relationship between relative power and just one component 
of state-building, while the international norms moderator variable was never found 
to affect the relationship between relative power and state-building. 
 Domestic instability was found to impact the relationship between relative power and 
four of five components of state-building; in every case it did so as H1 predicted. 
In all, the primary surprise of Chapter 4 was how infrequently moderator variables 
were found to affect the relationship between relative power and state-building. The 
results, otherwise, were mostly predictable. Although all four moderator variables were 
expected to impact the relative power – state-building relationship, it makes sense that 
some were found to do so more often than others. It is not a surprise that reverence for 
the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention was found to have the scarcest impact, given 
that the pre-to-post Cold War shift in the norm has been subtle; while the norm has 
arguably weakened in the previous 20 years, it has certainly not eroded entirely. 
Domestic instability, on the other hand, poses a clear threat to regime security. Finding 
that it commonly impacted the relative power – state-building relationship was therefore 
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not surprising. Equally predictable was the frequency with which the border vulnerability 
moderator variable was found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship. 
Yet it often did not do so as expected. While results were in line with expectations with 
CINC scores were employed to measure national power, the use of GDP and GNP  
produced results indicating that state-building progression was more robust when relative 
strengthening was coupled with longer borders than shorter borders. This finding is 
confounding, given that longer borders should heighten regime insecurity and incentivize 
regimes to pursue policies that run counter to the interests of state-building.  
4.4  Summary and Conclusion 
Briefly put, the objective of Chapter 4 was to take the findings of Chapter 3 and add 
context. While the findings of Chapter 3 showed that, in places, the distribution of power 
appears to matter to state-building, little was said about any additional circumstances that 
cause it to matter more or less. Chapter 4 set out to address this deficit by assessing how 
the impact of the regional distribution of power on state-building progression changes 
contingent upon four moderator variables: neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, 
international norms, and domestic instability. In short, Chapter 4 aimed to shed light on 
when and where relative power matters the most. Chapter 5, the final chapter of this 
dissertation, has three objectives: to briefly review the arguments and findings of the 
dissertation; to assess possible policy implications of the findings; and to suggest new 





5.0  Introduction 
State-building has received a good deal of attention from academics, policy-makers, and 
non-governmental organizations alike. Yet despite the time and resources that have been 
dedicated to understanding and advancing state-building, gaps remain in our knowledge, 
and performance across the Global South has been spotty. Over the course of the 
previous four chapters I have moved to fill in some of these gaps and make a contribution 
toward solving the puzzle of why state-building has advanced in some places at certain 
times, but stagnated or declined in others. In other words, I have shed some light on the 
causes of state-building variation in the Global South. In doing so I have moved beyond 
the two approaches commonly found in the literature: those which look exclusively inside 
a state to make sense of its state-building performance, and those which look to a state’s 
relationship with the Global North – often emphasizing themes of neocolonialism. 
Instead, I have focused on an area that has received considerably less empirical analysis 
and is not well-understood – that is, the effect of region on state-building. In doing so I 
accepted the need to take seriously the role of domestic politics, but argued that state-
building performance is best understood when public policy decisions are seen to at least 
partially reflect the politics between states, namely those that share borders.  
 The initial objective of Chapter 5 is to briefly review the main theoretical 
arguments and findings of the previous four chapters. Having done so, I will then 
conclude the dissertation by suggesting a few paths for future research in the area of 
state-building. While state-building to date has received a tremendous amount of 
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attention, there remain important areas yet to be adequately explored, and questions yet to 
be adequately answered.  
5.1  How & Why Relative Power Impacts State-Building: Theory & Findings 
In my explanation of variation in state-building performance in the Global South, I have 
taken seriously the role played by domestic politics, but argued that state-building 
performance is even better understood when domestic political behavior is seen to at least 
partially reflect the politics between states. But before incorporating the role played by 
neighbors into my analysis of state-building performance, I first attempted to provide 
some order to the debate about which domestic factors are most responsible for state-
building success or failure by categorizing explanations into two groups: those which are 
agency-oriented, and those which are structure-oriented. Both approaches look inside the 
state to account for state-building performance, but emphasize different variables. 
Agency approaches emphasize the role of political elites and the decisions they make – 
decisions often said to be motivated by self-interest or greed, and running counter to the 
imperatives of state-building. Structural approaches are more inclined to assume that 
political elites have benevolent intentions and do seek to build their states, but confront 
barriers they did not create and have trouble overcoming. Artificially-drawn borders at 
the turn of the twentieth century, the divide-and-rule tactics of colonial powers, 
exploitative economic relationships with the Global North, strong societies, restive border 
areas, and geographical boundaries that are either too large or too small for viable 
statehood are among the reasons cited by structuralists for subpar state-building in the 
Global South. While both approaches have their merits, I have argued that neither is by 
itself able to adequately explain state-building’s successes and failures; structural 
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explanations are invariably too deterministic, while agency approaches tend to ignore 
very real structural obstacles and overstate what political elites can realistically be 
expected to deliver. In fact, I argued that a more complete understanding of where and 
why state-building succeeds or fails requires that agency be considered alongside 
structure, and vice-versa. Political elites after all make decisions that impact state-
building, but those decisions are informed by the structural environments they confront.  
 Having argued that state-building progression hinges on the dynamic between 
agency and structure, I then went on to hypothesize that international politics might 
influence that dynamic in such a way as to facilitate state-building advancement in some 
cases, and stagnation or decline in others. Specifically, I suggested that the way power is 
distributed in a region may either be facilitative or detrimental to state-building 
progression. My suggestion that an external variable might influence internal politics in 
such a way as to affect state-building is not new; Charles Tilly argued that the constant 
threat of state-annihilating war did just that in early-modern Europe. Yet changes to the 
rules that govern the international system have rendered Tilly’s model nearly irrelevant 
today. In fact, whereas Tilly contended that chronic international insecurity in early-
modern Europe altered agency-structure dynamics in ways conducive to state-building, I 
have argued and attempted to demonstrate that international insecurity has actually had 
the opposite effect on state-building in today’s Global South. In short, without 
abandoning the idea that international politics can influence the internal agency-structure 
dynamics of states (and, with it, state-building progression), I have tried to modify Tilly 
for the twenty-first century. 
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To that end, I hypothesized that regimes in charge of states at relative power 
advantages vis-à-vis their neighbors would be more proficient state-builders than those in 
charge of states at parity. And regimes in charge of states at parity with their neighbors 
would be more proficient state-builders than those in charge of relatively weak states. In 
making these predictions I accepted two premises: First, no longer faced with the threat 
of defeat on the battlefield followed by incorporation and subjugation, regimes today 
have less incentive to make long-term and costly investments in increasing state capacity, 
and populations have less incentive to turn to the regimes in charge of states for 
protection. With state survival all but guaranteed, chronically insecure regimes facing 
multiple structural threats at home have turned first and foremost to ensuring their own 
survival. To that end, regimes have favored a strategy of personal rule and shunned 
political and economic institutionalism. While in the near-term such a strategy may 
buttress regime security, it is highly detrimental to state-building.  And second, while 
state survival is no longer credibly threatened by neighbors, regime survival is. Regimes 
consequently have good reason to fear their neighbors. A regime surrounded by more 
powerful states should feel a heightened sense of insecurity and, with it, a greater urgency 
to prioritize personal rule at the expense of governance through institutions. 
Overall, results of tests assessing the impact of relative power on state-building 
were a mixed bag; strong support was found for my hypotheses when state-building was 
associated with the regulation of social and economic life, the provision of infrastructure 
services, and the promotion of human development. Yet results failed to meet the 
threshold of statistical significance when state-building was measured in terms of the 
forging of a national identity or the monopolization of force and provision of security. 
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Having showed that relative power, in places, does appear to influence state-building 
progression, I set out to add context to my findings. I did so by testing whether or not 
relative power matters more or less in the presence or absence of certain moderator 
variables. In cases, moderators were found to matter. Border length and domestic 
instability, for example, were often found to affect how the regional distribution of power 
impacted state-building. Yet in all, moderator variables failed to impact the relationship 
between relative power and state-building as comprehensively as I expected.  
While the regional distribution of power was in places found to impact state-
building, all in all it did not do so as robustly or comprehensively as I had expected. It is 
interesting to consider whether and in which direction my findings might change in the 
years ahead. Naturally, if the interstate environment in sub-Saharan Africa remains as it 
is today, there is good reason to expect my findings to hold up going forward. Yet Africa 
could conceivably one day see considerably more inter-state violence than it has to this 
point; many of the so-called correlates of war exist on the continent. Should this happen 
and by extension neighbors become more threatening, it may be that a replication of my 
study would produce findings more strongly in line with my hypotheses.   
5.2  Pathways for Future Research in the Area of State-Building 
5.2a  The Role of Region 
State-building in general has hardly been a research area neglected by academics. In fact, 
it is a poster child for cross-disciplinary research, studied by economists, historians, 
political scientists, sociologists, and others. Yet despite the attention paid to state-
building, particular aspects remain understudied. Most glaring is the impact on state-
building of region – an oversight that I have attempted to address in this dissertation. Yet 
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what I have done – looking at how the regional distribution of power affects state-
building performance – only scratches the surface. As additional paths tying region to 
state-building are explored, our understanding of where, when, and why state-building 
advances, stagnates, or declines will surely increase. 
 One obvious approach is to move beyond relative power and explore the impact 
of additional region-specific cross-border variables on state-building progression. When 
done at all, this has too often been carried out superficially, without rigorous empirical 
assessment. We may have an idea about which types of cross-border variables affect 
state-building performance, but we do not always know for certain that they do so, how 
they do so, or when they do so. To take one component of state-building and provide an 
example, it is believed that cross-border refugee flows can affect a state’s capacity to 
forge a sense of national identity. But do refugee flows help or hurt? On the one hand, 
refugees have the potential to antagonize existing ethnic cleavages in recipient states. On 
the other hand, refugees could serve as an out-group against which citizens of recipient 
states might unite. Additionally, to what extent do refugee flows advance or retard state-
building progress? Does the size of the refugee flow matter? Are there additional 
circumstances that cause refugee flows to matter more or less? And does strength or 
weakness in other components of state-building offset or accelerate the effect of refugee 
flows on the state’s capacity to shape national identity? Depending on the component of 
state-building being assessed, other possible region-specific cross-border variables worth 
looking at include the four used as moderator variables in this dissertation, the volume of 
bilateral trade with neighbors, the magnitude of civil conflict in neighboring states, the 
ethnic make-up of neighboring states, and whether or not political elites in charge of 
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neighboring states share an ethnicity. In short, our understanding of state-building would 
benefit from a greater emphasis on how region affects state-building, namely a more 
comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the regional cross-border variables believed to 
do so. Ultimately this might enable us to predict which states are most and least likely to 
make state-building advances simply by looking at their neighbors. 
5.2b  State-Building and Democratization 
This dissertation has focused nearly exclusively on the effect of an external variable – the 
regional distribution of power – on an internal process – state-building. Yet an area ripe 
for additional research is how state-building progression affects the trajectory of another 
internal process – democratization. The process of democratization has received a lot of 
attention in recent years in light of the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and 
more recently the 2010 Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa. And 
prior to these events, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, the international system underwent what Samuel Huntington called democracy’s 
“third wave.” In Central and Eastern Europe, former satellites of the Soviet Union, upon 
receiving their independence, rejected authoritarianism and began to meander down the 
path of democratization. A similar thing happened in South America as authoritarian 
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile were removed from power and replaced 
with governments at least ostensibly committed to democracy. The literature has 
extensively examined these transitions with the objective of developing a theory that 
explains and predicts when and where a democratic transition is likely to be initiated, and 
under what conditions democracy is likely to be consolidated. 
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 Sometimes overlooked is that Africa in the 1990s underwent its own transition. 
Michael Bratton calculates that between 1985 and 1989, only nine African states held 
competitive legislative elections. Moreover, of these nine, four were marred by state 
interference or other irregularities.
1
 In contrast, Freedom House now classifies 23 states 
in sub-Saharan Africa as at least partially democratic. Clearly, substantial political 
liberalization has occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in a relatively short amount of time. 
Yet, while the old days of unapologetic authoritarianism across the continent have waned, 
democracies have in most cases not yet become consolidated.
2
  Using Freedom House 
classifications, sub-Saharan Africa hosts just eight consolidated democracies. Instead, 
many states remain in democratic limbo; they are no longer entirely authoritarian, yet the 
transition to democracy has not been completed.
3
 The question is whether consolidation 
is a near-term possibility, or whether indefinite limbo or reversal of democratic gains is 
more likely.  
 At one time it was conventional wisdom that the initiation, sustainability, and 
consolidation of a democratic transition required a country to possess certain internal 
characteristics. Often associated with Seymour Martin Lipset, the pre-condition approach 
held that neither democratic transitions nor consolidation were possible in states lacking a 
certain level of socio-economic development. States, it was argued, must be 
industrialized, urbanized, have high GDPs, and possess educated populations. Yet 
scholars began to chip away at Lipset’s pre-condition approach. Dankwart Rustow, for 
                                                 
1
 Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 1 
(1997): 90. 
2
 Linz and Stepan consider democracy consolidated when its practice has become routinized and 
internalized in social, institutional, and psychological life. That is, when democracy has become “the only 
game in town.” Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5. 
3
 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 8. 
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example, contended that just one condition was necessary for transition and consolidation 
– national unity.
4
 And more recently it has become popular to disregard the pre-condition 
approach altogether and talk instead about agency, strategic choice, and the interactions 
and bargaining among elites that supposedly facilitate the process of democratization. 
 The strategic choice approach to explaining the initiation of democratic transitions 
is not entirely without its merits. Transitions do not materialize from thin air. They are 
driven by choices made by elites. Moreover, the fact that democratization has taken root 
at all in sub-Saharan Africa discredits the notion that the initiation of a transition does not 
occur absent a certain level of socio-economic development; of the world’s ten poorest 
countries, four have initiated (but not yet consolidated) a democratic transition. Still, 
focusing too heavily on agency and strategic choice at the expense of necessary pre-
conditions is a mistake. While the evidence indicates that transitions can be initiated in a 
variety of environments – socio-economically developed or not, nationally unified or not, 
formidable state capacity or not – longer-term democratic sustainability and consolidation 
requires more. Absent certain pre-conditions, preventing the rolling back of democratic 
gains and ultimately consolidating democracy becomes extremely difficult. 
 Existing research to this effect could use more precision. It is one thing to argue 
that the consolidation of democracy is rare absent certain pre-conditions, but how many 
of these pre-conditions are necessary, and how much of each? At what stage of the state-
building process, for example, is democracy optimally introduced, not only to minimize 
the risk of a transition being reversed, but also to minimize the time between the initiation 
of the transition and consolidation? While it is useful to know that democracy is more 
                                                 
4
 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, 
no. 3 (1970): 350. 
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likely to survive and ultimately be consolidated where force is monopolized by the state, 
human development is promoted, social and economic life is regulated, infrastructure is 
in good repair, and convergence between nations and state is strong, how much of these 
things are necessary? In other words, at what stage of each component of state-building 
does the initiation of a democratic transition optimally occur? By now enough democratic 
transitions have been initiated, reversed, consolidated, or have languished somewhere 
between authoritarianism and consolidation to enable a more detailed and substantive 
discussion of democracy’s pre-conditions.  
5.2c  State-Building and the Need for Conceptual Clarity 
As I discussed at some length in Chapter 1, no consensus is found in the literature as to 
what precisely constitutes state-building. Naturally, therefore, how state-building ought to 
be measured is also disputed. This has made theory-building difficult. In an attempt to 
overcome this problem, I suggested a definition and measurement criteria guided by a 
single theme: what are the most basic tasks a state must carry out in order to avoid the 
worst possible fate for itself and its population – that is, state failure or collapse. In doing 
so I identified five tasks. This was my best effort to produce a definition and 
measurement technique oriented around something meaningful – avoiding state-failure – 
yet also broad enough to capture what the immensely complex undertaking of state-
building entails. I am confident that my approach is superior to those which, for the sake 
of methodological neatness, rely on a single proxy variable such as tax extraction or 
political liberalization to measure the progression of state-building. I am not convinced 
beyond doubt, however, that my five components are superior to all others that might be 
imagined, or even that there are only five components. Moreover, I am not convinced that 
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it is impossible to adequately capture “state-building” with a single proxy variable. I have 
only yet to come across one that works. The point is that I have done my best to provide 
some order to a messy literature. Going forward, the generation of more meaningful 
theories about state-building requires that additional work be done in this regard. 
 A final question worth considering addresses the extent to which state-building 
should be considered a “process” at all. I have suggested that state-building be thought of 
in terms of five component parts. Others might suggest another number, but in any case it 
would be worthwhile to understand how each component part relates to the others. How, 
for example, does strength or weakness in one component of state-building affect the 
strength or weakness of the other components? How strong are these relationships, and 
which components seem to be most and least closely related? In attempting to develop 
the state, which components should be prioritized, and in what order? If we were to find, 
for example, that the regulation of social and economic life suffers considerably absent a 
monopolization of the legitimate use of force, but holds up equally well whether or not 
convergence has formed between nations and the state, this would not only shed light on 
how precisely state-building advancement ultimately unfolds, but where domestic and 
foreign resources should be devoted. 
5.2d  State-Building Research and the Problem of Data Quality 
State-building is a subject ripe for additional research, and the preceding pages of this 
chapter have suggested a handful of paths it might take. Yet, arguably, nothing would do 
more to advance the possibilities for and quality of research in state-building than the 
availability of higher-quality data. As it is, much of the data available on countless 
aspects of state behavior and performance – from military expenditures, to literacy rates, 
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to the number of fixed phone lines per 1,000 people – comes from the state itself; the 
quality of the data, therefore, depends on how seriously the state takes the collection of 
statistics. Perhaps not surprisingly, data quality is believed to vary along with a state’s 
wealth and stability. As states become richer and more stable, the quality of their data 
collection processes improve. And, conversely, impoverished, fragile states produce 
poorer quality data. The problem for the state-building research agenda is of course that 
researchers tend to be most interested in the very states that are least equipped to collect 
and provide high-quality data. The integrity of research findings may therefore be 
compromised as conclusions are drawn based on available data that is of low-quality, or 
from outputs generated by statistical procedures that non-randomly select out states from 
datasets due to missing data.
5
 
 The data quality problem is one with which any student of state-building who opts 
for a quantitative research project must contend, and I certainly have here. Where 
possible, however, I have taken steps to minimize risk. I have selected measures of 
variables that are inclusive; data on the quality and availability of education was my 
preferred way to measure how well states promote human development, but the number 
of states with missing data was large enough that I opted instead for an alternative. In an 
effort to mitigate the possibility of relying entirely on low-quality data, when possible I 
measured my variables with multiple sources of data. To take infrastructure provision as 
an example, rather than rely solely on the number of fixed telephone lines per 1,000 
people, I also incorporated the percentage of the population with access to clean water. 
Similarly, how well states regulate social and economic life is calculated from multiple 
                                                 
5
 For a very good discussion of the problems caused by poor data quality and availability in the Global 




measures. The goal is to refrain from putting all my eggs in one basket. Still, despite 
whatever precautions were taken, there will justifiably be questions about the credibility 
of this dissertation’s findings. Key to high-quality research on state-building going 
forward is the availability of high-quality data. 
5.3  Policy Implications of the Dissertation’s Findings 
The findings of this dissertation may be of most interest to those working on development 
issues in the Global South. Unfortunately, the findings indicate that the entity best-
positioned to promote development – the regime in charge of the state – is often inclined 
to favor policies that do harm rather than help. This makes solutions to the development 
deficit in the Global South more difficult to come by, as simply providing more foreign 
aid to regimes in charge of underdeveloped states is unlikely to generate much return. 
Problematically, threatening structural environments confronted by political elites are 
what drive the decision to opt for self-serving and development-adverse policies, yet 
there is little appetite in the international community for solutions relied upon long ago to 
make structure more manageable. Jeffrey Herbst’s provocative call, however serious he 
was, to “give war a chance” is a non-starter. Certainly any extension of Mohammed 
Ayoob’s argument that state-building is an inherently violent process incompatible with 
international human rights norms is a non-starter. And both great power politics and the 
preferences of regimes in charge of states in the Global South take the option of boundary 
changes by way of secession or irredentism off the table. Still, although any advancement 
in state-building is likely to be marginal in much of the Global South given that the threat 
posed by structure to regimes is unlikely to dissipate in any near-term future, there are 
policy options available that may help around the edges. 
171 
 
 First, foreign development aid channeled through the state should be targeted at 
states with structural conditions that pose the least threat to regimes. Aid to these states is 
more likely to be used as intended. For similar reasons, given how the regional 
distribution of power was found to affect state-building progression, the provision of 
foreign aid to states that are preponderant relative to neighbors should receive priority 
over states that are comparatively weak. Yet another option for providers of foreign aid is 
to bypass the state all-together and channel resources toward community development. In 
doing so, the risk that the state will misuse funds intended for development is alleviated. 
The downsides, however, are that state capacity can be further undermined, states are 
often resistant to development initiatives they have been frozen out of, and effective 
community development projects require community organization and a high level of 
social capital – qualities at times in short supply. 
 5.4  Summary and Conclusion 
The final chapter of this dissertation first reviewed the theoretical arguments and findings 
of the previous four chapters. It then touched on possible paths for future research in the 
area of state-building and concluded with a brief section on the policy implications of my 
findings. With much of the world in the relatively early stages of state-building, the 
subject is sure to remain relevant for quite some time. The better it is understood, the 
more effectively those in a position to help can do so. In exploring an international 
dimension to state-building beyond the usual two areas of focus – how might foreign aid 
help today, and how war helped centuries ago – I have hopefully brought to light new 




Appendix: Replications with Prais-Winsten GLS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, my dissertation relies on time-series data which is commonly 
characterized by autocorrelation. Indeed, Durbin-Watson tests consistently indicate the 
presence of autocorrelation in my data. Yet the data is not only time-series, but also 
cross-sectional, making testing for and diagnosing of autocorrelation considerably more 
complicated. Rather than ignore the possibility that autocorrelated data has skewed my 
results, I correct for it using the Prais-Winsten method of generalized least squares 
regression. As it turns out, results generated from models employing OLS and Prais-
Winsten are very often consistent. Results of the Prais-Winsten replications are found 
below – first those for Chapter 3, followed by those for Chapter 4. 
A.1   Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3 
Recall that the objective of Chapter 3 was to test the relationship between relative power 
position and state-building progression. Three hypotheses were submitted and I expected 
to be able to reject H1, but accept H2-3.  
H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. 
 
H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. 
 
H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to 
their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage. 
It turns out that swapping OLS regression for Prais-Winsten GLS did not change 
results when state-building was measured in terms of the monopolization of force and 
provision of security, the regulation of social and economic life, or the provision of 
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infrastructure services. Results did change when state-building was associated with the 
promotion of human development and the forging of a national identity, but only slightly; 
in both instances, results of the Prais-Winsten replications corresponded with those 
generated by models using OLS when GDP and GNP were employed to measure national 
power, but diverged when CINC scores were used. Results tables are found below. 
A.1a  The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security
Table A.1: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table A.2: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



























































A.1b  The Regulation of Social and Economic Life 
Table A.3: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table A.4: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































A.1c  The Provision of Infrastructure 
Table A.5: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 

























































Table A.6: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 


















































A.1d  The Promotion of Human Development 
Table A.7: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table A.8: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 


























































A.1e  The Shaping of a National Identity 
Table A.9: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (with hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































Table A.10: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (without hegemons) 
Variable 
CINC GDP GNP 
B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value B S.E. P-Value 



















































A.2  A Summary of  the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3 
The summary table below concisely captures the extent of support found for each of my 
three hypotheses when Prais-Winsten GLS was employed. An empty cell indicates that 
no statistically significant relationship was found, and a checkmark indicates that support 





CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Monopolize Force –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Social/Economic Life –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
Provide Infrastructure –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 
Human Development – 
with Hegemons 
         
Human Development –    
ex Hegemons 
         
 
Measure 
CINC GDP GNP 
H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 




      
National Identity –      
ex Hegemons 
         
 
A.3   Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4 
Recall that the objective of Chapter 4 was to test whether or not relative power affects 
state-building differently in the presence or absence of four moderator variables: 
neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, international norms, and domestic instability. 
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Tests in Chapter 4 employed ordinary least squares regression, but are replicated here 
using Prais-Winsten GLS. Results do not diverge profoundly; while statistical 
significance at times emerges or erodes depending on whether OLS or Prais-Winsten is 
employed, all findings that are statistically significant across both methods of regression 
are consistent. In other words, beyond the emergence or erosion of statistical 
significance, results never change as OLS is swapped for Prais-Winsten. Results tables 
are found below. 
A.3a  Neighborhood Conflict 
Recall that H1 read as follows:  
As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be more 
muted when there is a recent history of neighborhood conflict than when there is no 
recent history of neighborhood conflict. 
Overwhelmingly, results generated by models employing OLS correspond to those 
generated by models employing Prais-Winsten. Results diverge in just one instance – 
where state-building is assessed in terms of the strength of convergence between nations 
and state, GDP is used to measure national power, and hegemons are selected out (Tables 
A.13 and A.14). Here, results become statistically significant when Prais-Winsten is 
employed, whereas they were not when OLS was used. Counter to the prediction of H1, 
the value of β1 is smaller than the value of β1+ β3, indicating that relative power gains 
coupled with a history of neighborhood conflict leads to more robust state-building 




Table A.11: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.12: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.13: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.14: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































Table A.15: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.16: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































A.3b  Border Vulnerability 
Recall that H1 read as follows: 
H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be 
less robust in states with longer borders than in states with shorter borders. 
Again, results generated when Prais-Winsten was applied largely mirror those generated 
by OLS. There are just two instances where results diverged, and in both cases results 
that were statistically significant when OLS was employed became insignificant when 
Prais-Winsten was applied. First, where state-building is assessed in terms of 
infrastructure provision and CINC scores are used to measure national power, and again 
where state-building is associated with the promotion of human development and GDP is 
used to calculate national power (Tables A.17 – A.20). The complete set of tables below 
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lay out how border vulnerability and the regional distribution of power were found to 
interact and affect state-building.  
Table A.17: Interact – Border Length – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.18: Interact – Border Length – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.19: Interact – Border Length – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



























































Table A.20: Interact – Border Length – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.21: Interact – Border Length – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.22: Interact – Border Length – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































A.3c  International Norms 
Recall that H1 read as follows: 
H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be 




Once again, results generated by models employing OLS almost always correspond to 
those generated by models employing Prais-Winsten. Results diverge in just two 
instances: first, where state-building is assessed in terms of the strength of convergence 
between nations and state and CINC scores are used to measure national power, and 
again where relative power is calculated using GNP (Tables A.23 and A.27 – A.28). In 
both cases, results become statistically significant when Prais-Winsten is employed, 
whereas they were not when OLS was utilized. And in both cases the value of β1 was 
unexpectedly greater than the value of β1+ β3, indicating that a more favorable relative 
power position is associated with more robust state-building in the post-Cold War era 
than when the Cold War was ongoing. This finding contradicts H1. Complete results for 
all five components of state-building are found below. 
Table A.23: Interact – Cold War – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.24: Interact – Cold War – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































Table A.25: Interact – Cold War – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.26: Interact – Cold War – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.27: Interact – Cold War – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.28: Interact – Cold War – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 























































A.3d  Domestic Instability 
Recall that H1 read as follows: 
H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be 
less robust in states with greater domestic insecurity than in states with less domestic 
insecurity. 
The results of tests conducted using OLS and Prais-Winsten again largely mirror each 
other, although of my four moderator variables, divergence is greatest when domestic 
instability is interacted with relative power. When CINC scores were employed to 
calculate national power and state-building was measured in terms of the promotion of 
human development, results became statistically significant (and substantiated H1) when 
Prais-Winsten was employed, whereas they failed to meet the threshold of significance 
when OLS was used. When CINC scores were swapped for GDP and the provision of 
infrastructure was assessed, results that were significant when OLS was employed 
became insignificant when Prais-Winsten was applied. And when GNP was used to 
measure national power, statistical significance eroded somewhat when Prais-Winsten 
was utilized and state-building was associated with the provision of infrastructure and the 
forging of a national identity, but increased when associated with the monopolization of 
force and provision of security. Complete results of the Prais-Winsten replications are 






Table A.29: Interact – Coup History – CINC – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.30: Interact – Coup History – CINC – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.31: Interact – Coup History – GDP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 




















































Table A.32: Interact – Coup History – GDP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 






















































Table A.33: Interact – Coup History – GNP – With Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































Table A.34: Interact – Coup History – GNP – Ex-Hegemons 
Dependent Variable B1 S.E. B2 S.E. B3 S.E. F Sig N 
Monopolize Force/Security 
Regulate Social/Economic Life 
Infrastructure 
Human Development 



















































A.4   A Summary of  the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4 
In all, results seldom diverged when OLS was swapped for Prais-Winsten GLS. With the 
aim of making the interpretation of results presented above a bit easier, I have again 
created two summary tables. Both tables are divided into three columns – one for each 
measure of national power (CINC scores, GDP, and GNP). The first summary table is 
designed to depict the circumstances under which support was or was not found for 
Hypothesis 1. Recall that H1 predicted that state-building progression would be less 
robust when relative strengthening was coupled with greater levels of neighborhood 
conflict, border vulnerability, erosion of the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention, and 
domestic instability. Interpretation of the table is straightforward, with a checkmark 
indicating support for the hypothesis, an “X” indicating the hypothesis was rejected, and 
an empty field indicating the absence of a statistically significant interaction. I include the 
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results of tests employing both OLS and Prais-Winsten to make interpretation easier. The 
first summary table is found below.                                                                                      
 
 
          
 
 






Recall the closing pages of Chapter 4 in which I generated a table depicting whether 
state-building advanced or declined in absolute terms as a result of relative power – 
moderator interactions, not only whether it declined more in the presence or absence of 
certain moderating circumstances. I again do so, this time with the results of the Prais-
Winsten replications. Again, interpretation is straightforward and is as follows: A field 
containing a “plus” mark indicates that state-building was found to advance. A “minus” 
indicates decline. Fields colored orange identify areas where a relationship between 
relative power and state-building only materialized once moderator variables were added 
to models.  In other words, areas where relative power by itself failed to have a 
statistically significant impact on state-building progression. Fields colored blue identify 
areas where relative power alone was found to have a statistically significant impact on 
state-building progression. The question in these cases is whether the introduction of 
moderator variables altered how state-building progression was impacted.   
For ease of comparison I re-post results tables from the Chapter 3 Prais-Winsten 
replications. Recall that a checkmark indicates support for a hypothesis, and an empty 
field indicates the absence of a statistically significant relationship. The three hypotheses 
from Chapter 3 are re-posed below. Recall that I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 
1, and accept Hypotheses 2-3. 
 
H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-
building progression will increase as states lose power relative to neighbors. 
 
H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative 
to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-




H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to 
their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors. 
Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states as they gain power 














































A.5  Summary and Conclusion 
To account for the possibility that my data are autocorrelated, I re-ran tests conducted in 
Chapters 3 and 4, this time applying Prais-Winsten GLS rather than ordinary least 
squares regression. In this appendix I have reported the results of those tests. While the 
problem of autocorrelation may be overstated given that my data is cross-sectional, it 
turns out, in any case, that the Prais-Winsten replications do not diverge all that much 
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